The intention of the parties in express contracts is, in the first instance, embodied in the words which the parties have used and is to be deduced therefrom.1 If the contract is in writing, the intention of the parties is to be deduced from the written words if possible.2

7 "Seldom are any two exactly alike and precedents are of little value." Hoffmann v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383.

8Jersey City v. Flynn, 74 N. J. Eq. 104, 70 Atl. 497.

1 United States. Rockefeller v. Mer-ritt, 76 Fed. 909, 35 L. R. A. 633, 22 C. C. A. 608; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 236 Fed. 433, 149 C. C. A. 485; President Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam, 238 Fed. 159, 151 C. C. A. 235 [affirming decree, President Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam, 233 Fed. 433]; Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl 327.

Alabama. Davis v. Robert, 89 Ala. 402, 18 Am. .St. Rep. 126, 8 So. 114.

California. Schroeder v. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. 18, 84 Am. St. Rep. 17, 63 Pac. 1074.

Colorado. McDermith v. Voorhees, 16 Colo. 402, 25 Am. St. Rep. 286, 27 Pac. 250; Jennings v. Brotherhood Ace. Co., 44 Colo. 68, 96 Pac. 982.

Delaware. Adkins v. Campbell, 6 Del. 96, 64 Atl. 628.

Illinois. Atchison, etc., R. R. v. R. R., 162 111. 632, 35 L. R. A. 167, 44 N. E. 823; R. F. Conway Co. v. Chicago, 274 111. 369, 113 N. E. 703.

Indiana. Cravens v. Cotton Mills, 120 Ind. 6, 16 Am. St. Rep. 298, 21 N. E. 981.

Iowa. Heiple v. Reinhart, 100 la. 525, 69 N. W. 871 [superseding, 65 N. W. 331].

Kentucky. Louisville, etc., Ry. v. Ry., 100 Ky. 690, 39 S. W. 42.

Massachusetts. Yorston v. Brown, 178 Mass. 103, 59 X. E. 654.

Michigan. Mathews v. Phelps, 61 Mich. 327, 1 Am. St. Rep. 581, 28 N. W. 108; Hoose v. Ins. Co., 84 Mich. 309, 11 L. R. A. 340, 47 N. W. 587.

Missouri. Mas tin v. S toller, 107 Mo. 317, 17 S. W. 1011; Lovelace v. Protective Association, 126 Mo. 104, 47 Am. St. Rep. 638, 30 L. R. A. 209, 28 S. W. 877.

Nebraska. Jackson v. Phillips, 57 Neb. 189, 77 N. W. 683; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Brown (Neb.), 98 N. W. 697.

New Hampshire. Perry v. New England Casualty Co., 78 N. H. 346, 100 Atl. 605.

New Jersey. Chism v. Schipper, 51 N. J. L. 1, 14 Am. St. Rep. 668, 2 L. R. A. 544, 16 Atl. 316.

New Mexico. Ellis v. Stone, 21 N. M. 730, L. R. A. 1916F, 1228, 158 Pac. 480.

New York. Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 31, 2 Am. St. Rep. 362, 15 N. E. 70; Schoonmaker v. Hoyt, 148 N. Y. 425, 42 N. E. 1059; Berry Harvester Co. v. Machine Co., 152 N. Y. 540, 46 N. E. 952.

While the words used by the parties in their written contract are a part thereof, and each and every one of them must be considered in arriving at the intention of the parties, it does not necessarily follow that every word written on the paper when the contract is executed is a part thereof. Thus where a letter contained a proposition to pay for the manufacture and delivery of goods, and it was accepted by the party to whom it was sent by a letter, the words, "All sales subject to strikes and accidents," printed as part of the letterhead of the reply, do not form any part of the contract.3 This principle is still clearer where the words in question are on some paper other than that on which the contract is written. So if a contract of sale is in writing, the printed bill-head of the invoice of goods is no part thereof.4 The same principle applies where the contract is not in writing. Thus A, a manufacturer, had placed a printed warranty on wheels manufactured and sold by him. B bought a wheel and resold it without removing the placard. It was held that B did not thereby adopt A's warranty.1 These are really special examples of the application of the general doctrines of offer and acceptance.6 Words erased from a contract can not be considered in construing it.7

The rule that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the words which they have used, applies to oral contracts,8 as well as to contracts in writing.9 It is the rule which is recognized and applied by courts of equity,10 as well as by courts of law. It is frequently said that if the intention of the parties is so clearly expressed that it can be ascertained from a mere reading of the contract, there is no need for construction.11 In such statement, however, the term "construction" is evidently used in a very restricted sense. In the broad sense of the term, construction involves the discovery of the intention of the parties whether it is easy or difficult to discover such intention. In this sense of the term there is as much room for construction in case of a simple and unambiguous contract, as in the case of a complex and ambiguous contract, although the task is far easier in the former case than in the latter.

North Carolina. Finger v. Goode, 169 N. Car. 72, 85 S. E. 137.

North Dakota. Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N. D. 292, 152 N. W. 803.

Ohio. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Myers, 62 0. S. 529, 49 L. R. A. 760, 57 N. E. 458.

Oklahoma. Brown v. Coppadge, 54 Okla. 88, 153 Pac. 817; Union Trust Co. v. Shelby Downard Asphalt Co., 56 Okla. 251, 156 Pac. 903.

Virginia. Crane's Nest Coal & Coke Co. v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 105 Va. 785, 54 S. . 884.

West Virginia. Griffin v. Fairmount Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1115, 53 S. E. 24.

Wyoming. McFarland v. R. R., etc., Association, 5 Wyom. 126, 63 Am. St. Rep. 29, 27 L. R. A. 48, 38 Pac. 347,

677; Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyom. 41, 95 Pac. 846.

2 Streator Clay Mfg. Co. v. Henning-Vineyard Co., 176 Ia. 297, 155 N. W. 1001; Union Trust Co. v. Shelby-Downard Asphalt Co., 55 Okla. 251, 156 Pac. 903; Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N. D. 292, 152 N. W. 803.

3 Summers v. Hibbard, 153 111. 102, 46 Am. St. Rep. 872, 38 N. E. 899.

4 Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 1093.

5 Pemberton v. Dean, 88 Minn. 60, 97 Am. St. Rep. 503, 60 L. R. A. 311, 92 N. W. 478.

6 See Sec. 112 and 2040.

7 Straub v. Screven, 19 S. Car. 445; Watson v. Paschall, 93 S. Car. 537, 77 S. E. 291.

8Ins. Co. v. Crane, 134 Mass. 56, 45 Am. Rep. 282.