7 Emigrant Company v. Adams County, 100 U. S. 61, 25 L. ed. 563.

8 Havre De Grace Real Estate & Power Co. v. Havre De Grace, 102 Md. 33, 61 Atl. 662.

9 Benham v. Columbia Canal Co., 74 Wash. 110, 132 Pac. 884 (B was in default before A's performance was due).

10 Spokane Canal Co. v. Coffman, 54 Wash. 645, 103 Pac. 1106 (covenants to be performed at different times).

11 McMillan v. American Suburban Corporation, 136 Tenn. 53, L. R. A. 1917B, 401, 188 S. W. 615.

12 Crampton v. McLaughlin Realty Co., 51 Wash. 525, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 823, 99 Pac. 586.

13 Cheney v. Bierkamp, 58 Colo. 319, 145 Pac. 691.

14 Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. Car. 578, 125 Am. St. Rep. 52, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1121, 60 S. E. 507.

15 Galt v. Provan, 131 Ia. 277, 108 N. W. 760.

16 Palmer v. Britannia Co., 188 Ill. 508, 59 N. E. 247.

17 Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 Fed. 171, 54 L. R. A. 247, 47 C. C. A. 278.

18 Tracy v. Albany Exchange Co., 7 N. Y. 472.

19 Statesville Flour Mills Co. v. Wayne Distributing Co., 171 N. Car. 708, 88 S. E. 771.

20 Loveland v. Kibbey, 103 Kan. 292, 173 Pac. 976.

21 Tichnor v. Evans, 92 Vt. 278, L. R. A. 1918C, 1025, 102 Atl. 1031.

22 Bach v. Owen, 5 T. R. 409.

23 United & Globe Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Conard, 8O N. J. L. 286, 78 Atl. 203. (Performance due at different times. See Sec. 2072 et seq.

24 Big Run Coal Co. v. Employers' Indemnity Co., 163 Ky. 596, 174 S. W. 25. (Insured did not treat such breach as discharge.)

25 Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

26 Bettini v. Gye, 1 Q. B. D. 183.

27 Gould v. Brown, 6 O. S. 538.

28 Reindl v. Heath, 115 Wis. 219, 91 N. W. 734.

29 Mena v. Tomlinson, 118 Ark. 166, 175 S. W. 1187. (Delay due to referendum election on franchise ordinance.)

30 Hunlocke v. Blacklowe, 2 Saund. 156.

31 Measures Bros. v. Measures [1910], 2 Ch. 248 [affirming (1910), 1 Ch. 336].

"The rule pressed upon us by Mr. Russell from the notes to Pordage v. Cole (1 Wms. Saund. 3191), 'can not be intended to apply to every case in which a covenant by the plaintiff forms only a part of the consideration and the residue of the consideration has been had by the defendant. That residue must be the substantial part of the contract; and if in the case of Boone v. Eyre (1 H. Bl 273, n.) two or three negroes had been accepted and the equity of redemption not conveyed we do not apprehend that the plaintiff could have recovered the whole stipulated price and left the defendant to recover damage for the non-conveyance.' See per Pollock, C. B., delivering the judgment of the court in Ellen v. Topp ([1851] 6 Ex. 424, at p. 442). Further, in White v. Beeton (7 H. & N. at p. 49) Bramwell B. quotes with approval the remark of Lord Kenyon, C. J., in Campbell v. Jones ([1796] 6 T. R. 570). 'Whether these kinds of covenants be or be not independent of each other must certainly depend on the good sense of the case.' The reason for the rule itself is said by Sergeant Williams to be that 'where a person has received a part of the consideration for which he entered into the agreement it would be unjust, that because he has not had the whole, he should be permitted to enjoy that part without either paying or doing anything for it.' But in this case, as pointed out by Mr. Manisty, the respondent has given an equivelant in service for the remuneration he has received in salary. He stands, therefore, outside the reason of the rule." General Bill-posting Co. v. Atkinson [1909], A. C. 118 [affirming (1908), 1 Ch. 537].