In Nutting v. Conn. River Railroad Co., 1 Gray, 502, Metcalf, J., said: "On the facts of this case, we are of opinion that there must be judgment for the defendants. Springfield is the southern terminus of their road; and no connection in business is shown between them and any other railroad company. When they carry goods that are destined beyond that terminus, they take pay only for the transportation over their own road. What, then, is the obligation imposed on them by law, in the absence of any special contract by them, when they receive goods at their depot at Northampton, which are marked with the names of consignees in the city of New York ? In our judgment, that obligation is nothing more than to transport the goods safely to the end of their road, and there deliver them to the proper carriers, to be forwarded towards their ultimate destination. This the defendants did in the present case, and in so doing performed their full legal duty. If they can be held liable for a loss that happens on any railroad besides their own, we know not what is the limit of their liability. If they are liable in this case, we do not see why they would not also be liable, if the boxes had been marked for consignees in Chicago, and had been lost between that place and Detroit, on a road with which they had no more connection than they had with any railway in Europe. But the plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants on the receipt given by Clarke, their agent, as on a special contract that the boxes should be safely carried the whole distance between Northampton and New York. We cannot so construe the receipt. It merely states the fact, that the boxes had been received 'for transportation to New York.1 And the plaintiff might have proved that fact, with the same legal consequences to the defendants, by oral testimony, if he had not taken a receipt. That receipt, in our opinion, imposed on the defendants no further obligation than the law imposed without it. The plaintiff's counsel relied on the case of Muschamp v. Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421, in which it was decided by the Court of Exchequer, that when a railway company take into their care a parcel directed to a particular place, and do not, by positive agreement, limit their responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is primÔ facie evidence of an undertaking to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed, although that place be beyond the limits within which the company in general profess to carry on their business of carriers. And two justices of the Queen's Bench subsequently made a like decision. Watson v. Ambergate, Nottingham, & Boston Railway [15 Jur. 448]; 3 Eng. Law & Eq. 497. We cannot concur in that view of the law; and we are sustained in our dissent from it by the Court of Errors in New York, and by the Supreme Courts of Vermont and Connecticut. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Cham-plain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. 140; s. c. 23 Vt. 209; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1. In these cases the decision in Weed v. Samtrary.1 Of course, a railway company in both countries may render themselves liable for losses beyond their own terminus, by a specific undertaking to deliver goods at a particular place; - and where there is a business connection between different toga & Schenectady, Railroad, 19 Wend. 534 (which was cited by the present plaintiff's counsel), was said to be distinguishable from such a case as this, and to be reconcilable with the rule, that each carrier is bound only to the end of his route, unless he makes a special contract that binds him further." See also Jenneson v. The Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., District Court of Philadelphia, January, 1856, reported in 4 Am. Law Reg. 234, and the editor's note; Skinner v. Hall, 60 Me. 477 (1872); Green v. New York Cent. R. Co., 4 Daly, 553 (1872). When the goods are to be delivered to a connecting line, the carrier is not discharged until an actual delivery. He does not become a warehouseman by placing the goods in his depot to lie there until delivered to the next carrier. Railroad Co. v. Manuf. Co., 16 Wall. 318 (1872).
1 Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway Co., 8 M. & W. 421. In this case a parcel was delivered to the railway company at Lancaster, addressed to a place in Derbyshire, beyond the line of the Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway. Baron Rolfe, before whom the cause was tried, told the jury that a carrier who takes into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not, by positive agreement, limit his responsibility to a part only of the distance, undertakes primÔ facie to carry the parcel to its destination, and that the rule was not varied by the fact that that place was beyond the limits within which the carrier professed to carry. This ruling was sanctioned by the court in banc. The same rule was laid down in the subsequent case of Watson v. Ambergate, Nottingham, & Boston Railway Co., 15 Jur. 448; 3 Eng. Law & Eq. 497. In this case a case of models or plans of a machine to load colliers was sent from Grantham to Cardiff to compete for a prize of one hundred guineas, but arrived too late for the competition. It appeared that when the package was delivered to the storing-master at Grantham, he said he could only receive pay to Nottingham, as he had no rates beyond, and he erased the words "paid to Bristol," and substituted "paid to Nottingham," without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The original direction was left on the package, which was detained at Bristol, and did not arrive at Cardiff until the day after the award was made. The court held that the company was liable on a contract to carry from Grantham to Cardiff. So, also, in Scothorn v. The South Staffordshire Railway Co., 8 Exch. 341; 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 553; the Court of Exchequer reaffirmed the doctrine of Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Railway, and held, that where a carrier receives goods to carry from one station to another, he would be liable for any loss that should occur during the transit, though it should happen on a line of railway belonging to another company. And again, in Crouch v. The London & North Western Railway Co., 14 C. B. 255; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 287, the same rule was again restated after elabcompanies forming a continuous line of travel, by railway or other conveyances, one company may render itself responsible for losses occurring on the line belonging to another company.1 The liability of each company would depend upon the special circumstances of the case; if there be a partnership or share of profit and losses, and not a mere arrangement in respect to times and connection of trains and the like, each company would be liable. But the mere fact that there was an arrangement for the purpose of transporting passengers or luggage continuously, without loss of time, would not be sufficient to create a liability as partners. Thus, where three separate railway companies, owning distinct portions of a continuous railway between two termini, run their carriages over the whole road, employing the same agent to sell passage tickets and receive luggage to be carried over the whole distance, an action may be maintained against any one of them for a loss of luggage received at one of its stations to be carried over the entire road.2 Where, however, there are distinct sets of carrier companies, forming a continuous route of transportation, orate argument. See also Wilson v. York, Newcastle, & Berwick Railway Co., 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 557, note; Fowles v. Great Western Railway, 7 Exch. 699; 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 531; Walker v. York & North Midland Railway Co., 2 EL & B. 750; 22 Eng. Law & Eq. 315; Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403.