1 Weed v. The Saratoga Railroad, 19 Wend. 534; Slocum v. Fairchild, 7 Hill, 292; Waland v. Elkins, 1 Stark. 272; Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610; Hart v. Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad, 4 Seld. 37; Fowles v. The Great Western Railway Co., 7 Exch. 699; 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 531; Mus-charap v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421; Watson v. The Ambergate, etc, Railway, 15 Jur. 448; 3 Eng. Law & Eq. 497; Noyes v. The Rutland Railroad Co., 4 Am. Law Reg. 231 (1855), per Redfield, J.; Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; 25 Wend. 660; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. 140; 23 Vt. 209; Ackley v. Kellogg, 8 Cow. 223; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 502; Scothorn v. The South Staffordshire Railway Co., 8 Exch. 341; 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 553; Crouch v. The London & North Western Railway Co., 14 C. B. 255; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 287. And it is held that in such cases the carrier is bound to transmit to the connecting line, with the delivery of the goods, all special instructions received by him from the consignor. Little Miami R. Co. v. Washburn, 22 Ohio St. 324 (1872).
2 Hart v. Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad Co., 4 Seld. 37.
§ 946. Notwithstanding the confusion existing among the cases cited, it may now be considered as established by the great preponderance of authorities, both English 2 and American,3 that the receipt of a package marked for a place on a connecting line of railway, and payment to the first carrier of the price for the entire carriage, create a primÔ facie obligation on him as carrier for the entire distance, if the successive carriers are associated in one continuous line of transportation, and by an agreement between them divide the freight in proportion to their respective carriage. Some cases do not hold all these conditions essential to the liability of the first carrier. Some very respectable courts hold that either an express contract, custom, or usage is necessary in order to render the first carrier liable beyond his own line,1 a contract which, as most hold, a railroad corporation is legally competent to make;2 although this has not always been admitted.3 And among courts which allow a corporation carrier to contract for liability beyond its own line, there is not an entire harmony as to what facts constitute a special contract, imposing such liability; but most authorities agree in this, at least, that the issue of a bill of lading, receipt, ticket, or series of coupons, in which the property is described as destined for a point beyond the line of the company issuing it, and taking payment for the whole distance, creates a contract to carry the goods, or passengers holding such ticket, through to their or his final destination.4 But of course a carrier may make a special contract limiting his liability to his own line.5
1 Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb. 222.
2 In addition to the cases before cited, see the recent decisions of Bristol & Exeter Railway Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. C. 194; Webber v. Great Western Railway Co., 3 H. & C. 771, affirmed on error, 4 H. & C. 582; Great Western Railway Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 987; Buxton v. North Eastern Railway Co., Law R. 3 Q. B. 549 (1868); John v. Bacon, Law R. 5 C. P. 437 (1870); Thomas v. Rhymney Railway Co., Law R. 5 Q. B. 226 (1870); Law R. 6 Q. B. 266 (1871); M'Court v. London & North Western Railway Co., Irish R 3 C. L. 107 (1868); Keys v. Belfast & Ballymena Railway Co., 8 Irish Com. Law, 167; Wilby v. West Cornwall Railway Co., 2 H. & N. 703; Mytton v. Midland Railway Co., 4 H. & N. 615 (1859). In Eng-land, the first carrier of a through line has been held alone liable for a loss occurring by the negligence of the second carrier; and such second carrier has been held not liable. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. C. 194 (1859). As to the liability of a carrier while running over another road, if its own servants or agents are negligent, see Birkett v. Whitehaven Junction Railway Co., 4 H. & N. 730; Murch v. Concord Railroad Co., 9 Fost. 9; Peters v. Rylands, 20 Penn. St. 497; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421.
3 See Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester & Nashua Railroad Co., 48 N. H. 339 (1869); Foy v. Troy & Boston Railroad, 24 Barb. 382; Kyle v. The Laurens Railroad Co., 10 Rich. 382; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Cope-land, 24 I11. 332; Same v. Johnson, 34 I11. 389; Mosher v. Southern Express Co., 38 Ga. 37; Southern Express Co. v. Shea, ib. 519; Angle v. Mississippi & Missouri Railroad, 9 Iowa, 493; Candee v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 21 Wis. 582; Condict v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 4 Lans. 106 (1871); Illinois Central Railroad v. Frankenberg, 54 I11. 88 (1870).
1 Burroughs p. Norwich & Worcester Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 26 (1868); Gass p. New York, Providence, & Boston Railroad Co., 99 Mass. 226; Darling p. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co., 11 Allen, 295; Perkins p. Portland, Saco, & Portsmouth Railroad, 47 Me. 573; Philadelphia, etc, Railroad Co. p. Harper, 29 Md. 330; Brintnall p. Saratoga & Whitehall Railroad Co., 32 Vt. 665; Schneider p. Evans, 25 Wis. 241 (1870); Jenneson v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., 4 Am. Law Reg. 234 (1856); Coates v. U. S. Express Co., 45 Mo. 238 (1870); Pendergast p. Adams Express Co., 101 Mass. 120 (1869); Cutts p. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566 (1870).
2 McCluer p. Manchester & Lawrence Railroad Co., 13 Gray, 124; Bur-tis p. Buffalo & State Line Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 269. And as to what facts or arrangements are sufficient to constitute a special contract, see Najac v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Co., 7 Allen, 329; Morse p. Brainerd, 41 Vt. 550; Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566 (1870); Merrick p. Gordon, 20 N. Y. 93.
3 See Hood p. New York & N. H. Railroad Co., 22 Conn. 1; Elmore v. Naugatuck Railroad Co., 23 Conn. 457; Naugatuck Railroad Co. p. Waterbury Button Co., 24 Conn. 468; Converse p. Norwich & New York Trans. Co., 33 Conn. 166. These cases seem to hold such contracts to be ultra vires.
4 Cincinnati, etc, Railroad Co. p. Spratt, 2 Duvall, 4; Wilcox p. Par-
5 Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Co. p. The Farmers' & Millers' Bank, 20 Wis. 122.