All the phenomena which I have just described may be observed both in hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion. I ask a man before I hypnotize him to tell me of something which, in his opinion, would never be found in my room. He says he would never believe there was an owl in my room. In hypnosis I make him the post-hypnotic suggestion that there will be an owl in my room. He wakes and says he sees the owl plainly; it is chained by the foot. Although he knows and says that the owl is only a hallucination, it is so real to him that he hesitates to put his finger on the spot where he imagines it to be.

It is not always easy to recognize the mental state of a hypnotic subject in suggested sense-delusions. If in many cases all thought and action is dependent on the delusion, in other cases the effects are less complete. I even believe that most subjects retain a dim consciousness that they are in a fictitious, and not a real, situation. For example, I suggest to a patient that he is in battle and must fight. An imaginary struggle begins at once and he hits the air. When I suggest that a cloth on the table is an enemy, he strikes at it. I suggest that one of the persons present is an enemy, but in continuing the fight the hypnotic takes care not to strike this person. Naturally this looks like simulation, and an inexperienced person would take such to be the case; but it was quite possibly a real typical hypnosis, in which, in spite of the sense-delusions, there was a dim consciousness of the true situation which influenced the actions of the hypnotic. This dim consciousness of his real surroundings prevented the subject from striking a human being, but left him free to hit a cloth. This behaviour of the hypnotic reminds one forcibly of automatism.

As we when walking in the street and reading a newspaper, automatically avoid knocking against passers-by, so the hypnotic avoids hitting another person, although he is only dimly, or not at all, aware of his existence.

It is the same with negative hallucinations. Binet and Fere have said about this that the object must be recognized in order not to be perceived. At all events, in negative hallucina* tions the subject has a dim consciousness of the true situation. The authors mentioned above made a series of experiments in support of their assertion, which I have been able to repeat with success.

If ten sheets of white paper are taken and one of them marked on the back, the subject can be made to believe that he only sees nine sheets (negative visual hallucination), even when the sheet whose invisibility was suggested is among them. If he is asked to give up the nine sheets, he picks out the nine unmarked ones and leaves the other, guided by the mark. Consequently he is able to distinguish it from the others, although he is unconscious of making the distinction.

A series of experiments made by Cory are even better. I was able to repeat them in part, and came to the same results. I took a sheet of paper and drew a rather irregular line on it. I then suggested to the subject, X., that the paper was blank. X. agreed that he saw nothing. I then drew fifteen straight lines on the paper and asked X. what he saw. He said, "Fifteen lines." I recommenced the experiment, but made the first line straight instead of crooked, and then suggested its invisibility; upon which I added twenty more lines exactly like it, and made X. count them. "There are twenty-one," he said. Therefore the line suggested as absent was only invisible to X. when he could distinguish it from the others. The following experiment resembles this: - I took a match and marked its end with a spot of ink. I then suggested that the match was invisible. I took twenty-nine other matches and put the Whole thirty on the table in such a manner that X. could see the ink spot. To my question, 'X. replied that there were only twenty-nine matches on the table. I then, while X.'s eyes were turned away, moved the marked match so that X. could not see the ink spot. He looked at the matches and said there were thirty of them on the table.

Thus the marked match was only invisible so long as X. could distinguish it from the others.

From these and other such experiments it may be concluded that the subject recognizes the object of a negative hallucination, even though there is no perception of it. The automatic writing, of which I shall speak farther on, also demonstrates this (Pierre Janet), as I can prove by numerous experiments I have made. The results of the suggested negative hallucination depend upon the influence exerted by the real object, in spite of the opposition brought to bear by suggestion. I suggest to a subject, X., that a table which is between him and the door is no longer there. X. goes carefully to the door, but avoids hitting against the table. I suggest that the electrode, which is armed with the very painful faradic brush, is invisible. After closing the current I touch the subject with the brush, and he shows great pain. When I ask X. what has hurt him, he says he does not know, for my hand is empty; but at the same time he takes care not to touch the place where the brush is lying, or does it hesitatingly, and with evident signs of fear. I tell another that I am going out of the room; he apparently neither sees nor hears me. Yet every suggestion that I now make to him is executed.

I order him to take the cushion from the sofa and throw it on the floor; the order is obeyed, though after some hesitation. To another subject, who also believes that I am out of the room, I suggest sense-delusions - the presence of a dog, etc. All the suggestions succeed, evidently because the subject hears what I say, though he believes me absent. I tell another that he is deaf, upon which he ceases to do what I tell him. But after I have several times repeated "Now you can hear again," he obeys every command. We see in these cases, which I could multiply, that the organs of sense act normally, that a certain effect is produced, but that the impressions are not received into clear consciousness. I naturally do not maintain that this is the case in all positive or negative hallucinations; on the contrary, in some the delusion is complete. This depends on character, on training, and to a great extent on the manner in which the suggestion is made.