By the doctrine of implied notice, one who has no notice himself is presumed to have notice because of his legal relations with one who has notice. This arises most often from the relation of principal and agent,261 which includes attorney and client.262 One who deals with real property through an agent is bound by any notice which may come to the agent in the scope of his employment.263 In the same way, a cestui que trust is bound by notice to his trustee.264 But notice to a husband is not notice to his wife.265 No tice to a corporation can be given only by notice to an officer who has the matter in charge. Notice to the agent of a corporation is not notice to the corporation, unless it touches matters in the line of the agent's business.266 The implication of notice in any case may be rebutted by showing facts which raise a presumption that the agent did not communicate his knowledge to his principal. This is the case where the agent has been guilty of fraud, or where the knowledge comes to the agent in another transaction, or under such circumstances that he will not be presumed to have remembered it.267

259 Brown v. Welch, 18 111. 343; Schultze v. Houfes, 96 111. 335; Palmer v. Williams, 24 Mich. 328; Dixon v. Hill, 5 Mich. 404; Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343.

260 Baldwin v. Sager, 70 111. 503; Redden v. Miller, 95 111. 336.

261 Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 260; Bigley v. Jones, 114 Pa. St 510, 7 Atl. 54; Sowler v. Day, 58 Iowa, 252, 12 N. W. 297. But see Reynolds v. Black (Iowa) 58 N. W. 922.

262 May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217; Josephthal v. Heyman, 2 Abb. N. C. (N. T.) 22; Walker v. Schreiber, 47 Iowa, 529.

263 Hoppock v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 303; Tucker v. Tilton, 55 N. H. 223.

264 Pope v. Pope, 40 Miss. 516.

265 Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449; Satterfleld v. Malone, 35 Fed. 445.

266 Wilson v. Mccullough, 23 Pa. St. 440.

267 Armstrong v. Abbott, 11 Colo. 220, 17 Pac 517; 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed) § 560.

Constructive Notice-recitals in Title Deeds.

Constructive notice is notice implied by operation of law, and can-nut be controverted by extraneous evidence.268 One who takes a conveyance of realty is bound by the recitals in all the instruments in bis chain of title,269' such as a recital in a deed that the premises are conveyed subject to a mortgage. This is binding on a subsequent purchaser, even though the mortgage is not recorded.270 And so he is bound by notice of facts of which he is put on inquiry by recitals in his title deeds.271 And, when one has actual notice of an unrecorded conveyance, he is bound by all the facts of which such conveyance is notice.272 But, when a reference in one of the deeds making up the chain of title to other deeds or writings is only incidental (for instance, if it is in a part of the deed in which other lands are granted), the purchaser is not bound to pursue the inquiry; and he has no actual, and, it seems, not even constructive, notice of the matter which may be found in those deeds.273

Same - Possession.

In most states it is held that possession by one not the owner of record is notice of the rights of the occupant,274 as when one is

268 Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264.

269 George v. Kent, 7 Allen (Mass.) 16; United States Mortg. Co. v. Gross, 93 111. 483; Dean v. Long, 122 111. 447, 14 N. E. 34; Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich. 61; Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326; Parke v. Neeley, 90 Past. 52; Kerr v. Kitchen, 17 Pa. St. 433; Dailey v. Kastell, 56 Wis. 444, 14 N. W. 635; Clark v. Holland, 72 Iowa, 34, 33 N. W. 350.

270 Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mich. 81; Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich. 51; Garrett v. Puckett, 15 Ind. 485.

271 Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1; Lytle v. Turner, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 641.

272 Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271; Green v. Slayter, 4 Johns. Ch. 381 Bent v. Coleman, 89 111. 364.

273 See Kansas City Land Co. v. Hill, 87 Tenn. 589, 11 S. W. 797.

274 Phillips v. Costley, 40 Ala. 486; Byers v. Engles, 16 Ark. 543; Smith v. Yule, 31 Cal. 180; Massey v. Hubbard, 18 Fla. 688; Sewell v. Holland, 61 Ga. Brainard v. Hudson, 103 111. 218; Sutton v. Jervis, 31 Ind. 265; Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa, 279; Lyons v. Bodenhamer, 7 Kan. 455; Hackwith v. Damron, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 235, Ringgold v. Bryan, 3 Md. Ch. 488; Allen v. Cadwell, 55 Mich. 8, 20 N. W. 692; New v. Wheaton, 24 Minn. 406; Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 415; Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587, 23 N. W. 1109; Appeal of Bugbee, 110 Pa, St. 331, 1 Atl 273. But other courts hold the contrary. Harral v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46; Pomroy v. Stevens, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 244; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498.

In possession as vendee under an executory contract to purchase,275 or when one holds as lessee.276 And most cases hold that possession by a tenant is notice, not only of his own rights, but of the rights of his landlord as well.277 It is held by many courts that possession is notice, although the possession is not actually known to the subsequent purchaser.278 But possession is notice only during its continuance,279 and it must be visible, notorious, and exclusive.280 Possession of part may operate as notice of a title to the whole of the premises.281 In order that possession may constitute notice, it must be inconsistent with the title on which the purchaser relies.282 Therefore possession by a grantor is not notice to a subsequent purchaser of any right reserved,283 though it may be notice of rights subsequently acquired.284 On the other hand, long-continued possession by the grantor is held to be notice of any right claimed by him,285 as where he holds as mortgagor after giving a deed absolute in form.286 Possession by the mortgagor or his grantee is not notice of an unrecorded release.287

275 Bank of Orleans v. Flagg, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 316.

276 Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. St. 112.

277 U. S. v. Sliney, 21 Fed. 894; Haworth v. Taylor, 108 111. 275; Whitaker v. Miller, 83 111. 381; Hood v. Fahnestock, 1 Pa. St. 470; Dickey v. Lyon, 10 Iowa, 544; But see Beatie v. Butler, 21 Mo. 313; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486, Fed. Cas. No. 4,847.

278 Ranney v. Hardy, 43 Ohio St. 157; Hodge v. Amerman, 40 N. J. Eq. 99, 2 Atl. 257; Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. C. 177.

279 Ehle v. Brown, 31 Wis. 405; Meehan v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 238.

280 Morrison v. Kelly, 22 111. 610; Bogue v. Williams, 48 111. 371; Kendall v. Lawrence, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 540; M'mechan v. Griffing, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 149; Webster v. Van Steenbergh, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 211; Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463; Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 523; Meehan v. Williams, 48 Pa, St 238.

281 Nolan v. Grant, 51 Iowa, 519, 1 N. W. 709; Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443.

282 Staples v. Fenton, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 172; Plumer v. Robertson, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 177; Smith v. Yule, 31 Cal. 180.

283 Newhall v. Pierce, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 450; Dawson v. Danbury Bank, 15 Mich. 489; Koon v. Tramel, 71 Iowa, 132, 32 N. W. 243.

284 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 597.

285 White v. White, 89 111. 460; Ford v. Marcall, 107 111. 136; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mccullough, 59 111. 166; Hopkins v. Garrard, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 312. 286 New v. Wheaton, 24 Minn. 406. 287 Briggs v. Thompson, 86 Hun, 607, 33 N. Y. Supp. 765.

Same - Lis Pendens.

By the doctrine of lis pendens,288 one who purchases realty from a party to a suit which involves the title thereto takes it subject to the rights of the litigants, as they may be determined by the action; that is, the pendency of the suit affecting the title to realty is constructive notice to purchasers who acquire interests in the property after the commencement of the action.289

Same - registration

131. By recording instruments affecting real property in the manner provided by statute, constructive notice of the contents of such instruments is given to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers.

In all states there are statutes which make it possible to give constructive notice of any conveyance affecting realty by recording the instrument in an office designated by the statute.290 These statutes will be treated of in this place in their application to other kinds of instruments besides mortgages. The theory of the registry acts is that, by the record of a conveyance, constructive notice is given of its existence and provisions, because every one can examine the record. If a man does not record his deed or mort gage, he is negligent, and should suffer, rather than an innocent purchaser.291 There is a difference between the effect of notice (actual or constructive), and that of recording, upon the action of a subsequent purchaser. While, under the laws of many states, such a purchaser is protected against a prior, unrecorded convey288 See Fetter, Eq. p. 93.

289 Haven v. Adams, 8 Allen (Mass.) 363; Jackson v. Andrews, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 152; Boiling v. Carter, 9 Ala. 921; Blanchard v. Ware, 37 lowa, 305; Hersey v. Turbett, 27 Pa. St. 418; Youngman v. Railroad Co., 65 Pa. St. 278; Edwards v. Banksmitli, 35 Ga. 213; Grant v. Bennett, 96 111. 513; Smith v. Hodsdon, 78 Me. 180, 3 Atl. 276. But see Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. (Va.) 93; Douglass v. Mccrackin, 52 Ga. 596; M'cutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65; Wyatt v. Barwell, 19 Ves. 435.

290 1 stim. Am. St. Law, art 161.

291 In some states a mortgage is of no validity unless recorded within a certain time. 1 Stim. Am. St Law, § 1615; 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 458. And see Truman v. Weed, 14 C. C. A. 595, 67 Fed. 645.

§ 131) ance only if he has first put his own deed on record, and thus the recording of the first deed would defeat him, though he has laid out his money and received his deed, it is otherwise with notice in pais, which comes too late when the price or consideration has been paid, and the deed delivered to the later purchaser.