Reference is made elsewhere84 to the statements, so frequently made by the courts, that a conveyance is invalid unless accepted by the grantee, and so it has occasionally been stated that a conveyance to one to hold in trust for another is invalid unless accepted by the trustee named.85 Such a statement appears to be

82. Linton v. Bunn, 20 Fed. 455; Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 73 Am St. Rep. 289, 53 N. E. 823; Collins v. Stewart, 58 N. J. Eq. 392, 44 Atl. 467, 60 N. J. Eq. 488. 46 Atl. 1098; O'Neil v. Greenwood, 106 Mich. 572, 64 N. W. 511; Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916, 27 Am. St. Rep. 641; see Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329; Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581; Janes v. Falk, 50 N. J. Eq. 468, 35 Am. St. Rep. 783, 26 Atl. 138.

83. See Govin v. De Miranda, 76 Hun. (N. Y.) 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 249.

84. Post Sec. 463.

85. Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 clearly inconsistent with the statement,86 which is, it is submitted, entirely correct, that a conveyance in trust is valid, although the grantee, the trustee named, is unaware of such conveyance. The proper view is, it is submitted, that the title vests in the trustee in such case, subject to disclaimer by him, the title being, in case of such disclaimer, vested in the creator of the trust or his heirs, until the appointment of another as trustee.87

Although an acceptance of the conveyance be conceded not to be necessary to its validity, for the purpose of vesting the title in the grantee, an acceptance by him of the office of trustee is necessary in order that he become trustee.88 Such acceptance of the office may be inferred from either words or acts, as may the refusal of the office.89 An acceptance of the office would no doubt be inferred from an express acceptance of the conveyance,90 and an acceptance of the conveyance would be inferred from an acceptance, however evidenced, of the office,91 but this does not indicate that an acceptance of the conveyance is necessary to vest title.

Wall. (U. S.) 120, 20 L. Ed. 765; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 111. 281, 86 N. E. 139; Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 121 Mo. 614, 26 S. W. 367.

86. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Minot v. Tilton, 64 N. H. 185; Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq. 358; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 105.

87. Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 185, 22 L. Ed. 504; Saunders v. Harris, 1 Head (Tenn.) 185; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.) 67; Mallott v. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ch. 494.

88. Bethune v. Dougherty, 21 Ga. 257; Carruth v. Carruth, 148 Mass. 431, 19 N. E. 369.

89. Taylor v. Atwood, 47 Conn.

498; McCreary v. Gewinner, 103 Ga. 528, 29 S. E. 960; Jamison v. Zausch 227 Mo. 406, 126 S. W. 1023; In re Robinson, 37 N. Y. 261; Harvey v. Gardner, 41 Ohio St. 642; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec.Sec. 259-261.

90. Hearst v. Pujol, 44 Cal. 230; Patterson v. Johnson, 113 111. 559.

91. Wise v. Wise, 2 Jones & La Tonche, 403.

That a refusal of the office involves a disclaimer of the conveyance, see In re Birchall, 40 Ch. Div. 436; Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall. (U. S.), 120 L. Ed. 765. Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 24 S. W. 1035, 41 Am. St. Rep. 673; Jackson v. Bodle, 20 Johns. (N.

In one state the view appears to obtain that a trust sought to be created otherwise than by will is not validly created unless the cestui que trust is informed thereof before the death of the creator of the trust.92 But, generally, the fact that the cestui is not notified of the trust is regarded as entirely immaterial,93 he having, however, when he does receive notice thereof, the privilege of refusing to accept it.94

- (f) Testamentary trusts. If a trust in land is sought to be created by will, it is necessary that the will be executed in accordance with the statutory provisions as to wills of land, in order that it may be ad-missible to prove the trust, and the fact that it complies with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds is not in itself sufficient, since an instrument which is to take effect only after the death of the maker derives its effect entirely from the statute in regard to wills.95

An instrument which was intended to operate as a will, however, and could not do so because not properly executed, may, by reason of a recital therein that the signer holds land in trust for another, be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds as proving and manifesting a trust already created.96

Y.) 185; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.) 67.

92. Welch v. Henshaw, 170 Mass. 409, 49 N. E. 659, 64 Am. St. Rep. 309; Boynton v. Gale, 194 Mass. 320, 80 N. E. 448.

93. Koch v. Strenter, 232 111. 594, 83 N. E. 1072; Brunson v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 216; Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946; Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 413, 78 N. W. 474, 43 L. R. A. 840; Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446;Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 210; Connecticut River Sav.

Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571.

94. A refusal by him is, It seems, conclusive. See note in 26 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 660, and White v. White, 107 Ala. 417, 18 So. 3 and Libby v. Frost, 98 Me. 288, 56 Atl. 906, referred to therein.

95. 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec.Sec. 90-94; Addlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141; Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 111. 557, 45 N. E. 179; Chase v. Stockett, 72 Md. 235, 19 Atl. 761; Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen (Mass.) 283, 85 Am. Dec. 753; Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 396; As to the statutory requirements in regard to the execution of wills see post, Sec.Sec..

- (g) Quantum of the trustee's estate. When land is conveyed or devised to one person as trustee for another, the trustee will take an estate of a quantum-sufficient to enable him to carry out the purposes of the trust, irrespective of whether the language of the limitation in his favor is in itself sufficient to give him such an estate.97 On the other hand, although the language of the limitation is in itself sufficient to give to him an estate in fee simple, he will actually take such an estate only as is necessary to enable him to carry out the purposes of the trust.98