The cases are generally to the effect that if a trustee is given a power to sell and convey in fee simple, he necessarily has a legal estate in fee simple in order resulting trust in favor of the grantor. Somewhat unfortunately, the courts did not restrict their employment of the expression "resulting" to the case of uses and trusts implied in favor of the grantor, but applied it as well to those implied in favor of third persons, regardless of the inapplicability to such a case of the conception of the use or trust "springing back." In other words, since a use implied in accordance with the presumed intention of the parties, in favor of the grantor, was termed a resulting use, a use or trust implied, in accordance with the same presumed intention, in favor of a third person, was designated by a like expression. Consequently, resulting trusts may be defined as those trusts which, apart from any express declaration of trust, are recognized by the courts in accordance with the presumed intention of the parties to the transaction.

96. Keith v. Miller, 174 111. 64, 51 N. E. 151; Hiss v. Hiss, 228 111. 414, 81 N. E. 1056; Leslie v. Leslie, 53 N. J. Eq. 275, 31 Atl. 170; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 91.

97. Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. Ed. 1044; Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Ala. 273, 45 L. R. A. 66, 72, Am. St. Rep. 160, 24 So. 984; In re Fair's Estate, 132 Cal. 523, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 111. 248, 54 N. E. 918; Packard v. Old Colony R. Co., 168 Mass. 92, 46 N. E. 433; Toronto General Trust Co. v. Chicago, B. Q R. Co., 123 N. Y. 37, 25 N. E. 198; Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172, 51 S. E. 889; Jourolmon v. Massengill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 89 Tex. 445, 35 S. W. 145; Carney v. Rain, 40 W. Va. 758, 23 S. E. 650.

98. Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. Ed. 1044; Cherry v. Richardson, 120 Ala. 242, 24 So.

570; Henderson, v. Williams, 97 Ga. 709, 25 S. E. 395; Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 Atl. 28; Temple v. Ferguson, 110 Tenn. 84, 100 Am. St. Rep. 791, 72 S. W. 455. 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 312. And see citations, post, Sec. 116(c), nota 33.

In England a like rule as to the quantum of the trustee's estate appears to have prevailed in the case of a devise, before the passage of the Wills Act of 1837, Doe d. Player v. Nicholls, 1 B. & C. 336; Doe d. Cadogan v. Ewart, 7 Ad. & El. 636. But in the case of a conveyance inter vivos the court adheres to a strict construction of the language limiting the trustee's estate. Colmore v. Tyndall, 2 Y. & J. 605. Underhill, Trusts (7th Ed.) 196. By force of the Wills Act the trustee, it seems, takes less than a fee simple only when it is certain that the purposes of the trust cannot continue after some definite event. See Lewin, Trusts to be able to give title to the purchaser.99 Such a power would, however, usually be exercisable only for a limited time, as for instance, until the death of a cestui que trust for life, and the question then arises whether the estate in fee simple originally vested in the trustee comes to an end upon the cessation of any active duties on his part. The language of some of the courts in this country would seem to indicate the view that the trustee's estate does then come to an end, by force of the Statute of Uses.1 The English courts do not apparently take such a view, that is, in that jurisdiction, if the trustee is given a fee simple in the first place, it is not automatically terminated merely because there is no purpose to be served by his retaining it.2