11. Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242, 28 L. Ed. 415; David Bradley & Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 99 111. App. 427.

12. See Litt. Sec. 551; Butler's note to Co. Litt. 309 a; 2 Shep-pard's Touchstone, c. 13, pp. 253-266.

Real Property.

[Sec. 53 of states the statute of Anne, dispensing with the necessity of an attornment, but saving the rights of a tenant paying rent before notice of the transfer, has been substantially adopted or re-enacted,13 and in others the requirement of attornment has been regarded as inapplicable owing to the absence of the feudal relation in which it had its origin.14 In Illinois attornment was at one time, regarded as strictly necessary on a transfer of the reversion, but has been held to have been dispensed with by a statute giving the transferee of the reversion all the remedies of the lessor.15 And in other states, occasionally, it seems to have been regarded as a still existent requirement.16 The American statutes on the subject, it may be remarked, differ from the English statute in that they ordinarily protect the tenant who pays rent "without notice of the transfer," while the English statute protects him only in making payments before notice of the transfer "shall be given to him." It was decided in England, after the passage of the Statute of Uses, that any conveyance of a reversion which took effect under that Statute, that is, as a bargain and sale or covenant to stand seised, was effectual without any attornment.17 In any state in which the Statute of Uses is in force, a conveyance of a reversion, made for a valuable consideration, or which recites the pay13. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. Sec. 146f.

14. See King v. Housatonic R. Co., 45 Conn. 226; Funk's Lessee v. Kincaid, 5 Md. 404; Burden v. Thayer, 44 Mass. (3 Mete.) 76, 37 Am. Dec. 117; Kelly v. Bower-man, 113 Mich. 446, 71 N. W. 836; Jones v. Rigby, 41 Minn. 530, 43 N. W. 390; Hendrickson v. Bee-son, 21 Neb. 61, 31 N. W. 266; Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248, 55 Am. Dec. 234; Abbott v. Hanson, 24 N. J. L. 493; Pelton v. Place, 71 Vt. 430, 46 Atl. 63.

15. Barnes v. Northern Trust Co., 169 111. 112, 48 N. E. 31, aff'g 66 111. App. 282.

16. See Thompson v. Chapman, 57 Ga. 16; Duke v. Compton, 49 Mo. App. 304; Winkelmeier v. Katzelburger, 77 Mo. App. 117; Stewart v. Gregg, 42 S. C. 392, 20 S. E. 193.

17. Bro. Abr., Attornment, pl. 29; Co. Litt. 309 b; Sir Moyle Finch's Case, 6 Coke, 68 b; Anonymous, 1 Dyer, 30 a; Anonymous, 2 And. 203.

- Transfer of "lease." Not infrequently a transfer of the "lease" by the lessor is referred to. apparently as synonymous with a transfer of the reversion.17a The expression "transfer of lease" can property be used only with reference to a transfer by the lessee or his assignee, the word lease being used elliptic-ally to designate the estate created by the lease. the leasehold interest.17b When used with reference to a transfer by the lessor, the expression cannot well refer to a transfer of the estate in reversion, since such estate exists independently of the lease, though it is not reversionary in character until after the lease has been made, and the only meaning which can be attached. thereto, would seem to be a transfer by the lessor of the rights created in his favour by the lease, so far as they can exist independently of and apart from the reversion, the chief, and usually the only one of which, is that to rent.17c

- (b) By operation of law. There may be a transfer of the reversion, not only by the voluntary act of the owner thereof, but also by operation of law. One case of such transfer occurs when the landlord dies intestate, the reversion, if in fee, passing, in most states,

17a. Keeley Brewing Co. v. Mason, 102 111. App. 381; Iowa Sav. Bank v. Frink, 1 Neb. Unoff. 14, 26, 92 N. W. 916; Merchants' State Bank of Fargo v. Ruettell, 12 N. D. 519, 97 N. W. 853.

17b. Ante Sec. 37 note 7.

17c. See Bordereaux v. Walker, 85 111. App. 86; Demarest v. Wil-lard, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 206; Huer-stel v. Lorillard, 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 260, aff'd 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. 251.

154 Real, Property. [Sec.53 to his heir or heirs,18 and if a chattel interest only, passing to his personal representative.19

Likewise, if the interest of the landlord is sold under a judgment, mortgage or other lien, which is subsequent to the lease, the purchaser becomes the landlord in the former owner's place, since the reversion passes by the sale.20 In such case the purchaser takes only what the lessor has, that is, his estate in reversion, and the rights of the tenant under the outstanding lease remain such as they would be in the case of a voluntary transfer of the reversion. If, on the other hand, the premises are sold under a judgment, mortgage or other lien prior to the lease, the purchaser comes in by title paramount to the lease,21 and he is entitled to possession as against the tenant thereunder,22 the purchaser's title dating back to the date of the lien under which he claims.23

Other cases, besides those previously mentioned, in which the reversion is transferred by operation of law, quite frequently occur, as when it passes under bankruptcy or receivership proceedings, or when it is

18. Sacheverel v. Frogate, 1 Vent. 161; Chamberlain v. Dun-lop, 126 N. Y. 45, 22 Am. St. Rep. 807, 26 N. E. 966; Stinson v. Stin-son, 38 Me. 593; Dixon v. Nicolls, 39 111. 372, 89 Am. Dec. 312.

19. Sacheverel v. Frogate, 1 Vent. 161.

20. Butt v. Ellett, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 544, 22 L. Ed. 183; Epley v. Eubanks, 11 111. App. (11 Bradw.) 272; Abrams v. Shee-han, 40 Md. 446; Rhyne v. Guevara, 67 Miss. 139, 6 So. 736; Smith v. Aude, 46 Mo. App. 631; Lanchashire v. Mason, 75 N. C. 455; Gross v. Chittim (Tex. Civ. App.), 18 Tex. Ct. Rep. 906, 100 S. W. 1006. In some of these cases the courts appear to be under the erroneous impression that it is the time of the sale, and not of the lien under which the sale is made, that determines the rights of the purchaser.