*This has been doubted, from the seeming want of mutuality in many cases of contract. As where one promises to see another paid, if he will sell goods to a third person; or promises to give a certain sum if another will deliver up certain documents or securities, or if he will forbear a demand, or suspend legal proceedings, or the like. (b) Here it is said that the party making the promise is bound, while the other party is at liberty to do anything or nothing. But this is a mistake. The party making the promise is bound to nothing until the promisee within a reasonable time engages to do, or else does or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise. * Until such engagement or such doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is mality in the execution, or for any other cause, and therefore not originally binding upon the other party, nevertheless be executed by the party not originally liable, the other party cannot refuse performance on the ground that the contract was not originally binding. Fishmongers' Company v. Robertson, 5 Man. & G. 131. In like manner in Phelps v. Townsend, 8 Pick. 392 (1829), where the defendant, by an agreement signed only by himself, had placed his son as an apprentice to the plaintiffs to learn the art of printing, therein promising that his son should stay with them until he was twenty-one, etc.; which the son failed to perform. On the trial the defendant objected that the contract was void for want of mutuality, it not being signed by the plaintiffs, and that there was no obligation on the plaintiffs to do anything which might form a consideration for the defendant's promise. But the court said, " that the acceptance of the contract by the plaintiffs, and the execution of it in part by receiving the apprentice, created an obligation on their part to maintain and instruct the defendant's son." See also Commercial Bank v. Nolan, 7 How. (Miss.) 508.

(b) In Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. 501, Parke, B., is reported to have said, while discussing the sufficiency of the consideration for a guaranty, which, was in these terms: "Truro, July 12th, 1838. Messrs. Kennaway & Co. Gentlemen - I hereby guarantee to you, Messrs. Kennaway & Co., the sum of £250, in case Mr. Paddon, of, etc, should default in his capacity of agent and traveller to you. William S. Treleavan." "There is a case in the books of Newbury v. Armstrong, 6 Bing. 201, which strongly resembles the present. There the guaranty was in these terms: ' I agree to be security to you for T. C. for whatever, while in your employ, you may trust him with, and in case of default to make the same good;' and the contract was held to be good, on the ground that the future employment of the party was a sufficient consideration. It is said, and truly, that in the present case there was no binding contract on the plaintiffs, and that, notwithstanding the guaranty, they were not bound to employ Paddon. But a great number of the cases are of contracts not binding on both sides at the time when made, and in which the whole duty to be performed rests with one of the contracting parties. A guaranty falls under that class, when a party says, ' In case you choose to employ this man as your agent for a week, I will be responsible for all such sums as he shall receive during that time, and neglect to pay over to you,' the party indemnified is not therefore bound to employ the person designated by the guaranty: but if he do employ him, then the guaranty attaches and becomes binding on the party who gave it. It is therefore no objection in the present case to say that the plaintiffs were not obliged to take Paddon into their service; they might do so or not, as they pleased; but having once done so, the guarantee attaches and the defendant becomes responsible for the default." See also Yard v. Eland, 1 Ld. Raym. 368; Caballero v. Slater, 25 E. L. & E. 285; s. c. 24 C. B. 300; Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C. M. & R. 692; Morton v. Burn, 7 A. & E. 19; Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380; Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528; Wellington v. Apthorp, 145 Mass. 69, 73; L'Amoureux v. Gould, 3 Seld. 349; White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254; Powers v. Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273.

A very large proportion of our most common contracts rests upon this principle. Thus, in the contract of sale, the proposed buyer says, I will give you so much for these goods; and he may withdraw this offer before it is accepted, and if his withdrawal reaches the seller before the seller has accepted, the obligation of the buyer is extinguished; but if not withdrawn, it remains as a continuing offer for a reasonable time, and, if accepted within this time, both parties are now bound as by a promise for a promise; there is an entire mutuality of obligation. The buyer may tender the price and demand the goods, and the seller may tender the goods and demand the price. (c) This subject, however, belongs rather to the topic " Assent."

A written agreement to submit disputes and claims to arbitration must be signed by all parties, or it is obligatory upon none. For no party can hold another to the award, without showing that he himself would have been equally bound by it.(d)

It should be added, that the common law makes an exception *to this requirement of mutuality, in the case of contracts between infants and persons of full age; following in this respect the civil law, and the law prevailing on the continent of Europe. The infant is not bound, while the adult is; the infant may avoid his contract, but the adult cannot.(e) This rule has been applied to the contract of future marriage, as well as to other contracts. Where a man of full age enters into such contract with a woman who is a minor, if he breaks the contract she has her remedy by action. (f) If she breaks it he has no action. But a woman under age may perhaps be bound by a marriage contract properly securing her interests, and deliberately entered into, with the approbation of her parents or guardians. (g)

(c) Thus, in White v. Demilt, 2 Hall, 405, the plaintiff brought an action for the non-delivery of certain goods sold him by the defendant. One ground of defence was want of consideration for the defendant's promise. But the court said, that the promise of the plaintiff to accept and pay for the goods was a good consideration for the defendant's promise to deliver them; See also Babcock v. Wilson, 17 Me. 372; Appleton v. Chase, 19 Me. 74.

(d) Kingston v. Phelps, Peake, Cas, 227; Biddell v. Dowse, 6 B. & C 255; s. c. 9 Dow. & R. 404; Antram v. Chase, 15 East, 212.

(e) See ante, p. *329.