* After all that may be said, the reasons for this distinction retain so much of their force, that the rule founded upon it, with modifications and exceptions introduced in the practice of equity, must be regarded as established and as useful, (x) Thus agreements to form a partnership, although they relate Altogether to chattel interests, might be enforced; (y) and so will most agreements in relation to a partnership, (z) Indeed the inadequacy of legal process and remedy is so obvious, upon many important questions relating to partnership, that the whole subject may be considered as peculiarly within the action of equity. Still no agreement for a partnership will be enforced, unless it be an agreement for a specific time;(a) for a partnership without limit is dissolvable at the pleasure of any partner; and to decree such a partnership would of course be useless. And now, when there are so many ways of dissolving or rendering nugatory a partnership for a time certain, it may be supposed that equity would require a plain and strong case *for compelling the formation of one. For some collateral purpose it may, however, be requisite, that an agreement for a partnership, terminable at pleasure, should have been made, and then equity will decree that it be considered as having been made at a time and in a manner necessary for this equitable result, (b)

(v) Ante, vol i. p. * 33.

(w) Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Simons & 8. 598. Where a factor had made advances on an agreement that the principal would consign to him the crops of the year, and the principal died, leaving a personal estate insufficient to pay his debts, it was held, that the factor had a good ground to seek a specific performance of the agreement at the hands of the executor, so that his lien might attach upon the crops and the proceeds of the sale of them, and the necessity of a resort to the testator's real estate for the payment of his advances he prevented. Sullivan v. Tuck, I Md. Ch. Dec. 59.

(x) And the distinction between land and a chattel may, perhaps, be stated thus: that in the case of the former, there is a conclusive presumption that the purchaser cannot be adequately compensated by the recovery of damages at law; while in the case of the latter, there is no such presumption, and, in order to induce the interposition of the extraordinary jurisdiction of equity, it must appear affirmatively, from the circumstances of the particular case, that the remedy at law is inadequate When the case is thus made out affirmatively,-when that is proven which, when real estate is in question, is presumed, - equity interferes as readily to enforce a sale of a chattel as a sale of land.

So, too, if a partner contracts that he will labor assiduously for the benefit of the partnership, or comes under any similar obligation, the courts of equity will not decree a specific performance, because the bargain is not itself specific enough, and it would be difficult to say what was a specific performance of it But if a partner agree, that while the partnership continues he will not enter into any other firm, or if he agrees not to carry on any other mercantile business whatever, equity will restrain him from the violation of such an agreement, (c)l And it is a general rule (subject, however, to qualification in certain particular cases), (d) that a contract for personal services cannot be specifically enforced by either party.(e)2

(y) Lord Hardwicke, C, Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 385. Lord Langdale, M. R., in reference to the impossibility of accomplishing, by means of a reluctant and compelled partnership, the full beneficial results of a voluntary concert of action, said: "This is a difficulty that always arises when partnership contracts come under the consideration of this court. It is impossible to make persons, who will not concur, carry on a business, jointly, for their own common advantage. It is that which makes everything of this kind exceedingly uncertain' It is that which makes this court, on all such occasions, exceedingly anxious (an anxiety, I believe, that has been felt by every judge who has ever sat in a court of equity), that when these disputes do arise, the parties should, if possible, come to some arrangement between themselves, to do that for their common benefit which the court cannot do otherwise than at the common expense. But if the parties insist on having a declaration of their rights, the court has over and over again entertained the jurisdiction, and must entertain the jurisdiction, unless some one or two or several partners are to be permitted to do just what they like with the partnership rights and interests.'1 England v. Curling, 8 Beav. 137, 138; Scott v. Rayment, L. R. 7 Eq. 112; Somerby v. Buntin. 118 Mass. 279; Cross v. Hopkins, 6 W. Va. 323; Meason v. Kline, 63 Pa. 335.

(z) Birchett v. Boiling, 5 Munf. 42. Respecting the specific execution of a covenant of a partner, that his personal representatives after his death shall continue the partnership, see Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare, 418, 437.

(a) Hercy v. Birch, 9 Yes. 357; Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich. 166.

(b) Mr. Swanston, in his note to Craw-shay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 513. And see Nesbitt v Meyer, I Swanst. 226.

(c) SkadweU, V. C, Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 835.

(d) See post, p. *375, note (p), and section 7.

(e) It is obvious, that almost every contract for personal services, of whatever grade or kind, admits of a full compensation being made in money to the agent or servant, for the breach of it by the employer. The relation created by such a contract is one frequently requiring a high degree of confidence on the part of the master or principal; and therefore, in addition to the adequacy of the remedy in damages, as a reason for withholding enforcement of the contract specifically, there is a want of equality in the position of the two parties which is also considered as rendering the interference of a court of equity improper. Though the servant perform the required work never so well, yet if the master want confidence in him, he does not derive from his services that sense of satisfaction which is an essential element of their value; while, on the other hand, the utmost that the servant seeks is money, and that he can recover at law. "A man," said the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, in Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. Co. 3 De G., M. & G. 926, "may have one of the best domestic servants, - he may have a valet whose arrangement of clothes is faultless, a coachman whose driving is excellent, a cook whose performances are perfect,-and yet he may not have confidence in him; and while, on the other hand, all that the servant requires or wishes (and that reasonably enough is money, you are, on the other hand, to destroy the comfort of a man's existence for a period of years, by compelling him to have constantly about him, in a confidential situation, one to whom he objects. If that be so in private life, how important do these considerations become when connected with the performance of such duties - duties to society -as are incumbent upon the directors of a company like this." The case which gave rise to these remarks was one where par1 In Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman (1891), 2 Ch. 416 (C. A.), the plaintiff endeavored to enforce an agreement made by its manager to give " the whole of his time to the company's business,'1 by an injunction to restrain the manager from giving part of his time to a rival company. The court refused an injunction on the ground that there was no express negative promise, and disapproved Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189, where an actor engaged by the plaintiff was restrained from acting at a rival theatre, though there was no stipulation in terms that he would not do so. That equity will grant an injunction to restrain the breach of an express negative covenant in regard to personal services was settled in England by the case of Lnmley v. Wagner, I De G. M. & G. 604 (overruling Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333; Kimberley v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340). In that case an opera singer who had agreed to sing during a specified period at the plaintiff's theatre, and also that she would not sing elsewhere during that time, was enjoined from violating the latter part of her agreement. Later English cases where the doctrine was considered are, Wolverhampton, etc. Ry. Co. v. London, etc. Ry. Co. L. R. 16 Eq. 433; Ward v. Beeton, L. R. 19 Eq. 207; Donnell v. Bennett, 22 Ch. D. 835. In this country the courts seem less ready to grant an injunction for breach of a covenant relating to personal services. See Metropolitan Ex. Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. Rep. 198; Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356; Cort v. Lassard, 18 Ore. 221.