(t) Thus, a party was barred by saving his name was John, when interrogated before a process issued against him in that name. Price v. Harwood, 3 Camp. 108. In an action for re-entry in default of a distress, the defendant was concluded by admitting there was no property liable to distress. Presbyterian Congr. v. Williams, 9 Wend. 147. An execution having been levied on the land of defendant's reputed wife, he was estopped from showing the marriage to be within the prohibited degrees. Divoll v. Leadbetter, 4 Pick. 220; Waller v. Drakeford, 1 Ellis & B. 749. So judgment creditors, by assenting to a conveyance, are concluded from asserting their lien. Doub v. Mason, 2 Md. 380. It is well settled, if an obligor induce a person to take an assignment of a note or bond, by admitting the justice of the debt or declaring he has no defence, he cannot afterwards deny it to the prejudice of the assignee. But unless the assignee would be prejudiced by having parted with value, there can be no estoppel. Weaver v. Lynch, 25 Penn. St. 449; Sloan v. R. T. & M. Co. 6 Blackf. 175; Croat v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 393; Truscott v. Davis, 4 Barb. 495; Platt v. Squire, 12 Met. 494; Davis v. Thomas, 5 Leigh, 1. A corporation which has entered upon its appropriate functions, cannot object, in an action against it, that legal provisions concerning it have not been complied with: Commonwealth v. Worcester T. Co. 3 Pick. 327; nor can a member make such objection : Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 94. Where a mortgage, note, or other instrument, is given to a corporation as such, the party giving it is estopped from denying the existence of the corporation.

1 Thus the obligors of a guardian's bond, required on granting a license to sell real estate, are estopped to deny the recital of the due appointment of the guardian, Williamson v. Woodman, 73 Me. 163; stockholders neglecting for over four years to disaffirm an action of trustees in transferring all the corporation property in settlement of a claim, from attacking the validity of the transfer, Sheldon Co. v. Eickemeyer Co. 90 N. Y. 607; one leasing to a corporation, to deny its corporate character, Whitney v. Robinson, 53 Wis. 309; and a school-board treasurer to deny its legal existence so as to avoid his contract to convey land to it, Frick v. Trustees of Schools, 99 Ill. 167.

It must be obvious, however, that the doctrine of estoppel can go no further, than to preclude a party from denying that he has done that which he had power to do. (w) 1 The whole law of estoppel may seem to rest only on the ground, that the law will not permit a party to profit by his own fraud; and * upon fraud, actual or constructive, most of the cases do certainly rest. But it is also true, that if one, in honest error, asserts that which is not true, and makes the assertion for the purpose of influencing a party, who acts upon and trusts to the assertion in good faith, he that made the mistake shall not be permitted to correct it for his own benefit, and to the injury of the innocent party, who was deceived by his assertion. (x) The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a municipal corporation which issues bonds purporting on their face to be issued in conformity with a statute, is estopped from denying that fact when they have been put into the market. (y)1 However equally innocent the assertor may have been, the falsehood asserted was a wrong done to the other party. It is possible that the estoppel might, in such a case, be overcome, by the assertor showing that he was deceived by circumstances which entirely justify his belief, and that his own negligence in no way cooperated to produce the error. It is in reference to questions of this kind, that it has been said, that he who asserts what he does not know to be true, stands upon the same footing with him who asserts what he knows to be false; a principle which we cannot admit, as we elsewhere state, without important qualification. (z) 2

Angell & Ames on Corp. § 635; Dutchess Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 238; Searsbnrgh T. Co. v. Cutler, 36 Vt. 315. A party contracting with another as a corporation is estopped to deny the legal existence of each corporation. Worcester M. I. v. Harding, 11 Cash. 285. See contra, Welland Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480. If the maker of a note, at its maturity, deliver to an agent another note to be used in renewal thereof, and the holder refuses to accept the same in renewal, but takes it as collateral and then uses it as his own by procuring it to be discounted, he is estopped to say that he did not accept it for the purpose for which it was given; and, after paying the same, may maintain an action upon it, although he has afterwards refused to deliver up the original note to the maker. Dewey v. Bell, 5 Allen, 165. In Forsvth v. Day, 46 Me. 176, it was held, that where the apparent maker of a note upon its presentment for payment indulges in language or acts calculated to induce a reasonable belief that the note was genuine, although he may not be regarded as adopting the note as his own, still he will be estopped from denying his liability thereon, if the holder, acting upon the belief thereby created, has suffered damage.

(u) "Any culpable conduct, by which the relation of the parties to the property is completely altered, will have the same effect as fraud. Denman, C. J., in Coles v. Bank of England, 10 A. & E. 437, 452.

In that case an action was brought for a portion of stock held by testatrix, which had been fraudulently transferred; this was successfully resisted, on the ground, that, though there was no knowledge of the fraud, the stockholder had the means of knowledge, and was guilty of gross negligence, in receiving the diminished dividends without objection.

(v) Cornish v. Abington, 4 H. & N. 549.

(w) Thus, a corporation may show its incapacity for a certain contract or course of action. In Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray, 161, the question was, whether a married woman maybe barred by an estoppel in pais. Per Thomas, J.: "This doctrine of estoppel in pais would seem to be stated broadly enough, when it is said that such estoppel is as effectual as the deed of the party. To say that one may by acts in pais, by admission, by concealment, or by silence, in effect do what could not be done by deed, would be practically to dispense with all the limitations the law has imposed upon the capacity of infants and married women." Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf. 224. There cannot be an estoppel to show a violation of a statute, even to the prejudice of an innocent party. Steadman v. Duhamel, 1 C. B. 888. Legal incapacity cannot be removed by fraudulent representations, nor can there "be an estoppel involved in the act to which the incapacity relates, that can take away that incapacity. Keen v. Coleman, 39 Penn. St. 299.