(m) Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 219; Winch v. Winchester, 1 Ves. & B. 378; Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516. (The foregoing are judgments of Sir William Grant ) Rich v. Jackson, 6 Ves 334, note per Lord Loughborough, Ch.; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & L. 39. Alderson, B., Attorney-General v. Sitwell, I Younge & C, Ex. 583.

1 An agreement by a defendant that if a testator will bequeath him $30,000, instead of $20,000 to him and $10,000 to the plaintiffs, he will hold $10,000 of it in trust for them, will be specifically enforced either as effectuating a trust or as preventing a fraud Williams v. Vreeland, 2 Stewart, 417. - K.

2 Where from fraud, accident, or mistake a writing does not correctly represent the agreement of the parties, it is held in some jurisdictions that a suit may be maintained to reform the writing and to enforce it as reformed, though the contract is within the statute of frauds. Lenty v. Hillas, 2 De G. & J. 110; Murphy v. Rooney, 45 Cal. 78;

Law gives no relief where the mistake is one of law, or one arising from ignorance of law. This is well settled. It was once intimated that the maxim, "ignorantia legis neminem ezcusat" applied only to crimes and public offences, (n) but it is now universally agreed that it is of equal force in civil cases at law. (o) Whether this rule has equal force in equity may not be quite so certain, (p) In Ohio, it would seem that equity gives relief in mistakes of law, where law would not, (q) and in Kentucky, (r) and Connecticut, (s) there seems to be a disposition to give relief equally in mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. In England, at least, there is some conflict, (t) But even there, the courts of equity appear now to adopt this rule; (u) and, in this country, the high authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the State courts generally, may be regarded as having conclusively established the rule, (v) subject, perhaps, to some qualification in particular cases.

(n) Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, Mosely, 364, 2 Jacob & W. 205.

(o) See Lord Cottenham's remarks upon the case quoted in the preceding note, in Stewart v. Stewart, 6' Clark & F. 968. This rule is limited, however, to general public laws which prescribe a rule of action for the whole community; and has no application to special acts which are intended only to operate upon particular individuals. Ring v. Doolittle, l Head, 77.

( p) See Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Culbreath o. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64.

(q) McNaughton 0. Partridge, 11 Ohio, 223.

(r) Ray v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 B. Mon. 510; Gratz 0. Redd, 4 B. Mon. 178.

(s) Northrop 0. Graves, 19 Conn. 548.

(t) See cases before cited, and Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Sen. 126; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149,170; Eaglesfield 0. Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693, 709.

(u) Stewart v. Stewart, 6 Clark & F. 968; Cholmondeley v Clinton, 2 Meriv. 171, 233, 328; Denys v. Shuckburgh, 4 Younge & C, Ex. 42.

(v) Hunt v. Rousmaniere, I Pet. 15, 8 Wheat 211; Hepburn v. Dunlop, 10 Wheat. 179, 195; Shotwell 0. Murray, I Johns. Ch. 512, 515; Lyon 0. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch. 51; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 169; Kenyon v. Welty, 20 Cal. 637; Snell v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 98 U. S. 85; Hamblin v. Bishop, 41 Fed. Rep. 74; Corrigan v. Tiernay, 100 Mo. 276; Kelly v. Turner, 74 Ala. 513; Cald well v Depew, 40 Minn 528.

Philpott v. Elliott, 4 Md. Ch. 273; Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385; Beardsley v. Dunt-ley, 69 N. Y. 577.

In Massachusetts and other States this relief will only be granted where it is sought to avoid the effect of a provision of the agreement as written, and not where it is sought to enlarge the subject-matter of the contract, or to add a new term to the contract. Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24; Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 585, 587; Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80; Cliner v. Hovey, 15 Mich. 18; National Iron Armor Co. v. Bruner, 19 N. J. Eq. 331; Davis v. Ely, 104 N. C. 16; Whiteaker v. Vanschoiack, 5 Ore. 113; Dennis p. Dennis. 4 Rich. Eq. 307. And see Quinn v. Roath, 37 Conn. 16. Wells, J., in the case of Glass v. Hulbert, supra, thus stated the reason for this distinction. " When the omitted term is within the statute of frauds, there is no valid agreement which the court is authorized to enforce outside of the writing. In such a case relief may be had against the enforcement of the contract as written, or the assertion of rights acquired under It contrary to the terms and intent of the real agreement of the parties. . • . But rectification by making the contract include obligations or subject-matter to which its written terms would not apply, is a direct enforcement of the oral agreement, as much in conflict with the statute of frauds, as if there were no writing at all."

A contract cannot, in general, be rescinded for an innocent mistake, if the rescission will work an injustice to either party, * or, in other words, if both parties cannot be replaced substantially in their former condition. (w)

Mistake as to foreign laws, or those of another State, is a mistake of fact. (x) The mistake of law of an agent, in paying out money without the special direction of his principal, has been held to be no bar to a recovery by the principal, (y)

Some disposition has been manifested to give relief for mistake of law, which would be withheld if there were only an ignorance of it. (a) We doubt whether this distinction will be found of much use.

A contract entered into under the supposition that the law affecting it was in accordance with a previous decision upon a similar state of facts, will not be set aside because of a subsequent decision by the same court overruling the former one, and declaring a different rule on the subject, (b)

Courts of law, as well as of equity, give relief where there is a mistake both of law and of fact; that is, one who is injured by his mistake of fact, does not lose his remedy by having mistaken the law also, (c)