This subject has already been considered, to some extent, in the preceding chapter. We add, that the language of this clause is exceedingly general. It comprehends all contracts; and, whatever may have been in the minds of the framers of the Constitution,(c) - and arguments have been strongly urged on this ground,

(b) Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183, 184. Per Robertson, C. J.: "Marriage, though in one sense a contract, because, being both stipulatory and consensual, it cannot be valid without the spontaneous concurrence of two competent minds, is nevertheless sui generis, and, unlike ordinary or commercial contracts, is publici juris, because it establishes fundamental and most important domestic relations. And therefore, as every well organized society is essentially interested in the existence and harmony and decorum of all its social relations, marriage, the most elementary and useful of them all, is regulated and controlled by the sovereign power of the State, and cannot, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the contracting parties, but may be abrogated by the sovereign will, either with or without the consent of both parties, whenever the public good, or justice to both or either of the parties, will be thereby subserved. Such a remedial and conservative power is inherent in every independent nation, and cannot be surrendered or subjected to political restraint or foreign control, consistently with the public welfare. And therefore marriage, being much more than a contract and depending essentially on the sovereign will, is not, as we presume, embraced by the constitutional interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of contracts. The obligation is created by the public law, subject to the public will, and not to that of the parties. So far as a dissolution of a marriage, by public authority, may be for the public good, it may be the exercise of a legislative function; but so far as it may be for the benefit of one of the parties, in consequence of a breach of a contract by the other, it is undoubtedly judicial." In White v. White, 5 Barb 474, Mason, J., held, that marriage is not a contract, in the common-law or popular sense of the term, and that the relation of husband and wife is not within the prohibition of the Constitution respecting contracts, and came to a conclusion adverse to that intimated by Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward. In Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N. H. 268, per Woodbury, J., marriage was held to be a mere civil contract.

(bb) Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164.

(c) Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 644, per Marshall, C. J.-"It is more than possible, that the preservation of rights of this description was not particularly in the view of the framers of the Constitution, when the clause under consideration was introduced into that instrument. It is probable that interferences of more frequent occurrence, to which the temptation was stronger, and of which the mischief was more extensive, to limit the operation of this clause, - it is now quite settled that the clause is to be construed by itself, so far, at least, that there is no contract which a State law can affect which is not within the prohibition. Hence a contract between two States is a contract in this sense and for this purpose, (d) *This clause leaves no room for any question as to the degree in which the obligation of a contract is impaired, in order to come within the prohibition. Any change which bears injuriously upon the obligation, is fatal, and avoids the law which makes this change.

The Constitution gives to Congress the power of making a bankrupt law, and this power has been repeatedly exercised. But it seems to be settled that this power is not exclusive; because the several States may also make distinct bankrupt laws, each State for itself, (e) In fact, however, no State has enacted a bankruptcy law under that name; but all, or nearly all, have, or have had, insolvent laws, or at least laws making provision of some sort of cases of insolvency; and some of these insolvent laws have seemed to contain all the elements and characteristics which should entitle them to the name of bankrupt laws. (f) constituted the great motive for imposing this restriction on the State legislatures But although a particular and a rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by the rule when established, unless some plain and strong reason for excluding it can be given. It is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the convention, when the article was framed, nor of the American people when it was adopted. It is necessary to go further, and to say, that had this particular been suggested, the language would have been so varied as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception. The case being within the words of the rule, must be within its operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal con-struction so obviously absurd, or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify those who expound the Constitution, in making it an exception."

(d) Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 457. A contract of a State with an individual, whether it assumes the form of a grant or not, is a contract within the prohibition of the Constitution. New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 id. 87. Marshall. C. J.: " When, then, a law is in its nature a contract; when absolute rights have vested under the contract, - a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights; and the act of annulling them, if legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every individual in the community." Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190; Adams v. Hackett, 7 Foster, 294; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet 560. In Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, the State of Arkansas chartered a bank of which it owned all the stock, and provided in the charter that the bills of the bank should be received in payment of debts due the State; it was held, that a contract subsisted between the State and the holders of the notes, and that a repeal of that provision could not affect notes in circulation at the time of the repeal, with which the holder might discharge any debt due from him to the State. See Wabash, etc. Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448.