The effect of this clause upon the subject of marriage, or rather of divorce, has also been considered, but not yet fully ascertained and defined by adjudication. It has been decided that marriage is not a contract which comes within the scope of this clause; (yy) but it seems also to have been settled, that this clause may operate on the contract of * marriage, leaving only the question as to what is the effect and operation of the clause. It might seem, on general principles, that, if it be applicable at all, it must go so far as to prevent any divorce for reasons which were not sufficient ground for divorce when the marriage was contracted. Or, in other words, that a legislature might pass what law it would as to divorce, limiting its effect to marriages which should take place after the law was enacted; but that any law creating new grounds or new facilities for the divorce of parties married before the law was passed, would impair the obligation of the marriage contract, and therefore be void. We have not, however, sufficient adjudication for positively asserting this as law. (z) And, in one very important case, - in which, however, it is true that whatever touches marriage is spoken altogether obiter, - it is implied, that any divorce is valid which is granted for any cause which may be regarded v. Assessors of Watertown, 25 Wend. 686, 1 Hill, 616, 2 id 353; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Gordon v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525. Accordingly, it has been held, that where a charter prescribes the payment of a certain per cent. on the dividends of the corporation, as a tax, that is a temporary rule of taxation, which may afterwards he increased. Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Barr, 442; Debolt v Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. 1 Ohio St. 563, 16 How. 416. The legislature may exempt property from taxation for the time being, and a town cannot levy a tax upon it until the law exempting it is repealed. Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 142; Capen v. Glover, 4 Mass. 305. But a town cannot, by a grant or stipulation in a conveyance, exempt property thereafter from taxation. Mack v. Jones, 1 Foster, 393

(y) Hardy v. Waltham, 7 Pick 108; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 144; Fall v. County of Sutter, 21 Cal. 237.

(yy) Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. 255; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190; Rugh v. Ottenheimer. 6 Oreg. 231; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263.

(z) It was held in Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H 380, that a general law providing for the dissolution of existing marriages, for transactions occurring subsequent to its passage, which were not grounds of divorce when the marriage was contracted, is not within the prohibition of this clause of the Constitution.

as a breach of the marriage contract; for, if this contract be broken, there is no obligation left to be impaired, (a) If this be so, the operation of this * clause upon the contract of marriage would be confined to preventing a divorce at the will of one party, against the will of the other party, and for no cause. It should be added, that there is, at least, one judicial decision; that marriage is not only a contract, but much more than a contract, and so much more that it is not to be considered as within the scope or intention of the clause of the Constitution, (b)

(a) Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. Marshal, C. J.: "The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. It never has been understood to restrict the general right of the legislature to legislate on the subject of divorces." Story, J., pp. 695-697: "As to* the case of the contract of marriage, which the argument supposes not to be within the reach of the prohibitory clause, because it is a matter of civil institution, I profess not to feel the weight of the reason assigned for the exception. In a legal sense, all contracts recognized as valid, in any country, may be properly said to be matters of civil institution, since they obtain their obligation and construction jure loci contractus. Titles to land, constituting part of the public domain, acquired by grants under the provisions of existing laws, by private persons, are certainly contracts of civil institution. Yet no one ever supposed that, when acquired bona fide, they were not beyond the reach of legislative revocation. And so, certainly, is the established doctrine of this court. ... A general law regulating divorces from the contract of marriage, like a law regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of contracts, is not necessarily a law impairing the obligation of such a contract. Holmes v. Lansing, 3 Johns. Cas. 73. It may be the only effectual mode of enforcing the obligations of the contract on both sides. A law punishing a breach of a contract, by imposing a forfeiture of the rights acquired under it. or dissolving it because the mutual obligations were no longer observed, is in no correct sense a law impairing the obligations of the contract. Could a law, compelling a specific performance, by giving a new remedy, be justly deemed an excess of legislative power ? Thus far the contract of marriage has been considered with reference to general laws regulating divorces, upon breaches of that contract. But if the argument means to assert, that the legislative power to dissolve such a contract, without any breach on either side against the wishes of the parties, and without any judicial inquiry to ascertain a breach, I certainly am not prepared to admit such a power, or that its exercise would not intrench upon the prohibition of the Constitution. If, under the faith of existing laws, a contract of marriage be duly solemnized, or a marriage settlement Be made and marriage is always in law a valuable consideration for a contract), it is not easy to perceive why a dissolution of its obligations, without any default or assent of the parties, may not as well fall within the prohibitions as any other contract for a valuable consideration. A man has quite as good a right to his wife as to the property acquired under a marriage contract. He has a legal right to her society and her fortune; and to divert such right without his default, and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the principles of justice as the confiscation of his own estates. I leave this case, however, to be settled when it shall arise. I have gone into it because it was urged with great earnestness upon us, and required a reply. It is sufficient now to say, that, as at present advised, the argument derived from this source does not impress my mind with any new and insurmountable difficulty." The dicta of Story, J., are ratified in Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23. In Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295, it was held, that, as respects property, the contract of marriage must stand' upon the same footing as other contracts, and that where the husband, by virtue of the marriage relation or as incident thereto, becomes entitled to the property of the wife, a law passed subsequent to their marriage and vesting her property solely in herself, as her own sole and separate property, is void, as impairing the obligation of a contract.

It has been held that a statute may be constitutional which modifies the law as to dower where the marriage took place before the law was enacted, if the death of the husband had not completed his wife's title to dower. (bb)