Notes and bills payable on demand are in one sense always overdue;2 they are not, however, so treated until payment has been demanded and refused, [or, in this country, until a reasonable time from the date of making has elapsed]; then they become like bills on time which have been dishonored. There is this difference between a note on time and a note on demand; a note on time, after that time has passed, is certainly dishonored, and an indorsee must know it. But there is no time when a note on demand must have been dishonored, and none therefore when an indorsee could not have received it without that knowledge. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to * say that if a note which was payable at any day, has not been paid for very many days, it may fairly be presumed to have been dishonored, and an indorsee after this lapse of time, may be held to have had a sufficient notice of its dishonor; and [the] American authorities hold this view. (c)1 [In England, the principle that notes payable on demand may become discredited by mere lapse of time is not adopted.]2 The law does not presume that they were made with the intention of immediate demand and payment. [Therefore, both in England and in this country, presentment for payment within a reasonable time is sufficient (and also necessary) in order to charge indorsers.]3 And if it provides for interest, this strengthens the probability that the maker was to have a credit of some extent, and the indorser or guarantor will be held liable accordingly. (d) In such cases the note may be regarded as a continuing security, and the indorser would remain liable until an actual demand. Nor would the holder be chargeable with neglect for omitting to make such demand within any particular time. (e)1 A note payable generally, but not specifying any time of payment, is due immediately; and a provision that interest is to accrue after a specified contingency, as the decision of a certain suit, does not affect this rule. (f)

(x) Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B.430. But see Hausbrough v. Gray, 3 Gratt. 356.

(y) Fenton v. Pocock, 5 Taunt. 192; Bank of Montgomery v. Walker, 9 S. & R. 229; Murray v. Judah, 6 Cowen, 484; Clopper v. Union Bank of Maryland, 7 Har. & J. 92; Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick. 547; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227;

Marr v. Johnson, 9 Yerg. 1; per Wilde, J., Com. Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick. 274; Far. & M. Bank v. Rathbone, 26 Vt. 19; Strong v. Foster, 33 E. L. & E. 282; s. c. 17 C. B. 201; Prouty v. Roberts, 6 Cush. 19. See also Parks v. Ingram, 2 Foster (N. H.),283; Kirschner v. Conklin, 40 Conn. 77.

1 One who has become a party to accommodation paper may, before it has been transferred, revoke the authority to negotiate it. Second Nat. Bank v. Howe, 40 Minn. 390; Smith's Exec. v. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77; Dogan v. Dubois, 2 Rich. Eq. 85. And his death operates as a revocation of such authority. Smith's Exec. v. Wyckoff, supra; Michigan Insurance Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11. But it has been held that a purchaser for value may enforce the instrument if he purchased in ignorance that it was given for accommodation, though he knew of the death of the accommodating party. Clark v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 216. An accommodation indorser may revoke his indorsement after the note has been pledged, on paying the debt himself. Berkeley v. Tinsley, 88 Va. 1001.

Though accommodation paper is not transferred till after maturity in England, a purchaser may nevertheless enforce it. Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224; Stein v. Yglesias, 3 Dowl. 252; Sturtevant v. Ford, 4 M. & G. 101; Carruthers v. West, 11 Q. B. 143; Parr v. Jewell, 13 C. B. 909; 16 C. B. 684; Ex parte Swan, L. R. 6 Eq. 344. And in accord with the English law are Miller v. Larned, 103 Ill. 562; First Nat. Bank v. Grant, 71 Me. 374; Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95, 105; Seyfert v. Edison, 45 N. J. 393; Davis v. Miller, 14 Gratt. 1. But generally in this country the law is otherwise. Battle v. Weems, 44 Ala. 105; (cf. Connerly v. Planters', etc. Ins. Co. 66 Ala. 432, 442); Coghlin v. May, 17 Cal. 515; McPherson v. Weston, 85 Cal. 90; Whitwell v. Crehore, 8 La. 540; Kellogg v. Barton, 12 Allen, 527; Chester v. Dorr, 41 N. Y. 279; Hoffman v. Foster, 43 Pa. 137; Hart v. U. S. Trust Co. 118 Pa. 565, 569; Bacon v. Harris, 15 R. I. 599.

2 Thus an action may be brought immediately, without a demand, against a party primarily liable on such an instrument, and the statute of limitations runs from the date of issue. See Vol. III. * 92.

(c) If not negotiated until a long time after it is made, it is subject to all the equities in the hands of an indorsee, as it would be in the possession of the payee. Furman v. Haskin, 2 Caines, 369; Hendricks v. Judah, 1 Johns. 319; and two months and a half after a note was dated was held sufficient to let in the equities of the maker against the payee, in an action by the indorsee. Losee v. Dunkin, 7 Johns. 70. Under different circumstances, a period of five months after a note was dated was held not sufficient for this purpose. Sandford v. Mickles, 4 Johns. 324. So seven days has been held not to be sufficient. Thurston v. Mc-Kown, 6 Mass. 428; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370. In this case the rule concerning notes payable on demand was thus laid down by Parsons, C. J.: "A note payable on demand is due presently. In this case the note has been due eight months before it was indorsed, a length of time sufficient to induce suspicions that the promisors would not pay it, and to cause some inquiry to be made, whether it had in fact been dishonored, or why payment had not been made. If there was no other circumstance, this would be a good reason to let the defendants into any defence which could legally be made by them, if Page [the payee and indorser] were the plaintiff." See also Tomlinson v. Kinsella, 31 Conn. 2G8; Stewart v. Smith. 28 Ill. 397; Dennen v. Haskell, 45 Me. 430; Birch v. Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; La Due v. First Bank, 31 Minn. 33; Cross v. Brown. 51 N. H. 486; Merrick v. Woolyerton, 41 N. Y. 581; Atlantic Co. v. Tredick, 5 R. I. 171; Morey v. Wakefield, 41 Vt. 24.