1 That the national bankrupt law did not nullify, supersede, or wholly suspend the insolvent laws of the several States, and that jurisdiction might be exercised under the latter, at least until the jurisdiction of the Federal court had been called into exercise, see Reed v. Taylor. 32 la. 209. See also In re Damon, 70 Me. 153. That the right under a State statute to arrest a fraudulent debtor, whose debt would not be released by a discharge in bankruptcy, was not suspended by the bankrupt law of 1867, see Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324; nor the power to pass State laws for winding up the estates of insolvent corporations, see Chandler v. Siddle, 10 Baukr. Reg. 236. - K.

A somewhat analogous question arises in the several States, but is sometimes provided for by the statutes. It is, whether an insolvent act avoids voluntary assignments. We have already intimated, that the general purpose of an insolvent law being to produce an equal or ratable division of the effects of a debtor, it should do more than encourage this; it should prohibit *and prevent preferences, by something more effectual than merely withholding a discharge. In most of the States this is now done. But the practice does not always conform to the law. Thus, in Massachusetts, where a voluntary assignment is void, or would not protect the transfer of property against process under the insolvent law, it is not uncommon to make such assignments, the assignees being required to collect, dispose of, and distribute all the effects and property of the assignor, without preference, and in exact conformity with the provisions of the insolvent law. Where everything is done under such an assignment in good faith, and no suspicion attaches, and the creditors come in, and the assignor is discharged under seal, the whole effect of the insolvent law is produced without the delay and cost of the legal processes, (g)1 Such an assignby a decree of the court. Before that time, I think, upon a sound construction of the bankrupt act, it does not necessarily come in conflict with the insolvent laws of the States." Battle, J., delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Ex parte Ziegenfuss, 2 Ired. 463. But this doctrine has not met with subsequent approval. In Judd v. Ives, 4 Met. 401, the court say , "We are of opinion that the act of Congress, to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, does suspend the operation of the law of this Commonwealth, entitled ' An Act for the relief of Insolvent Debtors, & c, as to all persons and cases that are within its provisions. . . . But we are nevertheless of opinion, that this consequence of the act is limited to cases instituted under the insolvent law subsequent to the period when the bankrupt law went into operation, and that it cannot supersede or suspend proceedings rightfully commenced under the insolvent act, prior to the time of its going into operation." Ex parte

Eames, 2 Story, 322, 5 Law Reporter, 117; In the matter of Holmes, 5 Law Rep. 360, in the District. Court of Maine. In Griswold v. Pratt, 9 Met. 16, the doctrine of Ziegenfnss s case was adverted to, and the court said: "This principle, though at first view it may seem plausible, cannot, we, think, be sustained." Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass 1, and the cases cited by Parker, C. J. And a debt contracted while the insolvent law was suspended by the national bankrupt law, may be discharged under the insolvent law, which revived when the bankrupt law was repealed. Austin v. Caverley, 10 Met. 332. (g) It may properly be observed, how. ever, that there is always more or less of hazard attending such assignments, though they are frequently made The assignment must be drawn in all its details with the greatest care, and slight errors are of fatal consequence Moreover, there is not unfrequently difficulty in relation to the assent of creditors, ft any of them choose, they may, unless there be some statute provision allowing such ment is made legal in England by 12 & 13 Vict, if six-sevenths of the creditors approve it (h)1

1 By Mass Acts of 1887, c. 340, all acts done by trustees under such an assignment are valid if a majority in number and value of the creditors assent.

* Always and everywhere an assignment for the benefit of creditors is void if it be fraudulent But it seems to be conceded, that an assignment is not fraudulent in this sense, and to this effect, whenever the assignee may, under its provisions, commit a fraud, but only when those provisions, if carried out according to their fair and rational meaning, would, of themselves, work a fraud. (i) And the character of the assignment, in this particular, cannot be created, or even affected, by events subsequent to the assignment(j) assignments, invalidate the whole proceedings. The practice may be indulged in so long as the proceeding is wholly in pan, but when the matter comes before the courts, they are bound by the statutes Mann v. Huston, 1 Gray, 25a In Barton v. Tower, 5 Law Reporter, 214, an assignment of their property had been made bv two partners, with a direction that it should be distributed among their creditors by the assignees, " in the same manner as if the same were in the hands of an assignee under the bankrupt act of the United States, by virtue of proceedings duly had in bankruptcy." This assignment was held an act of bankruptcy and void. And Conckling, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "There are three descriptions of fraudulent conveyances, assignments, Ac, which bring a merchant, banker, factor, etc, within the operation of the first section of the bankrupt act I. Such as are fraudulent, or against the common law, or the provision of such English statutes as have been incorporated into the jurisprudence of this country, 2. (As I am now well satisfied, whatever doubts I may have originally entertained), such as are voluntarily made, in contemplation of bankruptcy, and for the purpose of giving a preference to one or more of the creditors of the debtor over his other creditors. The making of a conveyance of this description has always been "held to be an act of bankruptcy under the English bankrupt law, as being contrary to the policy of law, without any express words in the statute. But in our act they are expressly declared to be ' utterly void, and a fraud upon this act' 3 Assignments of all the effects of the debtor, whether upon trust for the benefit of his creditors or not, on the ground, first, that the debtor necessarily deprives himself, by such an act, of the power of carrying on his trade, and secondly, that he endeavors to put his property under a course of application and distribution among his creditors, different from that which would take place under the bankrupt law. It is unnecessary to cite authorities to show, that such an assignment is an act of bankruptcy in England, because it has been a well-settled and familiar rule. It is a sound and useful rule; and there is nothing whatever in the language of our act which requires a different construction in this respect." Ex parte Breneman, Crabbe, 456