Consideration not infrequently becomes important in executed transfers of property, especially in the law of fraudulent conveyances; and in such transfers courts of equity have recognized as a vital element in sustaining a contested conveyance, not only a valuable consideration, but also what has been called a good or meritorious consideration; that is, affection based on kindred by blood or marriage. Such reasoning has no place in the law of executory contracts. What is described as good or meritorious consideration will not support a promise. It is in fact nothing more than motive or moral obligation.35

Marriage is regarded by the law as a valuable consideration and marriage or promise of marriage is sufficient consideration for a promise.36 cher p. Fletcher, 191 Mass. 211, 77 N. E. 758; McMillan v. Ames, 33 Minn. 357,22 N. W. 612; Hale v. Dressen, 73 Minn. 277, 76 N. W. 31; Aller v. Alter, 40 N. J. L. 446; Waln v. Waln, 68 N. J. L. 640, 34 Atl. 106S; Wester v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 24 8. E. 9; Miles v. Hemenway, 59 Ore. 318, 117 Pac. 273; Evans v. Dravo, 24 Pa. 62, 62 Am. Dec. 359; Clymer v. Graff, 220 Pa. 580, 69 Atl. 1119; Monro v. National Surety Co., 47 Wash. 488, 92 Pac 280; Walterman v. Village of Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663,130 N. W. 479.

32See infra, Sec.218.

33See infra, Sec.217, ad fin.

34See Pound, "Consideration in Eqaity," 13 111. L. Rev. 436.

35See infill, Sec.Sec. 147-149. In Cono-ver'a Adra'r v. Brown's Ex'rs, 49 N. J. Eq. 156, 23 Atl. 607, the court asstained a promissory note given to a daughter without valuable consideration for the purpose of equalizing distribution of the maker's estate, by treating the note as a sealed note in view of the words "witness my hand and seal" contained in the note, though in fact there was no seal. This case, however, depends on the jurisdiction of a court of equity to make a transaction conform to the real intent of the parties; and the only importance of the "good" consideration afforded by the payee being the maker's daughter was to obviate the rule generally applied by Courts of Equity (see infra, Sec. 217, ad fin.) that an imperfect gift will not be aided.

36 The commonest illustration of this is found in mutual promises to marry which have always been held to constitute a good contract, since the case of Harrison c. Cage, 5 Mod. 411.

The question most commonly arises, not in the law of contracts, but in the law of conveyances fraudulent as against creditors; and here it is held also that marriage is a valuable consideration, and a reasonable marriage settlement made or promised in writing (to comply with the Statute of Frauds) can not be attacked by the settlor's creditors.37 But whether the question concerns an executory contract or a conveyance, the marriage or promise of marriage must have been contemporaneous or subsequent to the promise or conveyance for which consideration is sought and must have been given as consideration. A previous marriage is of no more validity than any other past consideration.38