It has been held in some cases that a promise to marry at a time more tham a year from the making of the agreement is not within the statute,81 but the contrary rule is better supported.82 If any distinction is made between contracts to marry and other agreements, it can be based only on an exception made to the statute in violation of its terms from judicial ideas of public policy. The fact that such promises have been held unaffected by the clause of the statute relating to promises in consideration of marriage is immaterial.82 Contracts which are not obnoxious to one clause of the statute are not therefore free from objection based on another clause, if that is applicable; and, on the other hand, contracts relating to land or goods, guaranties, as well as contracts relating to other matters, if at any time within three yean was held valid. Bickel v. Weaainger, 58 Or. 98, 113 Pac. 34. See also Parker v. Siple, 76 Ind. 345; Iinscott v. Mc-Intire, 15 Me. 201; Kent v. Kent, 18 Pick. 569; Ward v. Haabrouck, 169 N. Y. 407, 62 N. E. 434. The opinion in Mills v. O'Daniel, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 73,62 S. W. 1123, cannot be supported. The contract there provided that a certain sum should be paid and accepted in full satisfaction if paid "within two years." The court held the contract within the statute because suit could not be brought upon it until the two years had expired. But the statute invalidates contracts which cannot be performed within a year, not those in which the permissible period is greater than a year. See also Thomas v. Croom, 102 Ark. 108, 143 S. W. 88.
79Daily v. Cain, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 936, 13 8. W. 424.
80 Hodges v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 9 R. I. 482. The parties in this case had apparently estimated the neces-aary period as two years or longer. See also Southwell v. Beealey, 5 Ore. 143, 458, where a contract to pay for sheep within three years, 'or as soon as the vendee " can make the price out of them " was held not within the statute.
81 Blackburn v. Mann, 85 111. 223; Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md. 294, 45 Atl. 459, 47 L. R. A. 386; Brick s. Gannar, 36 Hun, 52.
82Ullman v. Meyer, 10 Fed. 241; Paris «. Strong, 51 Ind. 339; Nichols v. Weaver, 7 Kans. 373; Barge v. Haslam, 63 Neb. 296, 88 N. W. 516.
83 See supra, Sec. 486; Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515.
not performable within a year fall within the clause of the statute here under consideration, whether also objectionable under another clause or not. Thus, a contract purporting to lease realty is within the statute if the agreed end of the term is more than a year from the time the contract is made; although the term itself is of so short duration that it would be valid if the agreement provided that the term should begin presently,84 unless the local statute as construed by the courts provides that leases of certain length shall be valid, whether made a long or short time before they are to take effect.85So a contract to sell goods not performable within a year is not excluded from the operation of the statute by the acceptance and actual receipt of the goods.86
84Bain v. McDonald, 111 Ala. 269, 20 So. 77; Wickson v. Monarch Cycle Co., 128 Cal. 156, 60 Pac. 764, 79 Am. St. Rep. 36; Brodner v. Swiiaky, 86 Conn. 32, 84 All. 104, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 654; Wheeler v. Frankrathal, 78 111. 124; Wolf v. Doser, 22 Kans. 436; Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 164 S. W. 900; Delano p. Montague, 4 Cuah. 42; Shacklett v. Cummins, 178 Mo. App. 309, 165 S. W. 1145; White v. Holland, 17 Ore. 3, 3 Pac. 673; Anderson p. Frye, 69 Wash. 89, 124 Pac. 499; Brown v. Kayser, 60 Wis. 1, 18 N. W. 523. It is indeed said in Indiana that the clause of the statute invalidating oral agreements not performable within a year has no application to agreements concerning land. Baynes v. Cbastain, 68 Ind. 376. See also Higgins v. Gsger, 65 Ark. 604, 47 S. W. 848, but this statement would not generally be accepted.
85 See Higgins v. Gager, 65 Ark. 604, 47 S. W. 848; Sears v. Smith, 3 Col. 287; Steininger v. Williams, 63 Ga. 475; St. Josephs Co. p. Globe Paper Co., 156 Ind. 655, 59 N. E. 995; Stem v. Nysonger, 69 Ia. 512; Whiting v. Ohlert, 62 Mich. 462, 18 N. W. 219,
50 Am. Rep. 265; McCroy v. Tonoy, 66 Miss. 233, 5 So. 392, 2 L. R. A. 847; Ward p. Hasbrouck, 169 N. Y. 407, 62 N. E. 434; Jones p. Bennett, 40 Old. 664, 140 Pac. 148; Darnell p. Hume, 40 Okl. 668, 140 Pac. 775; Hilt-house p. Jennings, 60 S. C. 392,38 S. E. 596; Hayes p. Arrington, 108 Tenn. 494, 68 S. W. 44. In Sutherland p. Drolet, 154 Wis. 619,143 N. W. 663, the court held an oral agreement that a tenant was to occupy certain premises until they were sold void under St. 1911, $2302, requiring an instrument in writing to create any interest in lands, except a leasehold for a term not exceeding one year; and further held that there is no analogy between that statute under which the lease must affirmatively show that the term does not exceed one year, and section 2307, requiring a writing for agreements which by their terms are not to be performed within one year (in which case the agreement is not void unless it affirmatively shows that it will not be performed within the year).
86 Prested Miners Co. p. Garner,  2 K.B.776.