Though the right to rescind for honest misrepresentation seems in a fair way to be generally accepted, other effects of such misrepresentation are not so easily dealt with. It is common enough in our law to find that several parts of it which have grown up with little regard to each other have nevertheless logical and intimate connection, and that the doctrines laid down in one set of cases are hardly reconcilable with those established in others.

Poppleton v. Bryan, 36 Or. 89, 58 Pac. 767; Franz v. Hansen, 36 Dam. L. It. 349.

90 Such misrepresentations of health were held no defence to the insurer in Moulor it. American life Ins. Co., Ill U. S. 33S, 28 L. Ed. 447, 4 Sup. Ct, 466; Grattan v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 274, 44 Am. Rep. 372; Ferguson v. Massachusetts, etc., Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 647; Suraviti c. Prudential Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 582, 91 Atl. 495, L. R. A. 1915 A. 373; Oplinger v. New York L. Ins. Co., 253 Pa. 328, 96 Atl. 568. There is here also another reason for denying rescission. Representations of health must be understood as limited to the speaker's knowledge. Beyond that he can only give an opinion.

91 Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation, 262, 264.

92 In support of the denial of rescission except under these circumstances, Bower cites Atwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232; Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Cas. 605; Brownlie v. Campbell, 6 App. Cas. 925; Soper v. Arnold, 37

C. D. 96, affd. 14 App. Cos. 429; May v. Piatt, [1900] 1 Ch. 616; Debenham v. Sawbridge, [19011 2 Ch. 98; Be Metal Constituents, Ltd., [1902] 1 Ch. 707, 709; Seddon v. North Eastern Salt Co., [1905] 1 Ch. 326; Milch v. Coburn, (1910] 27 T. L. Rep. 170, and Angel v. Jay, (1911) 1 K. B. 666. The right of rescission even of wholly executed contracts, is well recognised where there is actual fraud. See, e. g., Charter v. Trevelyan, 11 a. A Fin. 714. The exception in regard to essential error, Bower states, is not so well recognised, but see Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 A. C. 926,937; Debenham v. Sawbridge, [1901] 2 Ch. 98. It should be observed that even apart from any misrepresentation, the mutual mistake of the parties should afford ground for relief where there is a mistake as to a vital matter.

93 See, e. g., Bloomquist v. Faraon, 222 N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 856; Canadian Agency v. Assets Realisation Co., 165 N. Y. App. Div. 96, 150 N. Y. S. 758, and see American decisions cited supra, note 87.

It is impossible that such a situation can be allowed to exist permanently. Some method of harmonizing the different doctrines must be worked out. The simplified forms of pleading which have almost everywhere superseded the earlier forms which were based on sharp distinctions between the various actions known to the common law, make it even more essential to establish harmony than it was when forms of action were clearly distinguished. Then it was possible as a practical matter to lay down a rule as to one action not wholly consistent with the rule established in regard to another. Then, in the language of an acute writer,"Each category was self-sustaining, its existence was its justification."94 But when the question presented by pleadings is reduced simply to an inquiry whether on a given state of facts a plaintiff is entitled to any relief, it is no longer possible to keep contradictory rules apart.

The law governing misrepresentation furnishes a striking instance of the truth of what has been said. Misrepresentation will call up to a lawyer's mind, primarily, the action on the case for deceit, and the requirements of a proper declaration in that action. But misrepresentation is legally important in other aspects, and some of them may profitably he compared with the rules established or in dispute in the action for deceit; and their connection is so close with the subject of contracts that many rights classed as contractual cannot otherwise be understood thoroughly.