It may be supposed that a voluntary conveyance or obligation under seal does not express the intention of the donor, either because it gives too much or gives too little. If it gives more than the donor intended, a court of equity will reform it though the donee knew nothing of the mistake.85 On the other

82 Davis v. Ely, 104 N. C. 16,10 S. K 138,5 L. R. A. 810,17 Am. St. Rep. 667.

83 See supra, Sec. 494.

84M. Sigbert Awes Co. v. Haslam, 37 N. Dak. 122, 163 N. W. 265; and see supra, Sec. 1425.

85 Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4. Eq. 30; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 40 Ga. 11; Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348; Spencer v. Spencer, 115 Miss. 71, 75 8o. 770; Day v. Day, 84 N. C. 408; Ferrell v. Ferrell, 53 W. Va. 515, 44 8. E. 187.

In Ellis v. Ellis, 26 T. L. Rep. 166, this principle was applied though the mistake seems to have been rather of law than of fact. A husband transferred securities of large value to his wife, intending them as a gift to her absolutely. When he made the gift he knew of his marriage settlement, but did not realise that the gift would come within the operation of a clause therein under which his wife covenanted to settle all after-acquired property. It having been decided that the gift came within the operation of that clause, the husband brought this action for the purpose of obtaining a revocation of the gift upon the ground that it was made under a mistake of fact, it was held, that the gift being voluntary, and having been made under a mistake of fact, the husband was entitled to have it set aside.

In Hood v. Mackinnon, [1901] 1 Ch. 476, the mistake must certainly be considered negligent, but it was held that an appointment of part of a fund by deed poll, made in entire forgetful-ness by the appointor of an earlier appointment of part of the fund to the same person, might be rescinded on the ground of mistake.