The defrauded party may lose his right of rescission by any act done after discovery of the fraud which indicates a willingness to allow the transaction to stand, such as the acceptance or demand of any benefit under the transaction.37 As it is entirely possible for a defrauded person to take the position that if payment or security is at once made he will let the transaction stand, but otherwise will claim the right to rescind, a demand of security does not necessarily indicate affirmance of the contract.38 But if security is actually obtained with knowledge of the fraud this will amount to affirmance,39 as will retention of goods by the seller as security for an unpaid balance of the price.40 Delay or action assuming the validity of the transaction will not prevent rescission if the fraud had not been discovered prior thereto,41 even though considerable time has elapsed.41 The election to rescind must be communicated either by bringing legal proceedings, asserting ownership of
36 Roberts v. James, 83 N. J. L. 492, 85 Atl. 244, Ann. Cos. 1914 B. 859. See also supra, i 1461.
37 Clough v. London, etc., Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 26, 34; Bulkley v. Morgan, 46 Conn. 393; O'Donald v. Constant, 82 Ind. 212; Stokes v. Bums, 132 Mo. 214, 33 S. W. 460; Fowler v. Bowery Bank, 113 N. ¥. 450, 21 N. E. 172, 4 L. R. A. 145, 10 Am. St. Rep. 479; Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. 1019; Genet v. Delaware Canal Co., 170 N. Y. 278, 296, 63 N. E. 350; Davis v. Gilford, 182 N. Y. App. D. 99, 169 N. Y. S. 492; CBryan u. Glenn, 91 Tenn. 106, 17 S. W. 1030, 30 Am. St. Rep. 862. But see Flower v. Brumb&ch, 131 III. 646,23 N. E. 335.
39 Cortland Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 83
Mich. 419, 47 N. W. 330; Boyd v. Shifter, 156 Pa. St. 100, 27 Atl. 60.
39 Bridgcford v. Adams, 45 Ark. 136; Joslin v. Cowee, 52 N. Y. 90.
40 James Music Co. v. Bridge, 134 Wis. 510, 114 N. W. 1108.
41 Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loew-enberg, 17 Wash. 29, 48 Pac. 785, 61 Am. St. Rep. 902. And see decisions cited in previous notes.
42 In Armstrong v, Jackson,  2 K. B. 822, 830, an action for rescission because of fraud, McCsrdie, J., said: "I may point out that mere lapee of time is no answer to a plea of rescission. Here some six years elapsed before the plaintiff claimed to rescind. But in Rothschild v. Brook-man, 5 BH. (N. S.) 165, and in Oclkers v. Ellis, [1914| 2 K. B. 139, six years property fraudulently conveyed, or otherwise.48 And such election when once made is conclusive, and precludes remedies based on a continued existence of the transaction.44