It is a necessary requirement in the nature of things that an agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite to enable a court to fix an exact meaning upon it. If an offer contemplates an acceptance by merely an affirmative answer, the offer itself must contain all the terms necessary for the required definiteness. An offer may, however, contain a choice of terms submitted to the offeree from which he is to make a selection in his acceptance. Such an offer is necessarily indefinite but, if accepted in the way contemplated, the ultimate agreement of the parties is made definite by the acceptance.99 A lack of definiteness in an agreement may concern

72, 58 N. E. 174; Witters v. Glendcn-ning, 87 Wis. 250, 68 N. W. 404.

97 Littleton Savings Bank v. Land Co., 76 ls. 660, 39 N. W. 201; Arm-Strong v. Keith, 3 J. J. Marsh. 153, 20 Am. Dec. 131; Wheeler v. Young, 143 Mass. 143, 9 N. E. 531; Rosemond v. Register Co., 62 Minn. 374, 64 N. W. 925; Albany v. McNamara, 117 N. Y. 168, 22 N. E. 931, 6 L. R. A. 212.

98 Infra, Sec. 1274. Any implied obligation there may be to indemnify a surety who did not become surety at the request of the principal debtor, however, is not contractual but quasi-contrac-tual.

99 Thus in Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424, the offer was to sell "ten or fifteen tons "of iron. Such an offer would require the offeree to fix the amount he wished. So in Keller v. Ybarru, 3 Cal. 147, an offer to sell as many of the defendant's grapes as the plaintiff wished to buy became a binding conthe time of performance, the price to be paid, work to be done, property to be transferred, or to miscellaneous stipulations in the agreement. Especially a reservation to either party of a future untrammelled right to determine the nature of the performance, or a provision that some matter shall be settled by future agreement has often caused a promise to be too indefinite for enforcement. The principle governing all such cases is the same, however, and the classification is merely for convenience. In construing such agreements a court should endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to a bargain of parties who evidently intended to enter into a binding contract 99a and ambiguous words in an obligation should be construed most strongly against the party who used them.1