In theory, however, in a case of debtor and creditor the situation is very different from that arising where the third person is a sole beneficiary. The creditor's right is purely derivative, and if the debtor no longer has a right against the promisor the creditor can have none. On one ground only has the creditor any right to object to a rescission or release. The promise to the debtor to pay the debt is a valuable right belonging to the debtor. like his other property the debtor has no right to give it away if he thereby deprives himself of sufficient l3 Biddd v. BriMolara, 64 Gal. 364, 30 Pac. 606; Merrick c. Giddings, 1 Mackey (D. C), 394; Durham v. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211; Camahan v. Tousey, S3 Ind. 561; Smith v. Flack, 95 Ind. 116, 120; Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 la. 349, 9 N. W. 293, 41 Am. Rep. 103; Cohrt v. Kock, 56 Ia. 658,10 N. W. 230; Seiffert Lumber Co. v. Hartwell, 94 Ia. 576, 682, 63 N. W. 333, 68 Am. St. Rep. 413; Dodge's Adm. v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441; Mitchell v. Cooley, 5 Rob. 240; Cucullu p. Walker, 16 La. Ann. 198; Gamsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 242, 7 Am. Rep. 440; Gifford v. Cor-rigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756, 6 L. R. A. 610; Seaman v. Hasbrouck, 35 Barb. 151; May v. National Bank, 9 Hun, 108, affd. 73 N. Y. 509; Wilson ft Stilwell, 14 Ohio St. 467, 75 Am. Dec. 477; Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378; Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 543, 43 Am. Rep. 436; Emmitt v. Brophy, 42 Ohio St. 82; McCown v. Schrimpf, 21 Tex. 22,73 Am. Dec. 221. Huffman v. Western Mortgage Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 169, 36 S. W. 306; Clark v. Fisk, 9 Utah, 94, 33 Pac. 248; Basaett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319; Stephens v. Casbacker, 8 Hun, 116, is contra. See also Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170.

What is required in the way of assent or acting upon the promise is not defined. Doubtless in many jurisdictions if the third person had knowledge of the promise and made no objection he would be regarded as assenting. But in Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152 (s. c. on appeal sub nom. Crowell p. Hospital, 27 N. J. Eq. 650), it was held that rescission was permissible because the third party had not altered his position, the court apparently requiring something like an estoppel to prevent a rescission; and in Wood v. Moriarty, 16 R. I. 201, 14 Atl. 855, a release by the promisee was held effectual, though the creditors bad made a demand upon the promisor Tor the money, because the creditors "did not do or say anything inconsistent with their continuing to look to T (the original debtor) for the debt." In California (Civ. Code, Sec. 1559) and Oklahoma [Rev. L. (1910), Sec. 895] it is declared by statute: "A contract made expressly for the benefit of a third party may be enforced at any time before the parties thereto rescind." See J. F. Hall Martin Co. v. Hughes, 18 Cal. App. 513, 123 Pac. 617; Hines v, Washita Valley Bank (Old.). 162 Pac. 112.