The nature of a creditor's right against one who has promised the debtor to pay the debt is also involved in determining when the Statute of Limitations bars the creditor's action. On principle the creditor must have a claim that has not been barred against the original debtor, and the latter must also have such a claim against the promisor. But courts which allow a direct right to the creditor against the promisor hold that though the creditor's original claim is barred he may nevertheless enforce a claim against the promisor if the statutory period has not run since the debt was assumed.16

14This analysis finds some support in the cases of Trustees v. Anderson,

30 N. J. Eq. 366; Youngs v. Trustees,

31 N. J. Eq. 290, and Willard v. Wor-sham, 70 Va. 392, where the validity of a release by the mortgagor of one who had purchased the equity of redemption from him and assumed the mortgage was made to depend on the solvency of the mortgagor.

15 This was so held in Hartman v. Piatorius, 248 111. 568, 94 N. E. 131, the court saying (248 111. at p. 573):

"They were as free to cancel and abandon their contract as they had been to enter into it." The case is sound, but it cannot be supported if the theory is accepted that a contract to pay another's debt gives the creditor an irrevocable right either immediately or as soon as he knows of the promise.

16 Daniels v. Johnson, 129 Cal. 415, 61 Pac. 1107, 79 Am. St. Rep. 123; Kuhl v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 101 Wis. 42, 77 N. W. 166. See also Roberta v. Fitzallen, 120 Cal. 482, 62 Pac