As has been Been,15 at common law an assignee of a chose in action could enforce his right at law only in the name of the assignor. He had, however, full power to control an action in that name if the whole right of action was assigned. If the assignor became bankrupt the right of the assignee to enforce the claim in the assignor's name was not lost;16 and if the assignor died the assignee could sue in the name of his executor or administrator.17 The assignor was entitled to indemnity against costs,18 but if thus protected the use of his name could net be prevented by any protest on his part;19 and since the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts of law have themselves so far recognized the equity of the assignee that defences which would be legal had suit been for the benefit of the assignor, in whose name it was brought, will not be permitted against the assignee if on the principles established by courts of equity the assignee should not be subject to them.20 If the assignee has an adequate remedy at law by an action in the name of the assignor, equity will not entertain a suit by him against the debtor.21 But wherever the remedy at law is inadequate, the assignee may sue in equity and in such a suit must proceed in his own name.22 By statute the procedure in regard to the enforcement of the assignee's rights has been much changed in modern times. The statutes may be classed under several heads:

9 See infra, Sec. 1162.

10 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 189. See also Litt. Sel. Cas. (Ky.) 200.

11 This was so held in Houston v. Mo-Neer, 40 W. Va. 366,22 S. E. 80.

12 GsJbreath v. Wallrich, 45 Col. 637, 102 Pac. 1085; Langdale v. Griffin, 135 Ga. 669, 70 S. E. 661; Robinson v. McNeill, 61 III. 225; Maynard v. Maynard, 106 Me. 567, 76 All. 299; Riley v. Galarneault, 103 Minn. 166,144 N. W. 766.

13 See Williston, Sales, J 244.

14 See Mardis v. Tyler, 10 B. Mon. 376, and the extract from the Negotiable Instruments Law quoted in the text. But see contra, Redwine v. Brown, 10 Ga. 317.

15Supra, {408. See also Forth v. Stanton, 1 Saund. * 210; Winchester v. Hackley, 2 Cranch, 342, 2 L. Ed. 299; Dawes v. Boyleaton, 9 Mass, *337.

1. An assignee under a written assignment may enforce his rights In his own name or at law. Under such a statute the effect of oral assignments is unchanged.

2. The real party in interest must be plaintiff in any litigation.

3. A chose in action is made assignable so as to vest title therein in the assignee.

16Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 819; Sawtelle v. Rollins, 23 Me. 196; Reed v. Paul, 131 Mass. 129. See also At-wood v. Bailey, 184 Maw. 133, 134, 68 N. E. 13; St. Albans Granite Co. v. Elwell, 88 Vt. 479, 92 Atl. 974.

17 Phillips v. Wilson, 25 111. App. 427.

18Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 4 L. Ed. 79; Anderson v. Miller, 15 Miss. 686; Gordon v. Drury, 20 N. H. 363.

19Calhoun v. Tullasa, 36 Ga. 119; Sumner v. Sleeth, 87 111. 500; Anderson v. Miller 15 Miss. 586; Dearer v. Eller,

7 Ired. Eq. 24; St. Albans Granite Co. v. Elwell, 88 Vt. 479, 92 Atl. 974.

20 See Winch ft Keeley, 1 T. R. 619. See also supra, Sec. 433, and oases cited in the preceding notes.

21 See supra, Sec. 410.

22 Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 45, 12 So. 536; Haskell ft Hilton, 30 Me. 419; Mills v. Hoag, 7 Paige, 18, 31 Am. Dec. 271; Sedgwick p. Cleveland, 7 Paige, 287; Hathaway v. Scott, 11 Paige, 173; Lowry p. Morrison, 11 Paige, 327; Varaey v. Bartlett, 5 Wis. 276.

How far these statutes work a change other than one merely of procedure, is open to argument in each case. It would seem certainly that a mere provision that the real party in interest must bring suit in his own name should effect only a change of procedure. As to statutes in different form the matter is not so clear; but it seems undesirable, unless the words of a particular statute clearly require it, to alter the rules of substantive law elaborated by courts of equity concerning the assignment of choses in action; since as appears from the following section these rights seem more in conformity with justice than those based on the assumption that a chose in action is transferable in the same way and to the same extent as a chattel. A chose in action and a chattel are inherently different in their characteristics. In fact the change effected by modern statutes has generally been held procedural only and not to alter the substantial rights of the parties.23

Consequently "whether an assignee can maintain an action in his own name, is held to be determined by the lex fori, and not by the lex loci contractus, a matter not of right but of remedy." 24 Such statements, therefore, as are occasionally found to the effect that complete legal ownership passes to the assignee of a legal chose in action 25 must be regarded as unfor-

23 Carossa p. Boxley, 203 Fed. 673, 122 C. C. A. 69; Glenn v. Busey, 5 Mackey (D. C.), 233; Eaves v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 200 111. App. 380; Leach v. Greene, 116 Mass. 534; Beckwith v. Union Bank, 9 N. Y. 211; Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489; Fuller v. Steiglits, 27 Oh. St 355, 358, 22 Am. Rep. 312; Bentley v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 40 W. Va, 729, 23 S. . 5S4; Watkins v. Angotti, 65 W. Va. 193, 63 S. E. 969.

24 Richardson v. New York Central R, Co., 98 Mass. 86, 92. See also Joseph Dixon Co. v. Paul, 167 Fed. 784, 93 C. C. A. 204; American Lithographic Co. v. Ziegler, 216 Mass. 287, 103 N. E. 909; Tully v. Herein, 44 Miss. 626; Lodge v. Phelps, 1 John. Cas. 139; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v, Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W. 1108, 52 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 275.

25This seems the established mode of expression in England. In Fitsroy v. Cave, [1906] 2 K. B. 364, the court said: "Henceforth in all courts, a debt must be regarded as a piece of property capable of legal assignment in the same sense as a bale of goods." See also Hambleton v. Brown, [1917] 2 K. B. 93. Before 1889 in England a buyer in possession of a bale of goods not having acquired title could transfer none even to an in accent purchaser; nor could a seller left in possession after he had transferred title. By statute passed in that year both these rules were changed. Williston, Sales, Sec. 319. Is the right of the assignee of a chose in action like that of the owner of a bale of goods in 1888 or in 1890? or does a statute which in tortus applies to the rights of the owner of tangible tunate if not erroneous, unless clearly required by the terms of a particular local statute.