It is not helpful to try to establish what special words constitute a promisor who induces the creation of a debt by his promise a primary debtor, and what words indicate merely a collateral obligation to pay the debt of another. The same words in different connections and under different circumstances may warrant opposite conclusions as to which meaning the promise bears. As to words, often the subject of litigation an English judge has said: "The words, ' I will see you paid,' as it seems to me, may mean either one thing or the other. 'I will see you paid, ' that is, 'I will pay you,' or 'You shall be paid'. But I do not think these words are necessarily to be taken in the sense Mr. Cole contended for, as meaning, 'I will see that somebody else pays you,' or that' your principal debtor pays you; and if he does not, I will be the surety for payment.' I do not think that phrase, 'I will see you paid,' has any hard and fast meaning of that kind; it must depend on the other facts of the case."89 The same principle is applicable to other parties a guaranty conclusive that the promise is not original,92 though such is the natural meaning which will be given to the word if there are no controlling facts.93

Warner, '62 Conn. 61, 25 Atl. 450; Growder v. Keys, 91 Ga. 180, 16 S. E. 686; Brandner v. Krebbs, 54 111. App. 652; Lake View Hospital Assoc, v. Nicholson, 202 111. App. 206; Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, 166 S. W. 635; Lohmeyer v. Young (Mo. App), 195 S. W. 507; Peyson v. Conniff, 32 Neb. 269, 49 N. W. 340; Haseltine v. Wilson, 55 N. J. L. 260, 26 Atl. 79; Barrett v. Johnson, 77 Hun, 527, 28 N. Y. 8. 892; Boston v. Fart, 148 Pa. 220, 23 Atl. 901; Eddy v. Davidson, 42 Vt 66; Runnion v. Morrison, 71 W. Va. 264, 76 S. E. 457; Murphey v. Gates, 81 Wis. 370, 51 N. W. 573.

88Butcher v. Andrews, Comberbach, 473; Harris v. Huntbach, 1 Burr. 373; Davis p. Tift, 70 Ga. 52; Stoltenberg v. Johnson, 163 111. App. 422; Rubey Trust Co. p. Weidner, 174 Mo. App.

692, 161 S. W. 333; Dux v. Spielberg. 140 N. Y. S. 410; Richardson v. Parker, 33 Okla. 339, 125 Pac. 442; Uvalde Nat. Bank v. Brooks (Tex. Civ. App.), 162 S. W. 957; Drovers' Deposit Nat Bank v. Ticheuor, 156 Wis. 251, 145 N. W. 777.

89Pigott, B., in Mountstepheu v. Lakeman, L R.7 Q.B. 196, 205. To the same effect, see Mulholland v. Jones, 83 N. J. L. 604, 83 Atl. 875. As to similar words the Florida court said in West v. Grainger, 46 Fla, 257, 35 So. 91, 94; "The language used by Casaels imports prima facie a collateral engagement; that is, that West, Wiggs & Co. would see that Bardin paid his debt to Grainger for services rendered or to be rendered, or that they would pay it if Bardin did not. It is true that circumstances may exist which will language. Unless the determination of the matter depends solely upon the construction of a written contract, the question should be submitted to the jury.90 The question to be determined is first whether the defendant promised absolutely; if so, whether any other absolute obligation arose simultaneously. If the defendant alone promised, unquestionably his promise is without the statute; and so it is if any other promise which was made was conditional on the defendant's prior default. If more than one promised absolutely, the matter will be governed by the principles stated in the next section. Evidence that the original charge was to one person or the other, though strongly tending to prove the creditor's intention that the primary obligation should rest upon that person, is not conclusive;91 nor is the fact that a promise is called by the show that an engagement in the language used by Cassels was intended to be original, and not collateral, Craft v. Kendrick, 39 Fla. 90,21 So. 803; Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826; Grant v. Wolf, 34 Minn. 32, 24 N. W. 289; Amort v. Chriatofferaon, 57 Minn. 234, 59 N. W. 304; but the circumstances under which the promise was made in this case do not, in the opinion of the court, affect this result here. Wagner v. Hal-lack, 3 Colo. 176; Rose v. O'Linn, 10 Neb. 364, 6 N. W. 430; Morrissey v. Kinsey, 16 Neb. 17, 19 N. W. 454; Walker v. McDonald, 6 Minn. 455 (Gil. 368); Payne v. Baldwin, 14 Barb. 570; Walker v. Richards, 41 N. H. 388; Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y. 187; Robertson v. Hunter, 29 S. C. 9, 6 S. E. 850; Pettit v. Braden, 55 Ind. 201; Haverly v. Mercur, 78 Pa. 257; Lewis v. Lewis Lumber Mfg. Co., 156 Pa. 217, 27 Atl. 20; Hall v. Woodin, 35 Mich. 67." See also Day v. Adcock, 11 Ala. App. 471, 66 So. 911; Corcoran v. Huey, 231 Pa. 441, 80 Atl. 881.

90 Day v. Adcock, 11 Ala. App. 471, 66 So. 911; Luak v. Throop, 189 111. 127, 59 N. E. 529; Fairbanks ». Barker, 115 Me. 11, 97 Atl. 3; Stone v. Walker, 13 Gray, 613; Downs v. Perkins, 207

Mass. 409, 93 N. E. 645; McGowan Commercial Co. v. Midland Coal, etc., Co., 41 Mont. 211, 108 Pac. 655; Chesebrough v. Tirrill, 61 N. J. L. 628, 41 Atl 215; Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C. 424, 73 S. E. 240; Lorick v. Caldwell, 85 S. Car. 94, 67 S. E. 143; Security Bank Note Co. v. Shrader, 70 W. Va. 475, 74 S. E. 416, Ann. Cas. 1914 A.488.

91 Clark v. Jones, 87 Ala, 474, 6 So. 362; Lusk v. Throop, 189 111. 127, 59 N. E. 629; Myer v. Graffiin, 31 Md. 350,100 Am. Dec. 66; Stone v. Walker, 13 Gray, 613; Walker v. Hill, 119 Mass. 249; Larson v. Jensen, 53 Mich. 427, 19 N. W. 130; Wittenberg v. Fisher, 183 Mo. App. 347, 166 S. W. 1106; McGowiin Commercial Co. v. Midland Coal, etc., Co., 41 Mont. 211,108 Pac. 655; Walker v. Richards, 41 N. H. 388; Gallagher v. McBride, 66 N. J. L. 360, 49 Atl. 582; Foster v. Persch, 68 N. Y. 400; White v. Tripp, 126 N. C. 523, 34 S. E. 686; Kesler v. Cheadle, 12 Okla. 489, 72 Pac. 367; Mackey v. Smith, 21 Oreg. 598, 28 Pac. 974; Repair v. Krebs Lumber Co., 73 W. Va. 139, 80 S. E. 140. But see Millsaps v. Nixon, 102 Ark. 435, 144 S. W. 915; Rottman v. Fix, 25 Mo. App. 571.