By far the most important kind of symbolic delivery is that made by bills of lading and warehouse receipts. There are surprisingly few cases raising the question, but upon principle it seems clear that delivery of a non-negotiable document of title, though frequently called symbolic delivery, in cases not involving the Statute of Frauds, can hardly be considered as actual receipt of the goods by the buyer. If the buyer is the consignee or person to whom delivery is to be made according to the terms of the document, and the buyer has authorised or ratified this, there is actual receipt by the bailee on behalf of the buyer, by virtue of the shipment,8 not by virtue of the ery did not relate to the Statute of Frauds.

4 Calkins v. Lock wood, 17 Conn. 154, 42 Am. Deo. 729.

5Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black, 478, 17 L. Ed. 222; Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Me. 286; Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300, 7 Am. Dec. 74; Carter v. Willard, 19 Pick. 1.

6 Walden v. Murdock, 23 Cal. 540, 83 Am. Deo. 135.

7 Farmers' Savings Bank v. Newton, 154 Iowa, 49, 134 N. W. 436. The Iowa statute, however, simply inquires "delivery."

8 See supra, Sec. 556.

9 Bentnll v. Bum, 3 B. & C. 423; Farina v. Home, 16 M. ft W. 119. In the former of these ewes the court said of a delivery order: "There could not have been any actual acceptance of the wine by the vendee until the dock company accepted the order for the delivery, and thereby assented to hold the wine as the agents of the vendee. They held it originally as the agents of the vendors, and as long as they continued so to hold it the property was unchanged. It has been said that the London Dock Company were bound by law, when required to hold the goods on account of the vendee. That may be true, and they might render themselves liable to an action for refusing so to do; but if they did wrongfully refuse to transfer the goods to the vendee, it is dear that there could not then be any actual acceptance of them by him until he actually took possession of them." And in the latter case, Parke, B., said of a dock warrant: "This warrant is no more than an engagement by the wharfinger to deliver to the consignee or any one be may appoint; and the wharfinger holds the goods as the agent of the consignee (who is the vendor's agent), and his possession is that of the consignee until an assignment has token place, and the wharfinger has attorned, so to speak, to the assignee, and agreed with him to bold for him. Then, and not till then, the wharfinger is the agent or bailee of the assignee, and his possession that of the assignee, and then only is there a constructive delivery to him. In the meantime the warrant, and the indorsement of the warrant, is nothing more than an offer to hold the goods as the warehouseman of the assignee." So in Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 353, the acceptance of a bill of goods stored in a general warehouse and an order for their delivery without notice to the warehouse were held insufficient to satisfy the statute. See also Quintard v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 185. See, however, Wadhams v. Balfour, 32 Or. 313, 51 Pac. 042. In Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519, the court remarked: "Assuming, as it may properly be done, that the acceptance of the bill of lading by the defendants under ordinary circumstances would have been equivalent to the acceptance of the property mentioned in it, yet that could not be the effect of it where, as in this case, the property bad been previously lost." In Lewis-Simas-Jones Co.v. C. Kee & Co., 27 Cat. App. 135, 148 Pac. 973, the court held delivery to a buyer of an order on a warehouseman who bad issued to the seller a non-negotiable receipt under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, amounted to acceptance and actual receipt of the goods. The court seems to have thought that prior decisions indicating that enough had been done to transfer tide proved that the statute had been satisfied. See further, Sec. 556.