If no contract exempting property from taxation exists, a subsequent statute increasing the burden of taxation or assessment is valid.1 Thus an assessment may be imposed in addition to the former taxation. A city ordinance requiring a street railway company to pave between the rails is not such a contract to impose no further assessment that the state legislature cannot further require the railway company to pave one foot outside its rails.2 So the imposition of an annual tax upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business in the state, is not a contract exempting its property within that state from taxation.3 In the absence of an agreement between the state and the property owner for exemption from taxation, supported by a sufficient consideration, actual exemption from taxation,4 or assessments,5 does not constitute a valid obligation to continue such exemption.6 Thus a license tax may be imposed upon an established business.7 Thus statutes exempting railroads from taxation if built and operated in certain territory,8 or a charter exempting a railroad from taxation for twenty years,9 or exempting realty from general road taxes if assessed for local street improvements in an amount equal to or greater than the general tax,10 or a provision in a municipal charter that any given tract of realty should be assessed only once for constructing a street,11 none of them constitute contracts. If the legislature is unrestrained by constitutional limitations, it may make a valid contract for an exemption from taxation, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation.12 Thus a contract by statute to exempt the property of a railroad company,13 or other corporation,14 or stock in a corporation,15 or certain occupations,16 cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation.

15 Reese v. Rutherford, 90 N. Y. 644.

16 Sanders v. Ry., 94 N. Y. 641.

1 Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66; Wells v. Savannah, 181 U.S. 531; 32 S. E. 669 (affirming 107 Ga. 1) ; Sioux City Street Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98 (affirming 78 la. 367; 43 N. W. 224); Commonwealth v. Ry., 129 Pa. St. 463; 15 Am. St. Rep. 724; 18 Atl. 412.

2 Sioux City Street Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98 (affirming Sioux City Street Ry. v. Sioux City, 78 la. 367; 43 N. W. 224).

3 Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116 (affirming 50 Ga. 530); Commonwealth v. Ry., 129 Pa. St. 463; 15 Am. St. Rep. 724; 18 Atl. 412.

4 Wisconsin, etc., Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379; Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66; Wells v. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531 (affirming 107 Ga. 1); 32 S. E. 669; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231; Grand Lodge, etc., v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143 (affirming Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 659; 11 So. 148) ; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; Newport v. Temple Association, 103 Ky. 592; 45 S. W. 881; 46 S. W. 697; Manistee, etc., Ry. v. Commissioner of Railroads, 113 Mich. 349; 76 N. W. 633.

5 Miller v. Hageman. 114 la. 195; 86 N. W. 281; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Busii. (Ky.; 667: 3 Api. Rci. 309: State v. Mayor, 45 N. J. L.

168; 37 N. J. L. 415; 18 Am. Rep. 729; Ladd v. Portland, 32 Or. 271; 67 Am. St. Rep. 526; 51 Pac. 654.

6 " The facts proved must show either a contract expressed in terms, or else it must be implied from facts which leave no room for doubt that such was the intention of the parties and that a valid consideration existed for the contract. If there be any doubt on these matters the contract has not been proved and the exemption does not exist." Wells v. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531, 539; citing Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 527; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134.

7 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Cuthbert v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 899; 9 S. E. 16.

8 Wisconsin, etc., Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379; Manistee, etc., Ry. v. Commissioner of Railroads, 118 Mich. 349; 76 N. W. 633.

9 Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66.

10 Miller v. Hagemann, 114 la. 195; 86 N. W. 281.

11 Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush.

(Ky.) 667; 3 Am. Rep. 309; State v. Mayer, 35 N. J. L. 168; 37 N. J. L. 415; 18 Am. Rep. 729; Ladd v. Portland. 32 Or. 271; 67 Am. St. Rep. 526; 61 Pac. 654.

12 Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672; Hoge v. Ry., 99 U. S. 348; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 45; Erie Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 492; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 44; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190; State v. Bible Society, 134 Ala. 632; 32 So. 1011; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn. 481; Commonwealth v. Ry., 95 Ky. 60; 23 S. W. 868; Newark v. Cemetery Co.. 58 N. J. L. 168; 33 Atl. 396; affirming Cemetery Co. v. Newark, 52 N. J. L. 539; 20 Atl. 832; Armstrong v. Athens County, 10 Ohio 235; Hogg v. Mackay, 23 Or. 339; 37 Am. St. Rep. 682; 19 L. R. A. 77; 31 Pac. 779; Commonwealth v. Ry., 164 Pa. St. 252; 30 Atl. 145; State v. Bank, 95 Tenn. 221; 31 S. W. 993; Whiting v. West Point, 88 Va. 905; 29 Am. St. Rep. 750; 75 L. R. A. 860; 14 S. E. 698.

A succession tax is held not to be a direct tax upon property bequeathed or passing by intestate succession, but to be a charge upon the right to take such property. Accordingly, such tax may be laid upon property specifically exempted by statute from taxation.17