Since a contract is to be construed as a whole, terms which can be inferred from a consideration of the entire instrument are as much a part of the contract as if expressly set forth therein.1 Thus a provision requiring notice may be equivalent to a covenant to give notice.2 So the "assumption" of debts includes a promise to pay them,3 and a provision that "bills bear interest after maturity" includes a contract to pay interest.4 A's promise to pay his proportion of the cost of draining a mine is equivalent to a request that such drainage shall be continued.5 A covenant between A, who possessed the material for a volume of the supreme court reports, and B, a publisher, by which B agreed to publish such reports and to deliver them to the state within a certain time after A delivered such material to B, is equivalent to a covenant on A's part to deliver such material.6

19 Fisk v. McNeal, 23 Neb. 726, 8 Am. St. Rep. 162, 37 N. W. 616.

20 B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Fireproof Film Co.? 216 N. Y. 199, L. R. A. 1916D, 1069, 110 N. E. 440.

21 B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Fireproof Film Co., 216 N. Y. 199, L. R. A. 1916D, 1069, 110 N. E. 440.

1 United States. San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co., 195 U. S. 510, 49 L. ed. 299; United States v. Aneonia Brass and Copper Co., 218 U. S. 452, 54 L. ed. 1107.

California. Pringle v. Wilson, 156 Cal. 313, 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1000, 104 Pac. 316.

Colorado. Fisk Mining & Milling Co. v. Reed, 32 Colo. 506, 77 Pac. 240.

Connecticut. Lawler v. Murphy, 58 Conn. 294, 8 L. R. A. 113, 20 Atl. 457.

Illinois. Grimley v. Davidson, 133 111. 116, 24 N. E. 439.

New York. New England, etc., Co. v. R. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 153; Jugla v. Trouttet, 120 N. Y. 21, 23 N. E. 1066; Nicoll v. Sands, 131 N. Y 19, 29 N. E. 818.

Ohio. Legler v, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 88 O. S. 338, 103 X. E. 897.

Texas. Jones v. Gamm el-Statesman Publishing Co., 100 Tex. 320, 8 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1197, 99 S. W. 701.

Washington. Toellner v. McGinn is, 55 Wash. 430, 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1082, KM Pac. 641.

Wisconsin. Fergen v. Lyons, 162 Wis. 131, 155 N. W. 935.

2 Wells v. Alexander, 130 N. Y. 642, 15 L. R. A. 218, 29 N. E. 142.

3 Lenz v. Ry., 1ll Wis. 198, 86 N. W. 607.

If a threat is made to "proceed to collect" an account due from a contractor who is working for a railroad unless such debt due from him is paid, a letter from the railroad to the effect that it "expects to settle all bills" of the contractor does not necessarily import a promise to pay such account. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Shea, 174 Ind. 303, 91 N. E. 1081.

4 Braun v. Hess, 187 111. 283, 79 Am. St. Rep. 221, 58 N. E. 371.

This principle is often invoked where questions of mutuality are concerned. If the consideration relied upon for one executory promise is another, such other must itself be binding to constitute a legal obligation and a valuable consideration. Although the promise relied upon as a consideration may not be expressly stated in any clause of the contract, still if it appears from the entire contract that such promise is intended, it will be as binding and as much a valuable consideration as though it were expressly stated.7 Thus a promise to pay for realty agreed to be conveyed,8 or to permit the use of certain realty in consideration of the lease of other realty,9 may be implied from the entire contract. So a clause "machines to be returned by B to A at the termination of the contract on her repayment of their original cost," binds A to accept such machines and to repay their original cost.10