Under a claim of identifying subject-matter, the parties to a contract can not show by extrinsic evidence that they intended to contract for other and different property from that described in their contract, for this would be a contradiction of the written contract.1 If the description of realty in a contract or conveyance is unambiguous, and if it can be applied to an existing subject-matter by evidence which is admissible for identification, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that the parties had agreed upon a different subject-matter from that which is set forth in such contract or conveyance.2 A contract or conveyance which describes certain realty can not be contradicted that the parties had agreed upon a smaller tract than that which is thus described.3 A contract by which one party agrees to pay an "outstanding and open account," can not be modified by extrinsic evidence in order to show that the parties had intended to provide for the payment of certain promissory notes as well.4 Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that an insurance policy which is taken by an administrator upon property of the decedent, which is in his possession, is intended to cover the interest of the beneficiaries.5 Nor can the parties show that in addition to the property described in the contract, the other and different property was also contracted for. If the contract concerns personalty, the parol evidence rule forbids such addition, whether or not the local Statute of Frauds or the Sale of Goods Act includes personalty. Hence, if a bill of sale is complete on its face, the parties can not show that by oral contemporaneous agreement other property was included.6 If the contract concerns realty, such addition would violate not only the parol evidence rule but also the Statute of Frauds.7 Hence, under a lease, it can not be shown that premises omitted from the description were included by the prior agreement of the parties.8 Furthermore, the legal effect of the contract can not be contradicted,9 under guise of identifying the subject-matter. If A conveys to B all the coal under a certain tract of land, B can not introduce parol evidence to show that a certain vein of coal was in fact contracted for.10 If a contract by its terms and legal effect provides for a general subject-matter, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that the parties were really contracting for a specific subject-matter.11 In a contract for "one hundred bales of lint cotton," it is not permitted to show that cotton raised by the seller was intended.12 So under a contract for the sale of " one hundred head of good, fat, merchantable hogs,"13 or "eight thousand bushels of ear-corn," 14 extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that specific property was contracted for. So in a contract to pay "any and all of the grantor's notes," extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that only certain specific notes were intended.15 So if land is conveyed to a railroad "for all legitimate railroad purposes," extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that certain specific purposes were agreed upon.16 So a written contract whereby an actress agrees to "render services at any theaters" for a specified time, can not be modified by showing an oral agreement that the services were to be in one specified part only.17

45De Remer v. Anderson, 41 New 287, 169 Pac. 737.

46 Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Ida. 133, L. R. A. 1917A, 563, 100 Pac. 1052.

47 Griffin v. Hall, 115 Ala. 482, 22 So. 162

48See Sec. 2190.

1 Georgia. O'Neal v. Ward, 148. Ga. 62, 95 S. E. 709.

Illinois. Kane v. Farrelly, 192 111. 521, 61 N. E. 648.

Minnesota. Kramer v. Gardner, 104 Minn. 370, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 492, 116 N. W. 925.

North Carolina. Taylor v. Meadows, 175 N. Car. 373, 95 S. E. 662.

Rhode Island. Stanley v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 34 R. I. 491, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 79, 84 Atl 601.

South Carolina. Marchant v. Felder, 107 S. Car. 516, 93 S. E. 179; Taylor v. Meadows, 175 N. Car. 373, 95 S. E. 662.

West Virginia. Light v. Grant, 73 W. Va. 56, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 792, 79 S. E. 1011.

Chattel mortgage. Johnson v. Whitfield, 124 Ala. 508, 82 Am. St. Rep. 196. 27 So. 406.

Insurance policy. Sanders v. Cooper, 115 N. Y. 279, 12 Am. St. Rep. 801, 5 L. R. A. 638 [sub nomine, Landers v. Cooper, 22 N. E. 212]. (Ox described as "one red-spotted ox"; as against levy, held inadmissible to show that a black ox was intended.)

Contract for sale of realty. Duggan v. Uppendahl, 197 111. 179, 64 N. E. 289

2 O'Neal v. Ward, 148 Ga. 62, 05 S. E 709; Taylor v. Meadows, 175 N. Car. 373, 95 S. E. 662; Harman v. Dry Fork Colliery Co., 80 W. Va. 780, 94 S. E. 355.

3 Marchant v. Felder, 107 S. Car. 516, 93 S. E. 179.

4 Kramer v. Gardner, 104 Minn. 370, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 492, 116 N. W. 925.

5 Stanley v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 34 R. I. 491, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 79, 84 Atl. 601.

6 McEnery v. McEnery, 110 Ia. 718, 80 N. W. 1071; Becker v. Dalby (Ia.), 86 N. W. 314; Drexel v. Murphy, 59 Neb. 210, 80 N. W. 813.

7 See Sec. 1411.

8 Haycock v. Johnston, 81 Minn. 49 83 N. W. 494.

9 See Sec. 1195 and 2148.

10 Light v. Grant, 73 W. Va. 56, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 792, 79 S. E. 1011.

11 Georgia. Forsythe Mfg. Co. v Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 81 Am. St. Rep. 28, 37 S. E. 485.

Illinois. Mead v. Peabody, 183 111. 126, 55 N. E. 719.

Massachusetts. Violette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 53 N. E. 144 [citing, Grim-ston v. Cuningham (1894), 1 Q. B. 125; Drumond v. Atty. Gen., 2 H. L.

There is some apparent lack of harmony in judicial decisions on this question. Thus A agreed to deliver a certain amount of hay to the United States at a certain point. The contract was for hay generally, but both parties knew that the only way that A could obtain hay to furnish at that price was by cutting it in the Yellowstone Valley. The United States had all the hay in that valley cut by others. It was held that A was discharged.18 The admission of these facts was placed on the theory of the admissibility of surrounding circumstances, and not on identification of subject-matter.

Contradiction is not permitted under guise of identification of parties.19 A guaranty which is addressed to "Crane Brothers Company," a partnership, can not be shown to be intended for a corporation of a similar name.20 If a note which is payable to a trustee names the beneficiary under such trust, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that a different beneficiary was intended.21

Gas. 837; Nichol v. Godts, 10 Exch. 191].

Ohio. Johnson v. Pierce, 16 O. S. 472; Ormsbee v. Machir, 20 O. S. 295.

Oregon. Abraham v. Oregon & California R. R. Co., 37 Or. 495, 82 Am. St. Rep. 779, 60 Pac. 899.

West Virginia. Light v. Grant, 73 W. Va. 56, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 792, 79 S. E. 1011.

12Forsythe Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 81 Am. St. Rep. 28, 37 S. E 485.

13 Johnson v. Pierce, 16 O. S. 472.

14 Ormsbee v. Machir, 20 O. S. 295.

15Mead v. Peabody, 183 111. 126, 55 N. E. 719 [affirming, 83 111. App. 297].

16 Abraham v. R. R., 37 Or. 495, 82 Am. St. Rep. 779, 60 Pac. 899.

17Violette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 53 N. E. 144 [citing, Grimston v. Cuning-ham (1894), 1 Q. B. 125; Drumond v. Atty. Gen., 2 H. L. Cas. 837; Nichol v. Godts, 10 Exch. 191].

16 United States v. Peck, 102 U. S. 64, 26 L. ed. 46.

19 Roberts v. Morgan, 56 Okla. 513, 156 Pac. 319.

20Crane Co. v. Specht, 39 Neb. 123, 42 Am. St. Rep. 562, 57 N. W. 1015.