A judgment for wilful and malicious injury to property is not barred by a discharge in bankruptcy under the provisions of this section.1 An intentional conversion of property may amount to a wilful and malicious injury to property within the meaning of this section,2 and the conversion may be either of corporeal3 or of incorporeal4 property. If a mortgagor of chattels is permitted to have possession thereof, his conduct in selling such chattels and in appropriating the proceeds to his own use is a wilful and malicious injury to the mortgagee's property.5 The act of a pledgee of stock, in selling it without authority and appropriating the proceeds to his own use, is a wilful and malicious injury to property.6 If an assignor has collected, from the original debtor, the debt which he has assigned, his conduct in collecting such debt is a wilful and malicious injury to property, as against the assignee; and the discharge of such assignor in bankruptcy is not a defense as against a subsequent action by such assignee.7

13Bond v. Milliken, 134 la. 447, 120 Am. St. Rep. 440, 109 N. W. 774.

14 Bond v. Milliken, 134 la. 447, 120 Am. St. Rep. 440, 109 N. W. 774.

15In re Lorde, 144 Fed. 320; In re Wakefield, 207 Fed. 180.

16 In re Dowie, 202 Fed. 816.

17 Drake v. Vernon, 26 S. D. 354, 128 N. W. 317.

1 Mclntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205; Covington v. Rosen-busch, 148 6a. 459, 97 S. E. 78; Mason v. Sault, - Vt. -, 108 Atl. 267.

2 Mclntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S.

13S, 61 L. ed. 205; Bever v. Swecker, 138 la. 721, 116 X. W. 704; Mason v. Sault, - Vt. -, 108 Atl. 267.

3 Mason v. Sault, - Vt. -, 108 Atl. 267.

4 Mclntyre v. Knvanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205.

5 Mason v. Sault, - Vt. -, 108 Atl. 267.

6 Mclntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205.

Contra, as to conversion by a pledgee of a note, First National Bank v. Bamforth, 90 Vt. 75, 96 Atl. 600.