Bargain and Sale.
The conveyance called a bargain and sale was the same as a covenant to stand seised, except that a valuable consideration was required for its validity.70 Many of the cases hold that a recital in the deed of the consideration is sufficient evidence of its having been received, and the requirement for a valuable consideration has become a mere form.71 The operation of a deed of bargain and
65 Ante, p. 254.
66 2 Bl. Comm. 327; Chenery v. Stevens, 97 Mass. 77.
67 Jackson v. Sebring, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 515; Jackson v. Delancey, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 427; Bell v. Scammon, 15 N. H. 381.
68 Trafton v. Hawes, 102 Mass. 533.
69 Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Ta. St. 460; Fisher v. Strickler, 10 Fa. St. 348; Jackson v. Mckenny, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 233; Jackson v. Swart, 20 Johns. (N. Y.)85;wallis v.wallis,4mass.135.
70 Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509; Jackson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Wood v. Boach, 7 Vt. 522; Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264.
71 Fetrow v. Merriwether, 53 111. 278; Jackson v. Fish, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) sale is as follows: The conveyance which is in the form of a contract to sell raises a use in the feoffee which the statute of uses executes, and thereby conveys the legal estate to the bargainee72 In order to give notoriety to conveyances by bargain and sale, which became the usual form for transfer of lands, the statute of enrollments provides that such deeds must be enrolled within six months after their execution, or be of no validity.73
To evade the requirements of the statute of enrollments the expedient called a lease and a release was devised, and soon became the most usual form for a conveyance for lands. Its operation was as follows. A lease, usually for one year, was given to the intended grantee. This was not required to be enrolled, because the statute did not make any provision for chattel interests. By a release dated the next day after the lease the reversion of the estate was conveyed to the lessee, who in this way acquired the full interest in the land without the use of any conveyance which had to be enrolled.74
257. Statutes in many states provide short forms of conveyances, which are either ments have been abolished in some states77 Where statutory forms have been provided, their exclusive use is not required. Many of the deeds now in use have a dual character from the operative words used, which frequently are "give, grant, bargain, and sell." When such words are used, courts will construe them in the way most fitted to give effect to the intention of the parties,78 but they will be held to convey legal, rather than equitable, estates, when such construction is possible.79
(a) Warranty deeds, or
(b) Quitclaim deeds.
In a number of states short forms have been prescribed by the statutes, which are declared sufficient to convey various estates in land.75 Except where superseded by these statutory conveyances, conveyances operating under the statute of uses may still be employed. The common-law conveyances are, however, still sufficient to transfer lands, though their use is unusual,76 with the exception that feoff456; Jackson v. Dillon's Lessee, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 201. But see Perry v. Price, 1 Mo. 553.
72 Chenery v. Stevens, 97 Mass. 77.
73 27 Hen. VIII. c. 16.
74 2 Bl. Comm. 339; Lewis' Lessee v. Beall, 4 Har. & Mch. (Md.) 488.
75 1 Stim. Am. St. Law, art. 148.
76 Funk v. Creswell, 5 Iowa. 68; Brewer v. Hardy, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 376; Rogers v. Fire Co., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 611.
Warranty and Quitclaim Deeds.
Our most usual form of modern conveyance is called a warranty deed. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contains, besides the words of conveyance, covenants of warranty, the meaning and effect of which will be explained subsequently.80 Quitclaim deeds differ from warranty deeds in that they contain no such covenants, and are much like a common-law release, except, as has already been stated, they need not be to one in possession.81 A quitclaim deed transfers only the title which the grantor has,82 and does not prevent the grantor from setting up a future acquired title.83
258. Illinois has provided by statute an optional system of title registration, the principal features of which are:
(a) Certificates of title are issued to the owner of each estate in registered land for his interest (p. 413).
(b) Transfers of title can be made only on the public register (p. 413).
77 l stim. Am. St Law, § 1470.
78 Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 143; Trafton v. Hawes, 102 Mass. 533.
79 Sprague v. Woods, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 194.
80 Post, p. 446.
81 Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356; Rowe v. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154.
82 Gage v. Sanborn (Mich.) G4 N. W. 32; Mclnerney v. Beck, 10 Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130.
83 Frost v. Society, 56 Mich. 62, 22 N. W. 189; City and County of San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465. But see Welch v. Dutton, 79 111. 465; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Hewitt, 55 Wis. 96, 12 N. W. 382.
(c) Acquisition of title by adverse possession is abolished as to registered land (p. 414).
(d) An indemnity fund is provided to reimburse any persons who may be injured by the operation of the act (p. 414).
By an act approved June 13, 1895,84 the legislature of Illinois Inaugurated a system of registration of titles following in its main lines the German Grundbuch and the Australian system of registry of titles, or the so-called Torrens title system.* The act does not become operative in any county until adopted by the voters of the county.85 After the act has been adopted by a county, the registration of the title of any owner is optional with him.86