This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
Without reference to the doctrine, above discussed, that the landlord has an option to regard the tenant holding over as in for another period or succession of periods, it is evident that the landlord and tenant may agree upon a continuance, or rather renewal, of the tenancy, that is, there may be a new demise by the former to the latter, with a consequent right of possession in the latter. Such a demise may be, and frequently is, in express terms, but it may be inferred from the acts of the parties, such as the payment and receipt of rent. In either case there is, strictly speaking, a "renewal lease," but this expression is ordinarily restricted to the case of a new demise for a fixed term.
42. Harvey v. Brydges, 14 Mees. & W. 437; Blades v. Higgs, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 71?,; Vinson v. Flynn, 64 Ark. 453, 39 L. R. A. 415, 46 S. W. 186, 43 S. W. 146; Dawson v. Marsh, 74 Conn. 498, 51 Atl. 529; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568, 8 Am. Rep. 442; Manning v. Brown, 47 Md. 506; Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309, 23 Am. Rep. 272; Jackson v. Parmer, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Smith v. Reeder, 21 Ore. 541, 15 L. R. A. 172, 28 Pac. 890 (dictum); Sout-er v. Codman, 14 R. I. 119, 51 Am. Rep. 364.
43. Edwick v. Hawkes, 18 Ch. Div. 199; Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304; Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 22 S. E. 545; Reeder v. Purdy, 41 111. 279; Boniel v. Black, 44 La. Ann. 514, 10 So. 869; Flaherty v. Andrews, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 529; Thiel v. Bull's Perry Land Co., 58 N. J. L. 212, 33 Atl. 281 (but see Mer-shon v. Williams, 62 N. J. L. 779,
42 Atl. 778); Rush v. Aiken Mfg. Co., 58 S. C. 145, 79 Am. St. Rep. 836, 36 S. E. 497 (semble); Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 520, 71 Pac. 53.
44. Vinson v. Flynn, 64 Ark. 453, 39 L. R. A. 415, 46 S. W. 186,
43 S. W. 146; Sampson v. Henry, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 379, 30 Mass.. (13 Pick.) 36; Whitney v. Swett, 22 N. H. 10, 53 Am. Dec. 228; Gregory v. Hill, 8 Term R. 299.
The payment and receipt of rent, though prima facie it shows a consent to a new tenancy, may, under particular circumstances, fail to do so, as when the landlord received it in ignorance that the original tenancy had come to an end,45 or the payment is made after suit to recover possession has been brought by the landlord.46 It is a question of fact in each case whether a new tenancy is created.47
- Character of new tenancy. The weight of authority is to the effect that if the previous tenancy was for one or more years, a new tenancy the existence of which is inferred from circumstances is presumptively one from year to year.48 This view, in the ordinary case, when the new tenancy is based upon the payment and acceptance of rent, accords with the general rule as to the inference of a tenancy from year to year from
45. Doe d. Lord v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90.
46. Vanderford v. Foreman, 129 N. C. 217, 39 S. E. 839.
47. Dougal v. McCarthy  1 Q. B. 736; Pusey v. Presbyterian Hospital, 70 Neb. 353, 97 N. W. 475, 113 Am. St. Rep. 788; Wilcox v. Montour Iron & Steel Co., 147 Pa. St. 540, 23 Atl. 840; White v. Sohn, 63 W. Va. 80, 59 S. E. 890.
48. Doe d. Clarke v. Smaridge. 7 Q. B. 957; Dougal v. McCarthy  1 Q. B. 736; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Sayre, 75 Ala. 270; Beld-ing v. Texas Produce Co., 61 Ark. 377, 33 S. W. 421; Hallet v. Bar-nett, 51 Colo. 434, 118 Pac. 972; Roberson v. Simons, 109 Ga. 360, 34 S. E. 604; Streit v. Fay, 230 111. 319, 120 Am. St. Rep. 304, 82 N. E. 648; Hall v. Myers, 43 Md.
446 Schneider v. Lord, 62 Mich. 141, 28 N. W. 773; Gardner v. Dakota County Com'rs, 21 Minn. 33; Love v. Law, 57 Miss. 596; Hammon v. Douglas, 50 Mo. 434; West v. Lungren, 74 Neb. 105, 103 N. W. 1057; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 161, 49 N. E. 344; Borough of Phoe-nixville v. Walters, 147 Pa. St. 501, 23 Atl. 776; Matthews v. Hipp, 66 S. C. 162, 44 S. E. 577; Hib-bard v. Newman, 61 Tenn. (2 Baxt.) 285; Amsden v. Atwood, 69 Vt. 527, 38 Atl. 263; Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Grat. (Va.) 224; Baltimore Dental Ass'n v. Fuller, 101 Va. 627, 44 S. E. 771; Allen v. Bartlett, 20 W. Va. 46; Barber v. Watch Hill Fire Dist., 36 R. I. 236, L. R. A. 1916C 245, Ann Cass. 1916D 191, 89 Atl. 1056, 90 Atl. 161.
R. P. - 17
[ Sec. 73 the payment of a yearly rent,49 since the rent reserved on a lease for one or more years, even though payable monthly, is usually an annual rent, that is, adjusted with reference to yearly periods, and like sums, paid and accepted periodically after the termination of the lease, may well be regarded also as constituting annual rent. Likewise, adjudications that, if the original tenancy was for one or more months, at a certain monthly rent, the payment and acceptance of a like rent, after the expiration of the original tenancy, create a tenancy from month to month,50 are in accord with the general rule as to the inference of a monthly tenancy from the payment of monthly rent.51
In some cases the continuance of the relation by the assent of both parties has been spoken of, not as creating a periodic tenancy, such as one from year to year or from month to month, but as creating a new tenancy for another year.52
In Maine and Massachusetts, where the statutory provision that no estate or interest, unless created by writing, shall have greater force and effect than a tenancy at will, is construed as excluding the inference of a tenancy from year to year from the payment of a yearly rent, the new tenancy, ordinarily to be inferred from the actions of the parties in case of a holding over, is at will, and terminable as such by either party.53
49. Ante Sec. G4(b).
50. Stoppelkamp v. Mangeot, 42 Cal. 316; Williams v. Apothecaries Hall Co., 80 Conn. 503, 69 Atl. 12; Barlum v. Berger, 125 Mich. 504, 84 N. W. 1070; Shirk v. Hoffman, 57 Minn. 230, 58 N. W. 990; Backus v. Steinberg, 59 Minn. 403, 61 N. W. 335; Condon v. Barr, 47 N. J. L. 113, 54 Am. Rep. 121; Baker v. Kenny, 69 N. J. L. 180, 54 Atl. 526: Simmons v. Jarman, 122 N. C. 195, 29 S. E. 332; Providence County Sav.
Bank v. Hall, 16 R. I. 154, 13 Atl. 122; Whalen v. Manley, 68 W. Va. 328, 69 S. E. 843.
51. Ante Sec. 65.
52. Zippar v. Reppy, 15 Colo. 260, 25 Pac. 164; Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 208; Cole v. Sanford, 77 Hun (N. Y.) 198, 59 N. Y. St. Rep. 763, 28 N. Y. Supp. 353; Bateman v. Maddox, 86 Tex. 546, 26 S. W. 51; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 161, 49 N. E. 344.
53. Wheeler v. Cowan, 25 Me 283; Franklin Land, Mill & WatSec. 74 ]
In a number of states the character of the tenancy created by such a holding over with the landlord's consent is determined by the language of a local statute.
Conceding that the new tenancy, created by a per missive holding over, is in the particular case periodic, that is, from period to period, it can, by the weight of authority, be terminated only by notice, as in the case of a similar periodic tenancy otherwise created.54 In one state at least, however, a different view has been taken, to the effect that such a new tenancy can be terminated without notice, a distinction being made between a tenancy from year to year arising from holding over and one arising otherwise;.55
Ill (A) Estate on Condition.