If there be separation by consent, and a specific sum settled upon the wife, which is reasonably sufficient for her necessities, then the husband is not liable for necessaries supplied to her. (o) Nor is he so liable even if the party so furnishing * goods did not know of the provision made for the wife; unless this party had supplied her before, and the separation was recent and not notorious; (p) the fact of separation, if he knew it, was enough to put him upon inquiry. But the party supplying necessaries to a separated wife is not bound to show that no provision is made for her; if the husband would otherwise be bound, and undertakes to relieve himself from his liability by the fact of such provision, the burden of proving it

(mm) Babcock v. John Smith, 22 Pick. 61.

(n) Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox, 445; Stephens v. Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 91; Nunn v. Wilsmor, 8 T. R. 521.

(o) Angier v. Angier, Gilb. Eq. 152; Stephens v. Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 90; Todd v. Stokes, 1 Salk. 116, 1 Ld. Raym. 444. This allowance must be reasonably suffi-cient for the wife to the satisfaction of a jury; and the mere acquiescence on the part of the wife in the sum paid will not necessarily exonerate the husband. Hodg-kinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 87; Eramett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506. The sum stipulated by the husband must have been actually paid, or the husband is not discharged, and the wife is not driven to her remedy on the instrument of separation, but may bind her husband on her contracts. Nurse v. Craig. 5 B. & P. 148; Hunt v. De Bla-quiere, 5 Bing. 550.

(p) In Rawlins v. Van Dyke, 3 Esp. 250, Lord Eldon is reported to have held that in cases of separation between man and wife, if the tradesman's demand is for necessaries it is incumbent on the husband, in order to discharge himself, to show that the tradesman had notice of the separation. But this doctrine was directly repudiated in the late case of Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. & W. 481. and Alder-son, B., there said: "1 do not see how notice to the tradesman can be material. The question in all these cases is one of authority. If a wife living separate from her husband is supplied by him with lies cm him; (q) and if it be inadequate or not duly paid, he is liable. (r) But he is not liable, even if the separation were not by-deed, and there is no written agreement between them as * to the allowance if it be in fact paid to her. (s) And he is also under no liability if sufficient necessaries be provided for her by another person and none by him. (t)

Sufficient funds to support herself, - with everything proper tor her maintenance and support, - then she is not his agent to pledge his credit, and he is not liable." It has likewise been held in this country that if the tradesman was not accustomed to trust the wife before separation, neither express notice nor general notoriety of the fact of separation is necessary to discharge the husband. Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140; and see Baker v. Barney, 8 Johns. 72, Mott v, Comstock, 8 Wend. 544; Wilson v. Smyth, 1 B. & Ad. 801.

The rule of law is, that if a wife be separated from her husband, with her consent, he is liable for necessaries supplied to her only where in fact she has no other means of obtaining them. But under any circumstances of separation, the husband may be held to answer to articles of the peace against him, if occasioned by his violent conduct towards her, (u) and even held liable to pay the bill of the attorney whom she employs for that pur(q) See Frost v. Willis, 13 Vt. 202; Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571; Clancy on Husband & Wife, 28. But in Mott v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 544, it was held, that if a husband professes to provide for his wife, who lives apart from him, it is incumbent upon a party who has been expressly forbidden to give her credit to show clearly and affirmatively that the husband did not supply her with necessaries suitable to her condition, before he can charge him for supplies furnished her; and this seems to be the better law. But in McClellan v. Adams, 19 Pick. 333, where the wife of the defendant, being afflicted with a dangerous disease, was carried by him to a distance from his residence, and left under the care of the plaintiff as a surgeon, and after the lapse of some weeks, the plaintiff performed an operation on her for the cure of the disease, soon after which she died, it was held, in an action by the plaintiff against the defendant, to recover compensation for his services, that the performance of the operation was within the scope of the plaintiff's authority, if in his judgment it was necessary or expedient, and that it was not incumbent on him to prove that it was necessary or proper under the circumstances, or that before he performed it he gave notice to the defendant, or that it would have been dangerous to the wife to wait until notice could be given to the defendant.

(r) Hodgkinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 87; Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506; Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. 550. - It has been held that notwithstanding the husband pay the wife a sufficient allowance, yet if he expressly promise to pay the debts she has contracted during such separation, he is bound by such promise. Harrison v. Hall, 1 Mood. & R. 185;

Hornbuckle v. Hornbury, 2 Stark. 177. But these cases seem certainly very anomalous, and difficult to be supported, since if the allowance was duly paid, and was adequate, the husband's promise would be nudum pactum.

(s) No deed of separation is actually necessary; it is sufficient if a separation actually took place. Hodgkinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Emery v. Neighbour, 2 Halst. 142; Lookwood v. Thomas, 12 Johns. 248; Kimball v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 33. But if the separate maintenance be secured by deed, it is held that the deed is void unless executed by a trustee on the part of the wife. Ewers v. Hutton, 3 Esp. 255.

(t) It is immaterial from what source the wife's provision comes, provided it be sufficient and permanent. Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 86; and see Dixon v. Hurrell, 8 C. & P. 717. The case of Thompson v. Hervey, 4 Burr. 2177, sometimes cited as deciding that the provision must he derived from the husband in order to discharge him, seems to have proceeded rather on the ground that the provision was purely voluntary, and during the pleasure of the grantor, and therefore that creditors could not be supposed to rely upon it.