If the wife has a separate estate, this is usually reached in equity. Thus, if she join with her husband in making a promissory note, this separate estate is chargeable with it. (s)1 Perhaps, however, it must be shown that the promise was made with special reference to, or was received on the credit of her separate estate. (t) Our courts now protect with great care any separate estate of the wife, and any reasonable agreement in her favor. (u) Nor will they interfere to vary or discharge it but for strong cause and on certain evidence. (v) Nor will the wife herself be permitted to

(p) 3 Bl. Com. 414.

(q) Austin v. Wilson, 4 Cush. 273.

(r) Birdseye v. Flint, 3 Barb. 500.

(s) Yale v. Dederer, 21 Barb. 286; s. c. 18 N. Y. 265; 22 N. Y. 450; 68 N. Y. 329; Bell v. Kellar, 18 B. Mon. 381; Ozley v.

Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Collins v. Rudolph, 19 Ala. 616.

(t) Conn v. Conn, 1 Md. Ch. 212; Cherry v. Clements, 10 Humph. 552; Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B. Mon. 482.

(u) See Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio, 649.

(v) Rogers v. Smith, 4 Barr, 93.

A husband is liable in replevin for his wife's unlawful detention of chattels under a claim of title in herself. Choen v. Porter, 66 Ind. 194. - K.

1 Contracts by a married woman for necessaries or her separate estate's benefit are enforceable against it, Priest v. Cone, 51 Vt. 495; as for money borrowed for the avowed purpose of benefiting her estate, and her note is received in reliance upon her statement, although the money was in fact otherwise applied, McVey v. Cautrell, 70 N. Y. 295; see Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20; or for services rendered in borrowing money to lift a mortgage from her separate estate, Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio St. 79; or a bond for part of the purchase-money of her estate, Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. 305; but not for money lent to her on an agreement that it should be applied to the use of her husband or his firm, Nourse v. Henshaw, 123 Mass. 96. - She is not liable as surety on a guardian's bond without expressing an intention to bind her separate estate. Gosman v. Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87. - K.

waive such an agreement if it were made after marriage, and obviously intended to benefit her children. (w) And if the wife's debts are contracted before marriage, the remedy against her separate estate is suspended during her marriage. (x) But if contracted after marriage, they are prima facie chargeable on her separate estate.(y) It will be seen in the synopsis at the close of the chapter, that the statutes of many States contain provisions for the security of the wife's separate estate.

Whether a wife, acting with her husband, may dispose of land conveyed to trustees for her separate use, when no power of disposition is given her, is not certain. The better rule seems to be, that she may, if the trust instrument is silent, but not if it contain express prohibitions or restrictions. (z) After some * fluctuation it seems that the English courts incline to permit a wife, with the consent of the trustees and the husband, to alienate funds or modify a trust created for her benefit. But it would also seem, that in this country the wife is protected against her own acts, and that such a trust cannot be discharged or changed unless by order of court. (a) And if lands so held in trust are sold by the husband under an agreement to purchase with the proceeds other lands to be held under the same trust, the lands so purchased by him are protected from his creditors. (b) But where, by such a trust, the wife may dispose of the fund, for ever, but dies without disposal, it goes to her husband. (c) Nor can a second husband interfere with a trust created by a first husband. (d) It has however been held, on grounds which seem to us doubtful, that where a wife has power to dispose of lands under a trust, and executes that power by selling them, and with the proceeds buys other lands, these other lands do not come under the original trust, and become subject to the original power.(e) If she has the power to sell, she may make a valid contract to sell. (/)

(w) Fenner v. Taylor, 1 Sim. 169.

\x) Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 1 Comst. 452. See Dickson v. Miller, 11 Sm. & M. 594.

(y) Greenough v. Wigginton, 2 Greene (Ia.), 435; Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 217.

(2) So held in New York, in Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. 548. In Maryland, in 5 Md. 219; Tarr v. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68; Williams v. Donaldson, id. 414. In Tennessee, in Marshall 0. Stephens, 8 Humph. 159; Litton v. Baldwin, id. 209. In South Carolina, Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. .53; Adams v. Mackey, id. 75. In Georgia, Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 228. In Mississippi, Doty v. Mitchell, 9 Sm. & M. 485. And in Rhode Island, Metcalf v. Cooke, 2 R. I. 355. That she cannot make such disposition unless the power be given her, is held in Connecticut, Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146, 175. In Alabama, Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797. In North Carolina, Harris v. Harris, 7 [red. Eq. 111, and in Virginia, Hume v. Hord, 5 Gratt. 374.

(a) Leggett v. Perkins, 2 Comst. 297; L'Amoureux v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Barb. Ch. 34; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sandf. Ch. 104; Noyes v. Blakeman, 2 Seld. 567; Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb. 467. The Supreme Court of the United States have held that a court of equity should protect such a trust for the collateral relatives, if intended for their benefit. Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196.

(b) Barnett v. Goings, 8 Blackf. 284.

(c) Broun v. Brown, 6 Humph 127; Wilkinson v. Wright, 6 1'.. Mon. 576.

(d) Cole v. O'Neill. 3 Md. Ch, 174; Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 122.

A married woman may contract with her husband for a settlement for her benefit, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, and courts of equity will sustain it, and even do what may be necessary to complete such a contract, if interrupted by death or accident. (g) If made in good faith in pursuance of an antenuptial agreement, it seems that this is valid, without other consideration than the marriage, that being a good and sufficient one. (h) But if wholly voluntary, it is * void against existing creditors, although made in good faith, but not against subsequent creditors. (i)l

To any contract of a third person for the benefit of a wife, there must be a distinct assent of the husband; but this may be proved by implication, as by depositing money to her credit in a bank, and giving the deposit book to her with the knowledge of the husband. (j)

In New York, the statute requirements as to making a will, are held not to determine the age at which a married woman, with power to make a will, may exercise that power. (k) And the same rule would probably be adopted elsewhere.

Formerly, the rights which the husband acquired over the property of his wife by his marriage, were not only carefully protected, but any disposition of her property by the wife, made before marriage, in derogation of his rights, was held to be void on the ground that it was a fraud upon him. Doubtless there may now be such disposition of property by the wife, in actual fraud of the husband. (kk) But, in this country, nothing less

(e) Newlin v. Freeman, 4 [red. Eq. 312.

(f) Van Allen v. Humphrey, 15 Barb. 555.

(g) Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Coates v. Gealach, 44 Penn. St. 43.

(h) Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481.

(i) Borst v. Corey, 16 Barb. 136; Albert v. Winn, 5 Md. 66. See also, in relation to post-nuptial settlements, Kinnard v. Daniel, 13 B. Mon. 496; Thomson v. Dougherty, 18 S. & R. 448; Magniac v. Thompson, 1 Baldw. 344; Duffy v. Ins. Co. 8 W. & S. 413: Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason, 443.

(j) Fisk v. Cushman, 6 Cash. 20.

(k) Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. Ch. 9.

(kk) Duncan's Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 67; Belt v. Ferguson, 3 Grant, 289.

1 But a voluntary settlement by a husband upon his wife directly, without impairing the claims of existing creditors, is valid, although reserving a power of revocation, or appointment toother uses, jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225; and a deed of land, which is but a reasonable provision for her, by a husband to his wife, in consideration of love and affection, is valid as against an heir, Majors v. Everton, 89 Ill. 56; Horder v. Horder, 22 Kan. 391. - K.

than such a fraud, certainly proved, would be permitted by our courts to invalidate the acts of an unmarried woman, in favor of a husband subsequently married. We give in the note some authorities on this subject. (l)

Again we must refer to the synopsis of the statutes concerning married women, which follows immediately. The reader will also find the cases cited in this note bearing on this question. (ll) The law on this interesting subject must be regarded however as still in a transition condition, and changes in it are quite frequent.

(/) St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl & K. 610; Bill v. Cureton, 2 Myl. & K. 503; Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Bro. 345; s. c. 1

Ves. Jun. 22; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me.

124; Jordan v. Black, Meigs, 142; Ramsay P.Joyce, 1 McMull. Eq. 236; Logan v. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487.

(ll) Huff v. Wright, 39 Ga. 41; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass, 528;' Marsh v. Marsh, 43 Ala. 677; Corning v. Lewis, 54 Barb. 51; Demott v. McMullen, 8 AM,. Pr. (n. s.) 335; Smith v. Allen, 1 Lans. 101; Boyles' Estate, l Tuck, 4; Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743; Melley v. Casey, 99 Mass. 241; Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vroom, 463; Dutton v. Dutton, 30 Ind. 452.