23The "doctrine of estoppel seems scarcely applicable. The representation relied on . . . was more like a contract or promise than the statement of an existing fact." Per Kay, L. J., Low v. Bouverie, [1891] 3 Ch. 82, 100.

24See further, Bigelow on Estoppel (4th ed.), 556.

25Switzer v. Gertenbach, 122 111. App. 26; Ricketts v. Scothom, 57 Neb. 61, 77 N. W. 366, 42 L. R. A. 794, 73 Am. St Rep. 491. In both of these cases the plaintiff was the donee of a promissory note made by the donor. In the latter case the maker, the defendant, had given his note to the plaintiff with the expectation that she might thereupon give up working. Relying on the note, the plaintiff gave up a good position and was held entitled to recover on the note. Not infrequently, no doubt also courts allow juries to find an intent to make a bargain in cases where it is difficult to believe there was more than detrimental reliance on a gratuitous promise. See, e. g., Wood v. Danas, 230 Mass. 6S7, 120 N. E. 159.

26See supra, Sec. 112.

27 Whitechurch v. Cavanagh, [1902) A. C. 117; Maddison v. Aldenon, 8 App. Cas. 467, 473; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544, 24 L. Ed. 674; Ellis v. Dodge, 237 Fed. 860; Jelks v. McRae, 25 Ala. 440; Weaver v. Bell, 87 Ala. 386, 387, 6 So. 298; Germania Ins. Co. v. Bromwell, 62 Ark. 43, 49, 34 S. W. 83; Allen v. Run-die, 50 Conn. 9, 47 Am. Rep. 699;

Marsh v. Bridgeport, 75 Conn. 496, 54 Atl. 196; Morris v. Orient Ins. Co., 106 Ga. 472, 475, 33 S. E. 430; Starry v. Korab, 65 Iowa, 267, 21 N. W. 600; Travis. Davis' Ex's, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 825 15 S. W. 525; Gerrish v. Proprietors Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384, 46 Am Dec. 568; Langdon v. Doud, 10 Allen, 433; Tracy v. Union Iron Works, 29 Mo. App. 342; Prescott v. Jones, 69 N. H. 305, 41 Atl. 352; White v. Ash-ton, 51 N. Y. 280; Vick v. Vick, 126 N. C. 123, 35 8. E. 257; Keating v. One, 77 Pa. St. 89; Maxwell v. Urban, 22 Tat. Civ. App. 565, 55 S. W. 1124; Elliot v. Whitmore, 23 Utah, 342, 65 Pac. 70,90 Am. St. Rep. 700. See also Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143; Balfe v. Wert, 13 C. B. 466; Thome v. Dean, 4 Johns. 84; Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330.

28 Wisconsin &. Mich. R. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386, 48 L. Ed. 229, 24 Sop. Ct. 107, per Holmes, J., quoted with approval by McKenna, J., in Burning Co. v. California, 240 U. S.

142, 153, 60 L. Ed. 569, 36 S. Ct. 338.

29Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544, 24 L. Ed. 674; Edison Co. v. Buckeye Co., 59 Fed. 691, 699; Johnson v. Blair, 132 Ala. 128, 31 So. 92; Shields v. Smith, 37 Ark. 47, 53; Johnson v. Longley, 142 Ga. 814, 83 S. E. 952; Wire v. Wyman, 93 Ind. 392; Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich. 159; Stay-ton v. Graham, 139 Pa. St. 1, 21 Atl. 2.

30Holman v. Omaha, etc., Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Ia. 288, 90 N. W. 833, 62 L. R. A. 395, 94 Am. St. Rep. 293. Renackowsky v. Board of Water Commissioners, 122 Mich. 613, 81 N. W, 581; Crawford v. Winterbottom, 88 N. J. L. 588, 96 Atl. 497; Utica Insurance Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend. 652; Joyner v. Massey, 97 N. C. 148,1 S. E. 702; Ceul v. Henderson, 121 N. C. 244, 28 S. E. 481; Armstrong v. Levan, 109 Pa. 177, 1 Atl. 204; Burton v. Stevens, 24 Vt. 131, 58 Am. Dec. 153. See also State Loan & Trust Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245, 252, 62 Pac. 466, 600; Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Cal. 530, 127

Pac. 346; Webber v. Williams College, 23 Pick. 302; Gaylord v. Van Loan, 15 Wend. 308. But see contra,-Andrea) v. Redfield, 98 U. S. 225, 239,25 L. Ed. 158; Green v. Coos Bay Wagon Road Co., 23 Fed. 67; Mann p. Cooper, 2 D. C. App. 226,238; Langdon v. Doud, 10 Allen, 433; Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443, 1 Am. Rep. 548. See also Gray v. Day, 109 Me. 492,84 Atl. 1073, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535.

31 Schrceder v. Young, 161 U. 8. 334, 344,40L. Ed. 721,16S. Ct. 512, citing; Guinn v. Locke, 1 Head, 110; Comber. Little, 4 N. J. Eq. 310, 40 Am. Deo. 207; Griffin v. Coffey, 9 B. Mon. 452, 50 Am. Dec. 519; Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8; Butt v. Butt, 91 Ind. 305; Turner v. King, 2 Ired. Eq. 132, 38 Am. Dec. 679; Lucas v. Nichols, 66 111. 41; McMakin v. Schenck, 98 Ind. 264. In Schroeder v. Young, supra, at p. 345,' the court added: "Probably, if a motion had been made in the original case to set aside the sale upon the ground of mere irregularities, such motion would have to be made before the statutory period for redemption had passed; but in this class of cases, where fraudulent conduct is imputed to the parties conducting the sale, there is a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity, founded upon its general right to relievo from the consequences of fraud, accident or mistake, which may be exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for redemption has expired." See also De Lucia v. Wits, 92 Conn. 416,103 Atl. 117,118; Dow v. Bradley, 110 Me. 249, 85 Atl. 896, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041; Thomas v. Hall, 116 Me. 140, 100 Atl. 502.

32 See infra, Sec.Sec. 679, 689.

33 See infra, Sec. 186.

Pennsylvania decision,34 which held that a license, in terms permanent, to divert a watercourse could not be revoked after the licensee had made improvements and invested capital in consequence of it. This decision has been followed by other cases holding that a license cannot be revoked in violation of its terms after the licensee has seriously changed his position on the faith of it.35 It should be noticed that no slight acts or merely technical reliance will serve.36 The weight of authority, moreover, is opposed to these decisions and holds a gratuitous license revocable though action has been taken in reliance upon it.37 In connection with the subject of enforcement of promises because of a promissory estoppel, a doctrine of equity in regard to certain gratuitous promises should be mentioned. Where land has been gratuitoudy promised to one who, relying upon the promise, has entered upon the land and made improvements, it has been held that equity will specifically enforce the promise to convey the land.38 A promise not to enforce or foreclose a mortgage, in reliance upon which the promisee has made improvements, has been similarly held binding.39 It is to be noticed that in enforcing conveyances in such cases, equity regards only possession of the land and improvements upon it. No other detriment would suffice.40 It is probable that the actual delivery of possession of the land has been regarded as analogous to completing a gift.