34 Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267.

35 Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 68 Am. Dec. 190 (cf. Plunkett v. Meredith, 72 Ark. 3, 77 S. W. 600); Miller v. Kern, 151 Cal. 785, 99 Pac. 179; Al-brecht v. Drake Lumber Co., 67 Fla. 310,65 So. 98; Hiers v. Mill Haven Co., 113 Ga. 1002, 39 S. E. 444; McRey-nolds v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho, 26, 140 Pac. 1096; Joseph v. Wild, 146 Ind. 249, 45 N. E. 467; Patterson v. Burlington, 141 Iowa, 291,119 N. W. 593; Lee v. McLeod, 12 Nev. 280; Bowman v. Bowman, 35 Oreg. 279, 57 Pac. 546; Shaw v. Proffitt, 57 Oreg. 192, 109 Pac. 584, 110 Pac, 1092, Ann. Cas. 1913 A. 63; Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 10 S. W. 661; Barre v. Perry, 82 Vt 301.

36See cases in the preceding note.

37Hicks Bros. v. Swift Creek Mill Co., 133 Ala. 411, 31 So. 947, 57 L. R. A. 720,91 Am. St. Rep. 38; Profile Cotton Mills v. Calhoun Water Co., 189 Ala. 181,66 So. 60; Foot v. New Haven, etc., R. Co., 23 Conn. 214; Jackson & Sharp Co. v. Philadelphia R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180; Howes v. Barmon, 11 Idaho, 64, 81 Pac. 48, 69 L. R. A. 568; Eutwhiatle v. Henke, 211 111. 273, 71 N. E. 990 (but see Girard v. Lehigh Stone Co., 280 111. 479, 484, 117 N. E.

698); Stevens v. Stevens, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 251; Nowlin Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 119 Mich. 406, 78 N. W. 338; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 51 Minn. 304, 53 N. W. 639; Bebsoni Oil Co. v. Yasoo R. Co., 94 Miss. 58, 47 So. 468; Pitunan v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 19S. W. 1104, 33 Am. St. Rep. 536 ( cf. Cape Girardeau R. Co. v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 222 Mo. 461,484,121 S. W. 300); Archer v. Chicago Ry. Co., 41 Mont. 56,108 Pac. 571; Houston p. Laffee, 46 N. H. 505; Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289, 24 Atl. 933; Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604, 29 N. E. 824; Richmond R. Co. v. Durham R. Co., 104 N. C. 658, 10 S. E. 659; Rodefer v. Pittsburg R. Co., 72 Oh. 272, 74 N. E. 183; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47,67 Am. Dec. 505; Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah, 361, 53 Pac. 1045; Hathaway v. Yakima Water Co., 14 Wash. 469, 44 Pac. 896; Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S. E. 399, 49 L. R. A. 497; Thcemke v. Fiedler, 91 Wis. 386, 64 N. W. 1030. In Girard v. Lehigh Stone Co., 280 111. 479, 484, 117 N. E. 698, it was held that a gratuitous license thus relied on would be protected in equity, though invalid at law.

Another class of cases which seem to rest on the ground of promissory estoppel are promised marriage settlements. It is said to be the policy of the law to favor such settlements and in accordance with this policy promises which often seem to have been intended as gratuitous have been enforced when a marriage has taken place in reliance upon them.41 Doubt-

38 Neale v. Neale, 9 Wail. 1, 9, 19 L. Ed. 580; Guynn v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97; Bakersneld Assoc. v. Chester, 65 Cal 98; Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. S18; Irwin v. Dyke, 114 111. 302,1N. E. 913; Clancy v. Musky, 187 111. 605, 58 N. E. 594; Hughes v. Lindsay, 31 Ia. 329; Pranger v. Pranger, 182 Ia. 639, 164 N. W. 607; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 93 Me. 439, 46 Atl. 513; Hardesty v. Richard-eon, 44 Md. 617, 22 Am. Rep. 57; Potter p. Smith, 68 Mich. 212,35 N. W. 916; Doner v. Matson, 94 Mo. 328, 7 8. W. 268, 4 Am. St. Rep. 388; Story v. Black, 6 Mont. 26, 1 Pac. 1, 51 Am. Rep. 37; Seavey v. Drake, 62 N. H. 393; Young v. Overbaugh, 145 N. Y. 158, 39 N. E. 712; Messiah Home v. Rogers, 212 N. Y. 315, 106 N. E. 59; Schroder v. Wanxor, 36 Hun, 423; Pugh v. Spick-nail, 43 Ore. 489, 73 Pac. 1020; Scott v. Lewis, 40 Ore. 37,66 Pac. 299; Royer v. Ephrata Borough, 171 Pa. 429, 33 Atl. 361; Johnson v. Townsend, 77 Tex. 639, 14 S. W. 233; Grigsby v. Osborn, 82 Va. 371; Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 15 S. E. 87. See also Crosbie v. McDoual, 13 Ves.

148; Merenees c. DeLemos, 91 Conn. 651, 101 Atl. 8. But see the contrary decisions of Tolleson v. Blackstook, 95 Ala. 510, 513, 11 So. 284; Usher's Ex's v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552; Ridley v. McNairy, 2 Hump. 174. The matter is discussed by Pound in 13 111. L. Rev. 435, 440.

39Fasten v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159; Roe v. Fleming, 32 Okl. 259, 122 Pac. 496.

40 In this connection should be considered the doctrines of equity in regard to the enforcement of oral con-tracts for the sale of land, because of part performance. See infra, Sec. 494.

41Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Wms. 65; Shadwdl v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 159; Bold v. Hutchinson, 20 Beav. 250; Layer v. Fielder, 32 Beav. 1; Coverdale v. Eastwood, L. R. 15 Eq. 121; Kenya v. Gilmore, Ir. Rep. 8 Eq. 290; Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 186, 78 N. E. 943, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 734. In Laver v. Fielder, 32 Beav. 1, Romilly, M. R., said: "It is of great importance that all persons should understand that when a man makes a less there are reasons of justice for enforcing promises which have led the promisee to incur any detriment on the faith of them, not only when the promisor intended, but also when he should reasonably have expected such detriment would be incurred, though he did not request it as an exchange for his promise. Students of the Civil Law usually select the technicalities of the English and American law requiring consideration to validate a simple contract, for particular animadversion; and there is not infrequently observable in the decisions of American courts in cases of hardship an impatience with the requirement and an effort to enlarge the boundaries of enforceable promises. If this sentiment should find general expression, it may fairly be argued that the fundamental basis of simple contracts historically was action in justifiable reliance on a promise-rather than the more modern notion of purchase of a promise for a price, and that it is a consistent development from this early basis to define valid consideration as any legal benefit to the promisor or legal detriment to the promisee given or suffered by the latter in reasonable reliance on tile promise. Such a definition eliminates the necessity of a request by the promisor for the consideration. The proposition is by no means without intrinsic merit, but it should be recognized that if generally applied it would much extend liability on promises, and that at present it is opposed to the great weight of authority. A class of cases where a genuine estoppel exists must be distinguished from those discussed in this section. Where a note has been executed to a bank to make an appearance of assets to deceive the bank examiners and enable the bank to continue business, a receiver of the bank can maintain an action on the note, although as between the bank and the maker there was no consideration.42 Here there is a misstatement of fact made to solemn engagement upon an important occasion, such as the marriage of his daughter, he is bound by the promise he then makes. If he induce a person to set upon a particular promise, with the particular view, which affects the interests in life of his own children and of the persona who become united to them, this court will not permit him afterwards to forego his own words and say that he was not bound by what he then promised." See also De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807.

42 Golden v. Cervenka, 278 111. 409, 427, 116 N. E. 273; Niblack c. Farley, a third person representing the creditors, and action is taken relying thereon.