It is generally true that one who has led another to act in reasonable reliance on his representations of fact cannot afterwards in litigation between the two deny the truth of the representations, and some courts have sought to apply this principle to the formation of contracts, where, relying on a gratuitous promise, the promisee has suffered detriment.22 It is to be noticed, however, that such a case does not come within the ordinary definition of estoppel. If there is any representation of an existing fact, it is only that the promisor for wrongfully reporting the plaintiff unqualified for admission, and the court quoted, on page 50, from the note to Coggs v. Bernard, in Smith's Leading Cases, a statement which can hardly be accepted. "The confidence induced by undertaking any service for another, is a sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance of it." When such a person is liable, his liability is not contractual.
21 In Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75, the defendant undertook gratuitously to get a renewal of a policy of insurance, and failed to observe conditions requisite for the validity of the new policy. He was held liable. This seems perhaps to go farther than any other decision in holding a defendant liable for failing to secure to the plaintiff a promised advantage, as distinguished from injuring what the plaintiff had possessed before the undertaking.
22Beatty v. Western College, 177 111. 280, 52 N. E. 432, 42 L. R. A. 797, 69 Am. St. Rep. 242; Switzer v. Ger-tenbach, 122 111. App. 26 (cf. South
Park Commissioners v. Chicago City Ry, Co., 286 111. 604,122 N. E. 89,92); Simpson College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa, 596, 33 N. W. 74; School District c. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656, 37 L. R. A. 406, 60 Am. St. Rep. 576; Ricketts v. Scothom, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365, 42 L. R. A. 794, 73 Am. St. Rep. 491; Reimensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. 17,4 Atl. 425. In Alliance Bank v. Broom, 2 Dr. & Sm. 289, a promise was enforced because the effect of the promise was to induce some degree of forbearance, though it seems apparent from the facta that such forbearance was not asked for in exchange for the promise. This decision, however, is inconsistent with the doctrine stated in the later case of Miles v. New Zealand Alford Eat. Co., 32 Ch. D. 266, and has been explained away in later English decisions. Fullerton v. Provincial Bank,  A. C. 309; Glegg v. Bromley, [19121 3 K. B. 474, 481. See also In re Hudson, 54 L. J. Ch. 811; Burnett v. Turner, 105 Ark. 290, 161 S. W. 249.
at the time of making the promise intends to fulfil it. As to such intention there is usually no misrepresentation and if there is, it is not that which has injured the promisee. In other words, he relies on a promise and not on a misstatement of fact;23 and the term "promissory" estoppel or something equivalent should be used to mark the distinction.24 In the United States, the decisions which have enforced promises, confessedly because of the promisee's action in reliance thereon have generally been cases of charitable subscriptions where courts dissatisfied with the prevailing theories by which consideration is found for such agreements, but nevertheless disposed to follow the weight of American authority in sustaining the subscriber's promise, have explained the liability on the ground of estoppel. In a few cases, however, courts have applied the same doctrine to a promise, between individuals, for the payment of money.25 Opposed in principle to such decisions are those which have held that performance of a detrimental condition attached to a gratuitous promise is not a substitute for consideration, and does not make the promisor liable if he breaks his promise; 26 and many other decisions which hold that a detriment incurred in reliance on a promise is not valid consideration unless the detriment was requested as consideration.27 "The promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment, or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting." 28 Promises of future action, it is generally held, if they can furnish the basis for an estoppel at all, can do so only where they relate to an intended abandonment of an existing right, and are made to influence others who in fact are induced to act thereby.29 The commonest illustration of this doctrine is where one who has induced his creditor to forbear to bring action upon an enforceable claim by promise of payment or by a promise not to plead the Statute of Limitations as a defence, even though such forbearance was not requested as consideration for the promise, and though the new promise (because not in writing or for other reasons) was not binding as such, has not ben allowed later to set up the Statute after the creditor relying upon the debtor's promise has refrained from bringing Action until the statutory period has exphed.30 Another illustration is where a statutory period for the redemption of property sold by judicial process has been allowed to expire on the faith of statements made by the purchaser that the statutory limitation would not be insisted upon: "Under such circumstances the courts have held with great unanimity that the purchaser is estopped to insist upon the statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not in writing and were made without consideration, upon the ground that the debtor was lulled into a false security." 31 In these cases, however, no new right is created. The court does not sustain an action on the promise; it reaches the desired result by allowing a defence to an action or allowing an original right to be enforced by merely prohibiting the interposition of a defence. They properly fall under the head of waiver, giving that word the narrow significance hereafter ascribed to it.32 Moreover in such cases though the estoppel prevents an insistence on strict compliance with statutory requirements it by no means necessarily follows that the promise is binding according to its terms, permitting a delay, either indefinite or until a new statutory period has elapsed.33 A similar basis is to be found for the doctrine of an early