Analogous to cases of the detention of goods are cases where the assertion of a lien upon real property has been used as a means of coercion, though no lien existed or if it existed should have been discharged.61 So where a void tax has been paid to prevent seizure or levy on property,62 or a payment made in order to compel a public officer to perform his duty,63 the payment may be recovered. Illegal charges paid to public service companies in order to induce them to perform their duty
59 Astley t;. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 915; Irving v. Wilson, 4 Term Rep. 485; Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. A C. 73; Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 837; Oatea v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 346; Green v. Duckett, 11 Q. B. D. 275; Maakell v. Horner,  3 K. B. 106; Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581, 13 Sup. Ct. 684, 37 L. Ed. 569; Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn. 358, 87 Am. Dec. 178; Du Vail v. Norris, 119 Ga. 947, 47 8. E. 212; Fenwick Shipping Co. v. Clarke Bros., 133 Ga. 43, 65 S. E. 140; Pemberton v. Williams, 87 HI. 15; Lafayette, etc., R. Co. v. Pattison, 41 Ind. 312; Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 134, 20 Am. Dec. 352; Whitlock Machine Co. v;. Holway, 92 Me. 414, 42 Atl. 799; Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364, 19 Am. Rep. 367; McCabe v. Shaver, 69 Mich. 25, 36 N. W. 800; Betts v. Reading, 93 Mich. 77, 52 N. W. 940; Fargusson v. Winslow, 34 Minn. 384, 25 N. W. 942; Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N, W. 217, 16 L. R. A. 376; Quinnett v. Washington, 10 Mo. 53; Weber v. Kirkendall, 39 Neb. 193, 57 N. W. 1026; Baldwin v. Liverpool, etc., S. Co., 74 N. Y. 125, 30 Am. Rep. 277; Doyle v. Rector, etc., Trinity Church, 133 N. Y. 372, 31 N. E. 221; Cowley v. Fabien, 204 N. Y. 566, 97 N. E. 458; Clancy v. Dutton, 129 N. Y. App. Div. 23, 113 N. Y. S. 124; Mote v. Mitchell, 91 Pa. St. 114; Lowen-stein v. Bache, 41 Pa. Super. 552; Alston v. Durant, 2 Strob. L. (S. C.) 257, 49 Am. Deo. 596; Buford v. Lonergan, 6 Utah, 301, 22 Pac. 164; Marsh v. Port Hope Harbour Co., 6 U. C. Q. B. (O. S.) 100.
60 See Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543,15 S. W. 569, 23 Am. St. Rep. 363; and also cases cited supra, note 57; United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 21 L. Ed. 457; Wilkerson v. Hood, 65 Mo. App. 491; Van Dyke w. Wood, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 208, 70 N. Y. S. 328; Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay (S. Car.), 470.
61 Fraser v. Pendlebury, 31 L. J. C. P. 1; Rowland v. Watson, 4 Cal. App. 476, 88 Pac. 495; Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 16 L. R. A. 376, 32 Am. St. Rep. 581; Fout v. Giraldin, 64 Mo. App. 165; Wells v. Adams, 88 Mo. App. 215; First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L. R. A. 296; Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574, 111 Am. St. Rep. 722. But see Savannah Savings Bank v. Logan, 99 Ga. 291, 25 S. E. 692.
62 Maskell v. Horner,  3 K. B. 106; Gill v. Oakland, 124 Cal. 335, 57 Pac. 150; Bailey v. Goshen, 32 Conn. 546, 87 Am. Dec. 191; Hennel v.
Vanderburgh County, 132 Ind. 32, 31 N. E. 462; Greenabaum v. King, 4 Kans. 332, 96 Am. Dec. 172; Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268, 60 N. W. 316, 26 Am. St. Rep. 291; Minor Lumber Co. v. Alpena, 97 Mich. 499, 56 N. W. 926; American Baptist Missionary Union v. Hastings, 67 Minn. 303, 69 N. W. 1078, 72 Minn. 484, 75 N. W. 713, 77 N. W. 36; AEtna Ins. Co. v. New York, 153 N. Y. 331, 47 N. E. 593; Dale v. New York, 71 N. Y. App. Div. 227, 611, 75 N. Y. 8. 576, 1123; People v. Purdy, 143 N. Y. App. Div. 277, 128 N. Y. S. 119; Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527; Whittaker v. Deadwood, 12 S. Dak. 608, 82 N. W. 202; Stowe v. Stowe, 70 Vt. 609, 41 Atl. 1024; Keiley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593, 39 L. R. A. 594, 75 Am. St. Rep. 904. This matter is covered by statute in many States. Though not paid strictly under duress, a tax may be recoverable in case of mistake of some extrinsic fact rendering the tax void.
In Bets v. New York, 119 N. Y. App. Div. 91, 92, 103 N. Y. S. 886, the court said: "The rule stated in numerous decisions, that payment without coercion of a tax or assessment (1) which is void on its face, but not known by the payor to be void, or (2) of a tax or assessment which is void, but not void on its face, with knowledge by the payor of facts dehors which make it void, is not recoverable back, has no application to the present case. Such payments are technically called voluntary payments. the payment in this case does not come under that head at all. It was voluntary in the large sense, but is not within the legal definition of what are termed voluntary payments. In the case of payment without coercion of a tax or assessment void on its face as matter of law, the conclusive legal presumption that every one knows the law, regardless of whether that be the truth as matter of fact or not in the particular case, makes the payment a voluntary one, i. e., a payment made with knowledge that the tax or assessment is void. In the case of like payment of a tax or assessment not void on its face, knowl-ledge at the time by the payor of facts dehors which make it void, also makes the payment a voluntary one, i. e., a payment made with knowledge that the tax or assessment is void. In each case the knowledge that the tax or assessment is void is the basis on which the payment is declared to be a voluntary one. But where the facts dehors which made it void are not known to the payor, such basis does not exist. There the payment is not voluntary, for it can be such only when made with knowledge, either presumed or actual, that the levy is void. Instead of being made in the present case with knowledge of the fact that the tax was void, it was made and received under a mutual mistake of a fact on which the validity of the tax depended, and money so paid is always recoverable back. Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. 355,19 Am. Deo. 508; Pitcher v. Turin Plank Road Co., 10 Barb. 436; Thompson v. Otis, 42 Barb. 461; Kingston Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391, 100 Am. Dec. 516; Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 285, 25 N. E. 408; Davis v. Kling, 77 Hun, 598, 28 N. Y. S. 1026."
63 Lovell v. Simpson, 3 Esp. 153; Dew v. Parsons, 2 Barn. & Ald. 562; Morgan v. Palmer, 2 B. A C. 729; Hills v. Street, 5 Bing. 37; Steele v. Williams, 8 Exch. 625; Ogden v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 319; Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 111. 578, 78 as such, are also regarded as made under such compulsion as to justify recovery;64 and an executory contract induced by the same means is likewise voidable.66
N. E. 895; Ford v. Holden, 39 N. H. 143; Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370; Robinson v. Ezzell, 72 N. C. 231; Amer-can Steamship Co. v. Young, 89 Pa. St. 186, 33 Am. St. Rep. 748, aff'd 105 U. S. 41, 26 L. Ed. 966; Alston v. Durant, 2 Strob. L. (S. C.) 257, 49 Am. Dec. 596; Hays v. Stewart, 8 Tex. 358; Hooker v. Gurnett, 16 Up. Can. Q. B. 180. And see Laterrade v. Kaiser, 15 La. Ann. 296 (fees for stalls in a market); Marcotte v. Allen, 91 Me. 74, 39 Atl. 346, 40 L. R. A. 185 (fraud rather than duress); Nieder-meyer v. Curators Univ. of Missouri, 61 Mo. App. 654 (excessive fees obtained by University from student); Soderberg v. King County, 15 Wash. 194, 45 Pac. 785, 33 L. R. A. 670, 55 Am. St. Rep. 878 (recovery from county of excessive fees obtained by sheriff). Cf. Sheibley v. Cooper, 79 Neb. 232, 112 N. W. 363; Taylor v. Hall, 71 Tex. 213, 9 S. W. 141; Camden v. Green, 54 N. J. L. 591, 593, 25 Atl. 357, 33 Am. St. Rep. 686.
In the decision last cited the court said: "The case, then, could have been only this: the city board, claiming the legal fee to be $500 although the county board had ordered that the fee be reduced to $300 and being willing to issue a license to the plaintiff on payment of what it considered the legal fee, the plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts, paid $500, and received the license. In such a transaction there is nothing to take the case out of the general principle, that where a party, without mistake of fact, or fraud, duress or extortion, voluntarily pays money on a demand which is not en-forcible against him, he cannot recover it back. Flower v. Lance, 59 N. Y. 603; Schwarzenbach v. Odorless Excavating Co., 65 Md. 34, 3 Ad. 676, 57 Am. Rep. 301; Sowles v. Soule, 59 Vt. 131. A refusal to issue the license without payment of more than the legal fee would not constitute duress. Sooy ads. State, 9 Vroom, 324; Wright v. Remington, 12 Vroom, 48, 32 Am. Rep. 180, S. C. 14 Id. 451. Nor would it constitute extortion; for a license was not demandable by the plaintiff as a right, and the city board, under its authority, conferred by the Act of 1884, to license, regulate or prohibit, could lawfully have refused to issue a license upon any terms. Although the language of the Act of 1891 would empower the county board under certain circumstances, to reduce the license fee fixed by the city board, yet it did not attempt to impose upon the latter board the duty of issuing a license at the reduced rate, but merely entitled the applicant, on refusal of a license from the city board, to apply therefor to the county board. Consequently, by refusing to license the plaintiff unless he paid the city $500, which the city board deemed the lawful fee or tax, that board was not withholding from him anything which it was its duty to concede."
64 Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 837; Parker v. Gr«m Western R., 7
65 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gorham, 79 Kans. 643, 100 Pac. 647, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637. Cf. Kansas City Ac. Ry. Co. v. Graham (Tex. Civ. App.), 145 S. W. 632, where a release extending the carrier's time for unloading, induced by the carrier's threats, was held valid, though the court admitted that threats of a more serious breach of duty by the carrier might have amounted to duress.
An unlawful refusal by a mortgagee to release the mortage unless he is paid a bonus 66 or a demand of an excessive payment in order to prevent foreclosure,67 may also amount to duress. On similar principles a threatened injury to business or to means of livelihood which goes beyond the means legally allowed a creditor for the enforcement of his claim, may constitute such duress as to give a right of rescission.68