A contract which involves no moral turpitude, and the enforcement of which will violate no public policy of the State where action is brought, if valid where made will be enforced in the former jurisdiction, though it would be invalid if made there;12a but no contract will be upheld, the enforcement of which would violate the settled policy of the forum.12b On the ing intercourse. See The Panariellos, 84 L. J. (P.) 140; Robeon v. Premier Oil and Pipe line Co., [1915] 2 Ch. 124. The prohibition is based on public policy, which forbids the doing of acts that will or may be to the advantage of the enemy State by increasing its capacity for prolonging hostilities and by adding to the resources available to individuals in the enemy State. See Porter v. Freu-denberg, [1915] 1 K. B. 857, 868. In the present case the contract whereby the defendant covenanted, inter alia, to pay rent in respect of the property known as the Prince of Wales' Theatre was a subsisting and valid and enforceable contract at the outbreak of war. Since the war no intercourse has in fact taken place with the alien enemy, unless it can be said that seeking to obtain payment by him of the rent due under the lease is within the prohibition of common law and consequently illegal. It is contended for the defendant that not only would the payment be illegal, but that the lease itself must be treated as at an end or suspended in consequence of the war. Payment by or on account of an alien enemy to persons resident in this country is not trading with the enemy and is permitted, if the payment arises out of a transaction entered into before the outbreak of war. ...

"The property of alien enemies is at common law subject to confiscation by the Crown in virtue of the Royal prerogative; see Hale's Fleas of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 95; Porter v. Freuden-berg, [1915] 1 K. B. 857, 867. But if the Crown refrains from exercising the right to confiscate and allows the alien enemy to continue in ownership of the property, he holds it subject to all its obligations. It would be manifestly absurd that he should derive the advantage of holding the property without liability to perform the obligations incident to his right of ownership."

11 Tingley v. Mttller, [1917] 2 Ch. 144.

12 Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft 2ur Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1916] 1 K.

B. 763.

12a The Talus, 248 Fed. 670, 160 C.

C. A. 570, cert, granted sub nam. Sand-berg v. McDonald, 246 U. S. 669, 62 L. Ed. 930, 38 S. Ct. 345.

12b Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 62 L. Ed. 368,38 S. Ct. 147.

other hand, if a contract or sale is made with a view of violating the laws of another country, though not otherwise obnoxious to the law either of the forum or of the place where the contract was made, it will not be enforced. Out of comity the courts will treat bargains as against public policy which have for their object the violation of the laws of a sister State.13

13 Graves v. Johnson, 166 Mass. 211, 30 N. E. 818, 15 L. R. A. 834, 32 Am. St. Rep. 440 (again before the court in 170 Mass. 53, 60 N. E. 383, 88 Am. St. Rep. 355), was an action for the price of intoxicating liquors, which were sold and delivered in Massachusetts by the plaintiffs to the defendant, a Maine hotel-keeper, who bought the liquor intending to resell it in Maine, against the laws of that State. Holmes, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The question . . . should be decided as we think that a Maine court ought to decide this very case if the action were brought there. It is noticeable, and it has been observed by Sir F. Pollock, that some of the English cases which have gone farthest in asserting the right to disregard the revenue laws of a country other than that where the contract is made and is to be performed have had reference to the English revenue laws. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341; Pollock, Contract (5th ed.), 308. See also Mclntyre v. Parks, 3 Mete. 207. The assertion of that right, however, no doubt was in the interest of English commerce (Pellecat v. Angell, 2 Cr. M. & R. 311, 313), and has not escaped criticism (Story, Gonfl. Laws, Sec.{257, 264, note 3; Kent, Comm., 265, 266, and Wharton, Confl. Laws, Sec.484), although there may be a question how far the actual decisions go beyond what would have been held in the case of an English contract affecting only English laws. See Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181; Brown v. Duncan, 10 B.

& C. 93, 98, 99; Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79, 83, 84, 13 L. Ed. 901. Of course it would be possible for an independent State to enforce all contracts made and to be performed within its territory, without regard to how much they might contravene the policy of its neighbors' laws. But in fact no State pursues such a course of barbar-our isolation. As a general proposition it is admitted that an agreement to break the laws of a foreign country would be invalid. Pollock, Conk (5th ed.) 308. The courts are agreed on the invalidity of a sale when the contract contemplates a design on the part of the purchaser to resell contrary to the laws of a neighboring State, and requires an act on the part of the seller in furtherance of the scheme. Waymell c. Reed, 5 T. R 599; Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110, 76 Am. Dec. 154; Fisher v. Lord, 63 N. H. 514, 3 Atl. 927; Hull v. Rugglee, 56 N. Y. 424, 429. [See also Gambioso v. Maffett, 2 Wash. C. C. 98; Kohn v. Schooner Renaissance, 5 La. Ann. 25, 52 Am. Dec. 577; Ivey v. Lalland, 42 Miss. 444, 2 Am. Rep. 606, 97 Am. Dec. 475; Rocco v. Frapoli, 50 Neb. 666, 70 N. W. 236; Rosenbaum v. United States Credit System Go., 60 N. J. L. 294, 37 Atl. 595, 64 N. J. L. 34, 44 Atl. 966, 65 N. J. L. 255; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 25, 42 N. E. 419, 34 L. R. A. 757, 51 Am. St Rep. 654.] On the other hand, plainly, it would not be enough to prevent a recovery of the price that the seller had reason to believe that the buyer intended to resell the goods in violation of law; he must have known the intention in fact. Finch v. Mansfield, 97 Mass. 89, 92; Adams v. Couillard,