It is well settled that an infant may make himself liable for goods that are necessary, considering his position and station in life. This liability, though often treated as arising from the promise of the infant, seems to be rattier a quasi-contractual obligation. This is shown by several classes of cases. An infant is not liable for any price he may promise and never for more than the value of the necessaries.91 He is
87 See supra, Sec. 163.
88Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill, 120; Sayles v. Christie, 187 111. 420, 441, 58 N. E. 480; Chandler v. Glover's Adm., 32 Pa. St. 509.
89 See supra, Sec. 164.
90Capps v. Hensley, 23 Okla. 311, 100 Pac. 516.
91 An infant "is held on a promise implied by law, and not strictly speaking on his actual promise. The law implies the promise to pay from the necessity of his situation just as in the case of a lunatic. In other words, he is liable to pay only what the necessaries were reasonably worth, and not what he may improvidently have agreed to pay for them." Trainer v. Trumbell, 141 Mass. 527, 630, 6 N. E. 761; Hyer v. Hyatt, 3 Cranch C. C. 276; Gregory v. Lee, 64 Conn. 407, 30 Atl. 63, 25
L. R. A. 618; Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 246, 44 Am. Rep. 759; Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H. 346; Parsons v. Keyes, 43 Tex. S67; Plummer v. Northern Pac Ry. Co., 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73; Jones v. Valentines' School 122 Wis. 318, 320, 99 N. W. 1043. It is so enacted in the Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 2. In Iowa by statute a minor is stated to be "bound" by such contracts; yet the court apparently felt it open to argument whether more than a reasonable value could be recovered. Hickman v. McDonald, 164 Ia. 50, 145 N. W. 322.
See also Guthrie v. Morris, 22 Ark. 411; Cooper v. State, 37 Ark. 421; Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. 387; Dubose v. Wheddon, 4 McCord, 221; Haines' Adm. v. Tarrant, 2 Hill (S. C), 400; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 liable even though he was too young to understand the bargain into which he entered;92 and even though declared by statute incapable of making a valid contract of any nature;93 he is not liable upon an executory contract to buy necessaries.94 It would seem logically to follow that even though a contract for necessaries is executed on both sides, the infant might rescind and recover for any excess above a reasonable value paid by him.95 It has been urged in opposition to the theory that the infant's obligation is quasi-contractual that so to hold involves the consequence that the infant must lose the benefit of a favorable bargain if the agreed price was less than the real value.96 This objection is without force, however. It assumes that when it is said that an infant's obligation to pay for necessaries is quasi-contractual that the bargain which the parties actually made is void. But unless made so by statute such is not the case. The bargain is voidable and that only by the infant. If the infant elect to stand by the contract he may do so as well where necessaries are the subject of the contract as where they are not.97 What is meant by saying the infant is liable only quasi-contractually for necessaries is that he may avoid his contracts to pay for necessaries just as he may other contracts, but that if he does so a liability will be imposed upon him by the law which he cannot avoid. It is essential to recovery that necessaries shall have been furnished on the credit of the infant. If furnished on the credit of his parent or guardian, he is not liable.98
S. W. 1101, 5. L. R. A. 176; Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378. In the cases cited in this paragraph it was held that where an infant gives a note for necessaries, he is liable on the note, but the recovery will be reduced to the amount the necessaries were actually worth. Other jurisdictions hold that an infant is not liable on a bill, note, or bond, as such, whatever the consideration. Re Soltykoff,  1. Q. B 413; Morton p. Steward, 5 111. App. 633; Henderson v. Fox, 5 Ind. 489; Ayera v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245, 44 Am. Rep. 759; Beeler p. Young, 1 Bibb, 519; M'Crillis v. How, 3 N. H. 348; Fenton v. White, 1 Southard, 111; Swasey v. Vander-heyden, 10 Johns. 33; Bouchell v. Clarey, 3 Brev. 194; McMinn v. Rich-monds, 6 Yerg. 9.
93Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones L. 111.
94 N. H. Pub. St. (1901), c. 177, Sec. 26, so enacts as to persons under guardianship, but a. minor under guardianship was nevertheless held liable for neces-saries furnished herself and infant.
McConnell v. McConnell, 76 N. H. 385, 74 Atl. 875.
94 Gregory v. Lee, 64 Conn. 407, 30 Atl. 53, 25 L. R. A. 618; Wallin v. Highland Park Co., 127 Iowa, 131; Wells v. Hardy, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 464, 51S. W. 603; Pool p. Pratt, 1 D. Chip. 252, 254; Jones v. Valentines' School, 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043; International Textbook Co. v. McKone, 133 Wis. 200, 113 N. W. 483. If the contract is in part executed, the infant is liable for the value only of that part-Gregory v. Lee, 64 Conn. 407, 30 Atl. 63, 25 L. R. A. 618.
95 It has been held, however, that where an infant bargained to give his services for support and schooling, the infant could not recover for services rendered even though he offered to deduct the value of the consideration which he had received. Wilhehn v. Hardman, 13 Md. 140. See also Starke v. Storm's Ex., 115 Va. 651, 79 S. E. 1057.
96Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S. W. 1101, 6 L. R. A. 176. See Mechem on Sales, Sec. 122.