Frequently the nature of an offer or agreement or the surrounding circumstances will indicate sufficiently the time tention, that it contracted with reference to such known custom and usage."

"While a contract providing for payment at or for stated intervals, may create a presumption that the hiring was for corresponding intervals, the circumstances attending the particular employment, should be looked to in determining the length of the employment. Smith v. Theobold, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S. W. 394. Applying this rule to the facte in this case, we think the contract, if entered into had the telegram been received and its terms accepted, would have been for the base ball season of 1912."

26 See decisions in the following note.

27 This was so held in Carnig v. Carr, 187 Mass. 544, 46 N. E. 117, 36 L.R. A. 512,57 Am. St. Rep. 488. To the same effect axe Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802; Harrington v. Kansas City Ry. Co.) 60

Mo. App. 223. But see contra Roddy v. McGetrick, 49 Ala. 159, 16 Am. St. Rep. 82; Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 Pac. 1126, 15 Am. St. Rep. 82; Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 206 111 375,70 N. E. 369; Perry v. Wheeler, 12 Bush, 541; Sullivan v. Detroit, etc, R. Co., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N. W. 756, 64 L. R. A. 673,106 Am. St. Rep. 403; Milner v. Hill, 19 Oh. Cir. Ct. 663; Beck v. Walkers, 24 Pa. County Ct. 403. See also Christensen v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 26 Or. 302, 38 Pac 127.

28 Jessup v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 82 Iowa, 243, 48 N. W. 77; Kelly v. Peter, etc.. Stone Co., 130 Ky. 530, 113 S. W. 486.

29 McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 63 Minn. 405, 65 N. W. 661, 663; Carter White Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb. 409, 66 N. W. 636.

30 Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mas. 544, 46 N. E. 117, 35 L. R. A. 512, 57 Am. St. Rep. 488.

31 Gray v. Wulff, 68 111. App. 376.

within which performance of a promise was understood to take place though no express statement of the time is made. In a few such cases, definite rules of law have been established. Thus in a contract requiring mutual performances, if the performances are capable of being rendered simultaneously the law has established the rule that they are to be so performed.32 And therefore if the time for the performance of one promise is fixed, the time for the counter performance is also fixed.33

A promise is not too indefinite for enforcement because of the use of such inexact words of definition of the time of performance as "immediately."34 "As soon as possible."35 "At once."36 "Forthwith."37 "Directly."38 "Promptly."39

32 Blown v. Sanders, 4 B. ft C. 941; Lehman v. Warren, 53 Ala. 535, 540; Merrill Furniture Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17,32, 32 Atl. 712; Haskins p. Warren, 115 Mass. S14, 533; Delaware Trust Co. v. Calm, 195 N. Y. 231,88 N. E. 53; Miner lithographing Co. v. Mittenthal Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 1066.

33Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. R. 126; Withers ». Reynolds, 2 B. ft Ad. 8S2;

Parker v. Rawiings, 4 Bing. 280; Brennan v. Ford, 46 Cal. 7, 16; Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, 141 Ky. 379,132S. W. 575; Skillman Hardware Co. v. Davis, 53 N. J. L, 114, 20 Atl. 1080; Dunham v. Pettee, 8 N. Y. 60S; Zeihen v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 558,42 N. E. 1080; Catlin v. Jones, 48 Or. 158, 85 Pac. 515, 52 Or. 337, 97 Pac. 546. 34 This word was construed in eases

35 Attwood v. Emery, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 110 (the construction was given that as soon as possible meant as soon as was possible to the seller, considering his particular situation. It seems this construction might be a true one in

36Wichita Mill ft Elevator Co. v. liberal Elevator Co., 243 Fed. 99, 155 C. C. A. 629; Georgia Agricultural Works v. Price, 11 Ga. App. 80, 74 8. E. 718; Warder v. Horne, 110 Iowa, 285, 81 N. W. 591; Fisher v. Boynton, 87 Me. 395, 32 Atl. 995; Sharp v. Johnston, 3 Lansing, 520, 41 How. Pr. 400; Binger Co. p. Blumberg, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1115, 76 N. Y. Misc. 432; Lewis p. Hojer, 16 N. Y. Supp. 534 (sooner than a reasonable time); Victor Safe Co. v. O'Neil, 48 Wash. 176, 93 Pac. 214. See also Beg. v. Roans, 3 Q. B. D. 28.

37 Roberts v. Brett, 11H. L. Cas. 337 (not immediately, but within a reasonable time); Burgess v. Boetefeur, 7 M.

& G. 481, 494 (with all possible celerity); Kenney v. Hutchinson, 6 M. & M. 134 (as soon as reasonably possible). See also Hyde v. Watts, 12 M. ft W. 254; Boyes v. Bluck, 13 C. B. 652; Hudson v. Hill, 43 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 273; Furber p. Cobb, 18 Q. B. D. 494; Staunton v. Wood, 16 Q. B. 638 (goods to be delivered "forthwith," price to be paid within "fourteen days"- forthwith held to mean less than fourteen days); Anderson v. Goff, 72 Cal. 65, 13 Pac 73, 1 Am. St. Rep. 34 (as soon as reasonably possible).

38 Duncan v Tophan, 8 C. B. 225 (sooner than a reasonable time, but not "instanter").

39 Soper v. Creighton, 93 Me. 564,

"All convenient speed." 40 "Shortly." 41 Frequently the time stated in a promise is qualified by the use of the word "about." This will not render the promise too indefinite for enforcement. The meaning must be construed with reference to the particular circumstances of the case.42 But a promise to pay $900 "in monthly instalments" without indication of their numbers or amount is so indefinite that it can be construed only as a promise to pay in a reasonable time.43 And a promise to continue a business as long as it is profitable or pays expenses, is too indefinite for enforcement.44 So a promise to renew the plaintiff's notes "until such time as the improvement in the business situation should enable him to proceed in business without such assistance," is merely "a hopeful encouragement sounding only in prophecy," 45 and a relating to the sale of goods in promise to "extend an obligation until a specified bank shall resume business," has also been held too indefinite for enforcement,46 but this decision seems questionable.

Woods v. Miller, 55 Iowa, 168,7 N. W. 484, 39 Am. Rep. 170 (eight days held too late); Rhoades v. Cotton, 90 Me. 453, 38 Atl. 367 (seventeen days held too late); Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327, (nine days held too late). See also McCormick Co. P. Brower, 88 Iowa, 607, 55 N. W. 537; Neldon v. Smith, 36 N. J. L. 148. In the case last cited it was held that the word "immediate" might be explained by custom as meaning even so late a time as the next month. The word is construed in cases other than in the law of sales, in Pybus v. Mitford, 2 Lev. 75, 77; Thompson v. Gibson, 8 M. & W. 281; Hoggins v. Gordon, 3 Q. B. 466; Alexiadi v. Robinson, 2 F. & F. 679; Webster v. Appleton, 62 L. T. (N. S.) 704; Reg. v. Berkshire Justices, 4 Q. B. D. 469.

some cases and not in others); Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, 4 Q. B. D. 670; Egan v. Barclay Fibre Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 527; Tufts v. Mc-Clure, 40 Iowa, 317; Childs v. Omaha Paraphernalia House, 80 Neb. 673, 114 N. W. 941; National Cash Register Co. v. Brainson, 37 R. I. 462, 93 Atl. 645.

45 Atl. 840, 74 Am. St. Rep. 375 (shipment ordered by the seller from a distant place involving transit of a month, not compliance with order for "prompt shipment"); Brewer v. Lep-man, 127 Mo. App. 693,106 S. W. 1107; Tobias v. Lissberger, 105 N. Y. 404, 12 N. E. 13, 59 Am. Rep. 509 (means immediately, or at once). See also Elliott v. Lord, 48 L. T. (N. S.) 542, Doxey v. Coatee, 181 N. Y. App. D. 207, 168 N. Y. S. 76.

40 Gill v. Browne, 53 Fed. Rep. 394, 3 C. C. A. 573.

41 Cincinnati Glass Co. v. Stephens, 3 Ga. App. 766, 60 S. E. 360.

42 See Smiley v. Barker, 83 Fed. Rep. 6S4, 28 C. C. A. 9; Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Marsh, 20 Colo. 22,36 Pac 799.

43 Hannan v. McNickle, 82 Cal. 122, 23 Pac. 271.

44 Pulliam v. Schimpf, 109 Ala. 179, 19 So. 428. See also Davie v. Mining Co., 93 Mich. 491, 53 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A. 357.

45 Hall v. First National Bank, 173 Mass. 16, 53 N. E. 154, 44 L. R. A. 319, 73 Am. St. Rep. 255.