Some question has arisen of the right of one who holds an option to assign his right to another. An option if given for consideration or under seal is a contract; 96 and the right of the promisee might be supposed to be as assignable as any other contractual right. But such an option is also an offer to enter into a further relation; namely, that of seller and buyer. And it is a general rule that an offer can only be accepted by the person to whom it is made.97 It seems reasonable where a contract right of value is concerned (and an option often is of value) and-the performance of the offeree can be as effectively rendered by any one as by him, that the rule generally applicable to offers should yield, and it is accordingly generally held that an irrevocable option (that is one which is a contract) may be enforced by an assignee.98 And especially this has been held where an option is contained in a lease.99 A few cases, however, have held that an irrevocable offer partakes of the same character as a revocable offer in permitting acceptance only by the offeree.1 Whether one holding an option thereby acquires an interest in land is sometimes discussed as if it affected the question, but it may well be admitted that no interest in land is given by an option and yet asserted that a contract right exists which may be as valuable as an interest in land and which should partake of an ordinary incident of property, like assignability; though doubtless by the express terms of the option the right may be made personal to the one to whom it is given.2
92 In In re Wright, 157 Fed. 544, 85 C. C. A. 206; Greene v. Bartholomew, 34 Ind. 235, and Knevals v. Blauvelt, 82 Me. 458, 19 At1. 818, an insurance agent assigned his right to renewal commissions, the amount of which was wholly uncertain. The assignment was sustained. So other contract rights, the value of which depended upon uncertain future events have been sustained. Bank of Yolo v. Bank of Woodland, 3 Cal. App. 561, 86 Pac. 820; Augur v. Couture, 68 Me. 427; Johnson v. Donohue, 113 Tenn. 446, 83 S. W. 360; and see other oases of assignment of future claims cited in this section.
93 See infra, Sec. 444.
94 See Bowen v. King, 14 Ga. App.
319, 80 S. E 696. See Hall v. Boston Glass Co., 207 Mass. 328, 93 N. E. 640; Fay v. Bankers' Surety Co., 125 Minn. 211, 146 N. W. 359; Berlin Mills Co. v. Poole, 62 N. H. 439; Garland v. Linskey, 19 It. I. 713, 36 Atl. 837, and cases in the following note. Also 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564 and note, L. R. A. 1916 D. 367 n.
95 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 32 S. Ct. 74, 56 L. Ed. 175; aftg., s. c. 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916; Fay v. Bankers' Surety Co., 125 Minn. 211, 140 N. W. 359; Heller v. Luti, 254 Mo. 704, 164 S. W. 123, L, R. A, 1915 B. 191; Thompson v. Erie R. Co., 207 N. Y. 171, 100 N. E. 791.
96 See supra, Sec. 61.
97 See supra, Sec. 80.