20Kirkham v. Muter, 2 B. & Ald. 613; Turner v. Hubbell, 2 Day, 457, 2 Am. Deo. 115; Baker v. Morris, 33 Kan. 580, 582, 7 Pac. 267; Combe v.
Harshaw, 63 N. C. 198; Hamm v. McAfee, 5 Allen (N. Brunswick), 386. See also Richardson v. Crandall, 48
N. Y. 348; and infra, Sec. 482. A dictum or for the violation of a statutory duty,21 or for a contractual obligation other than a money debt is within the statute.22 Therefore an oral warranty of title of goods sold by another may be within the statute as a promise to answer for the express or implied obligation of the seller to warrant his title.23 Whether in any particular case such a warranty is collateral depends upon the question whether sole credit in the matter was given the promisor.24 The word "miscarriage" in the statute has been given the widest meaning. It was said by Abbott, C. J.,25 that the word comprehended "that species of wrongful act the consequences for which the law would make the party civilly responsible." The word "default," if given a natural meaning, implies not simply that there was a primary obligation, but that default had been made in performing it or was to be made, as a condition precedent to the performance of the special promise. The word "debt," however, seems to involve no such implication.
The courts have not generally sought to attach special meanings to these several words, but have rather assumed, probably correctly, that several words of somewhat similar meaning were inserted in the statute with the purpose of covering all kinds of obligations.