When an offer has been rejected it ceases to exist and cannot thereafter be accepted even though the acceptance is made within a time which would have been sufficiently early had there been no rejection.6

3In Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Met. 441, 454, Lord Ellenborough speaking of a contract by mail, said: "the acceptance matt be taken as simultaneous with the offer;" and a similar assumption was made in Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare, 1.byWigram, V.C.;and in Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463, where Bacon, Vive Chancellor, said that "it would be related back in point of date to the offer." The same fiction is repeated in Grossman p. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39.

4Lugdell Summary of Cont., Sec.7.

5The doctrine of a continuing offer was first clearly stated in Adams p. Lindsell, 1 B. A Ald. 681, [1818) a case of contract by mail, but the doctrine was not at once applied in other cases. See Head v. Diggon, 3 Man. & Ry. 97 (1828]. The modern law is of course perfectly clear. See Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5, 24 Pac. 695, 24 Am. St. Rep. 17; Gordon v. Darnell, 6 Colo. 302 304; Railroad Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 224, 227; South Branch Cheese Co. p. American Butter & Cheese Co., 191 Mich. 507,158 N. W. 158; Bradford v. Foster, 87 Term. 4, 8, 9 S. W. 195; and cases in the following sections passim.

This principle is most commonly illustrated where a counter offer or a conditional acceptance which amounts to a counter offer is made by the offeree. This operates as a rejection of the original offer.7

The reason is that the counter-offer is construed as being in effect a statement by the offeree not only that he will enter into the transaction on the terms stated in his counteroffer, but also by implication that be will not assent to the terms of the original offer. An answer purporting to accept upon condition is not an acceptance but is in effect a counteroffer, because it states in substance that the offeree will contract on the terms of the original offer if some addition or subtraction is made from them,8 but implies that otherwise he will not contract.9 It is not true, however, that any communication from the offeree other than an unequivocal acceptance is necessarily a rejection. Thus an inquiry by the offeree in regard to the possibility of other terms is not a counter-offer either in the form of a conditional acceptance or otherwise, and does not reject the offer.10 Nor does a statement by the offeree that he will " delay coming to determination." 11 Nor does a request for a qualification of the offer coupled with an unqualified acceptance not dependent on the granting of the request.12Nor does mere silence of the offeree.13

6 Sheffield Canal Co. v. Sheffield, etc., R. Co., 3 Ry. & Can. Cas. 121, 132; Pope d. Hoopes, 90 Fed. 461, 33 C. C. A. 695; Travis v. Nederland L. Ins. Co., 104 Fed. 486, 43 C. C. A. 663; Richardson v. Lenhard, 48 Kans. 629, 29 Pao. 1076. Where plaintiff refused to accept the reward for the recovery of a stolen automobile as too small, be could not recover the amount offered, though the machine was ultimately returned through information obtained from him. Hart v. Hop-wood, 151 N. Y. S. 871, 89 N. Y. Misc. 414. The principle is necessarily involved in the cases cited in the following note. See especially Minneapolis Ac. R. v. Rolling Mill Co., 119 U. S. 149, 30 L. Ed. 376; Henson v. Wilson, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1382, 66 S. W. 209; Lewis s. Johnson, 123 Minn. 409, 143 N. W. 1127; Sypherd v. Myers, 80 N. J. L. 321, 79 Atl. 340.

7Hyde v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 334; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43, 60, 26 L. Ed. 822; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U. S. 149, 30 L. Ed. 876; Beaumont v. Pristo, (U. S.) 39 Sup. Ct. 383, Ortman v. Weaver, 11 Fed. Rep. 358; Arthur v. Gordon, 37 Fed. Rep. 558; Goulding Co. p. Hammond, 64 Fed. 639, 4 C. C. A. 633; James v. Darby, 100 Fed. 224, 40 C. C. A. 441; Travis v. Nederland L. Ins. Co., 104 Fed. 486,43 C. C. A. 663; Sloan v. Wolf Co., 124 Fed. 196, 59 C. C. A. 612; National Trading Co. v.

Vulcanite Portland Cement Co., 169 Fed. 403, 86 C. C. A. 341; Doyle v. Hamilton Fish Co., 234 Fed. 47, 148 C. C. A. 63; Cage v. Black, 97 Ark. 613, 134 S. W. 942; Meux v. Hogue, 91 Cal 442, 27 Pao. 744; Niles v. Hancock, 140 Cal 157, 73 Pac. 840; McRae v. Ross, 170 Cal 74,148 Pac. 215; Anglo American Co. v. Prentiss, 167 111. 606; Fox v. Turner, 1 111. App. 163; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. McGuire Co., 108 111. App. 268; Baker v. Johnson Co., 37 Ia. 186, 189; Shaw v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 152 Ky. 329, 163 S W. 431; Wheaton Building & L. Co. v. Boston, 204 Msss. 218, 90 N. E. 698; Kehlor Flour Mills Co. v. Linden, 230 Mass. 119, 119 N. E. 608; Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 10 N. W. 37; Grenier v. Cota, 92 Mich. 23, 62 N. W. 77; Langellier v. Schaefer, 36 Minn. 361, 31 N. W. 690; Eileen v. Kennedy, 90 Minn. 414, 97 N. W. 12S; Bastian Bros. Co. v. Wemott Howard Co., 113 Minn. 196, 129 N. W. 369; Lewis v. Johnson, 123 Minn. 409, 143 N. W. 1127; Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 386, 43 Am. St. Rep. 596; Twentieth Century Macb, Co. v. Excelsior Springs Co. (Mo. App.), 171 S. W. 944; Harris v. Scott, 67 N. H. 437, 32 Atl. 770; Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Harrison, 93 Va. 569, 26 S. E. 888; Lynchburg Hosiery Mills v. Chesterfield Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 73, 77, 57 S. E. 906; Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736,744, 8 S. E. 743, 3 L. R, A. 94. See also infra, Si 78, 79.