It is commonly said that a memorandum may be made at any time subsequent to the making of a contract, and prior to the bringing of an action. It may, however, be made even before the contract is made, as the cases previously cited 3 to the effect that a written offer is sufficient memorandum indicate. That the memorandum need not be closely contemporaneous with the transaction to which it relates is shown by many of the cases cited in the previous section.4 It may be made after breach of the contract,5 or after the destruction of goods to which the memorandum relates.6 According to the weight of authority the memorandum cannot be made after action brought so as to enable that action to be sustained.7 The memorandum is often said to relate back to the time when the oral contract was made, but it is not necessary to resort to the fiction of a relation to explain the situation. It is the oral contract which is enforced, but it can be enforced only when the statute has been satisfied. The statute does not require the satisfaction to be simultaneous with the bargain, and it is unnecessary to make the fictitious assumption that it is in fact simultaneous in a case where it is not. Satisfaction of the statute does, however, result in an oral bargain theretofore unenforceable becoming binding as of the date of oral contract, and there seems to be no limit, except that imposed by the Statute of Limitations, upon the power of a party to an oral contract at any time to make a memorandum binding upon himself.8 Justice forbids, however, that after third parties have acquired property in good faith on the assumption that a certain person is the owner, that this person should thereafter invalidate their title by making a memorandum which for the first time makes effective a prior oral transfer. Doubtless the memorandum will bind the maker of it, but it will not affect the title of a third person to the property. This principle is generally expressed by saying, in analogy with the law of ratification of an unauthorized agency, that the memorandum has no retroactive effect as to third persons. However the principle be expressed, its effect is evident.9
99Kinney v. Horwitz (Conn.}, 105 Atl. 438; Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436; Hobart v. Lubaraky, 215 Men. 528, 102 N. E. 936; Roach v. Lane, 226 Man. 598, 116 N. E. 470; Pope Metals Co. v. Sadek, 140 Wis. 304, 135 N. W. 851.
1 Aguirre v. Allen, 10 Barb. 74.
2Farmer c. Robinson, 2 Campb. 339, note; Warwick v. Blade, 3 Campb. 127.
3 See supra, Sec. 579.
4See also Carrington v. Smith, 28 Gal. App. 460, 147 Pac. 225; Campbell v. Preeoe, 133 Ky. 572, 575, 118 S. W. 373; Gate City Bank v. Elliott, (Mo. 1919), 181 S. W. 25; Magee v. Blank-enahip, 95 N. C. 563; Window «. White, 163 N. C. 29, 79 S. E. 258; Puffer v. Bradley, (Oreg. 1919), 181 Pac. 1; Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 40 Am. Dee. 606; Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash.
131, 104 Pac. 153, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519,10 Ann. Cas. 1180.
5Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337, 22 Am. Rep. 671 (goods); Magee v. Blankenahip, 05 N. C. 563 (land). See also Spiegel v. Blankenahip, 162 N. Y, App. 443, 147 N. V. S. 655.
6 Phillips v. Ocmulgee Milk, 55 Ga. 633. See also decisions holding that acceptance and actual receipt of part of the goods, after the destruction of the remainder, is a satisfaction of the statute, supra, Sec. 561.
7 Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36; Lucas v. Dixon, 22 Q. B. D. 357; Gaines v. McAdam, 79 111. App. 201; Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337, 347, 22 Am. Rep. 571. A contrary decision under the section of the statute relating to land is Remington p. Linthi-cum, 14 Pet. 84, 10 L. Ed. 364. See also Cash v. Clark, 61 Mo. App. 636. See also supra, Sec. 527.