A buyer may accept the goods by an authorized agent. 45 The power of the agent to bind his principal depends upon the law of agency. The statute imposes only the limitations immediately to be mentioned. There is a dictum in a New York decision that payment to an agent whose authority is derived from the same oral agreement, the validity of which is in question, will not take the agreement out of the statute.46 The same reasoning would be applicable to an agent to receive the goods instead of the money,47 but this reasoning is open to the criticism applicable to New York decisions upon acceptance and receipt generally, that it attempts to make a rule (which the words of the statute do not justify), that something other than mere oral words is always necessary to take a case out of the statute.48 It may be observed also that unquestionably an agent as a broker or auctioneer may be authorized by parol hardt, 23 Dom. L. R. 805, 34 Ont. L. R. 72, with which compare Scott v. Melody, 27 Ont, App. 193.
43Section 4 (3). The English authorities have now defined acceptance, therefore, as an acceptance of the contract; but the statute says plainly that what is requisite is acceptance of the goods. But a receipt signed by the seller for bags sent by the buyer, into which potatoes, the subject-matter of the contract, were to be put, was held not a sufficient acceptance. Sumner v. Brown, 25 Times L. R. 745.
44 Dierson v. Petermneyer, 109 Iowa, 233, 80 N. W. 389; Corbett v. Wol-ford, 84 Md. 428, 36 Atl. 1088; Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 309; Mechanical Boiler Co. v. Kellner, 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 Atl. 599; Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211, 68 N. Y. 598. Compare Standard Wall Paper Co. v. Towns,
72 N. H. 324, 56 Atl. 744; Berkman v. Brower, 76 N. Y. Miac. 508. 135 N. Y. S. 582; Strong v. Dodds, 47 Vt 348.
45Simmonds v. Humble, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 258; Leavens v. Pinkham, 164 Cal. 242, 128 Pac. 399; Jones v. Mechanics' Bank, 29 Md. 287, 96 Am. Dec. 533; Snow v. Warner, 10 Met. 132, 43 Am. Dec. 417; Gaff v. Homeyer, 59 Mo. 345; Vanderbilt v. Central R. R Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 669, 12 Atl. 188; Outwater v. Dodge, 6 Wend. 397; Rogers v. Gould, 6 Run, 229; Wilcox Silver Plate Co. v. Green, 72 N. Y. 17; Alexander v. Oneida Co., 76 Wis. 56, 45 N. W. 21; Friedman v. Plows, 158 Wis. 435, 149 N. W. 218.
46 Hawley v. Keeler, A3 N. Y. 114, 120.
47See Alexander v. Oneida Co, 76 Wis. 56, 60, 45 N. W. 21.
48 This rule is discussed, infra, Sec. 554.
to sign a memorandum for the buyer as part of the transaction to which the memorandum relates.49 Whatever may be said of the New York decisions, it is at least settled, not only in New York but elsewhere, that the seller himself cannot be the agent of the buyer to accept. Aside from the statute it is entirely possible for the buyer to constitute the seller his agent to appropriate goods to the bargain, and such appropriation is sufficient to transfer title at common law, but it is not sufficient to constitute an acceptance within the statute.50 This principle is necessarily involved in the decisions which hold that delivery to a carrier or other bailee for the buyer is not a satisfaction of the statute, even though the seller has selected and shipped the goods in accordance with the offer or contract of the consignee,51 for the delivery to the carrier or bailee for the buyer is clearly a sufficient receipt; what is lacking is the acceptance.52 For this reason the delivery of goods at a particular place by the seller, in accordance with the contract, does not satisfy the statute unless there is some acceptance before or after the delivery.53 Acceptance by one joint buyer is insufficient 54 unless he is, as partner or otherwise, expressly or impliedly authorized by his co-buyers to act for them.