A may incur an obligation to C, which he agrees with C to discharge by paying the amount due thereon to B in payment of, or as credit upon, C's debt to B. This transaction between A and C is not a novation since C's debt to B is not released until payment in the absence of B's consent; and B's consent is not essential to the validity of A's promise. As between A and C, no question of the application of the statute of frauds can arise, since it is not the promise to answer for the debt of "another," that is, for the debt of a third person; since A is merely promising C to discharge A's liability in a specified manner.1 Thus, where B assigns a lease to A in consideration of which A promises to B to pay to B a claim held by him against C, such promise is not included in this clause of the statute.2 The complicating element which introduces the statute of frauds into the discussion of this subject is that in many jurisdictions B can treat such promise as one made for his benefit and can enforce it.3 Where B can enforce such contracts, the question is often raised whether A's promise is not to answer for the debt of another and hence within the statute of frauds. The view entertained by the great majority of the courts is that even between A and B, A's promise is to pay his own debt and not that of "another," and hence that this section of the statute of frauds does not apply. Furthermore, A's liability to C is not dependent on the continuance of C's liability to B.4 Thus, if A is indebted to C and promises to pay such debt by paying C's debt to B, such promise is not within the statute.5 So if A buys property of C and agrees to pay therefor by discharging C's debt to B, B, if he can maintain an action upon such contract at all can do so whether A's promise can be proved in writing or not,6 even if C is not released from liability by B.7 Thus where C conveys realty,8 or assigns a lease of realty,9 or transfers personalty10 to A, who in consideration of such transfer agrees to discharge C's debt to B, A's promise is not affected by this clause of the statute. So where there is a change in the membership of a firm and the incoming partner,11 or the partner who remains in the firm,12 agrees as payment for the interest acquired by him to pay the debts of the partnership, such contract is not within this clause of the statute. In some jurisdictions such contracts are within the statute of frauds unless the original debtor is released by agreement of all the parties.13

1 Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653; 62 Pac. 216; Tuttle v. Armstead, 53 Conn. 175; 22 Atl. 677; Reid v. Wilson, 109 Ga. 424; 34 S. E. 608; Boldenwick'v. Cahill, 187 111. 218; 58 N. E. 351; affirming, 86 111. App. 561; Darst v. Bates, 95 111. 493; Dumanoise v. Townsend. 80 Mich. 302; 45 N. W. 179; James v. Hicks, 58 Mo. App. 521; Smart v. Smart, 97 N. Y. 559; Thompson v. Chees-man, 15 Utah 43; 48 Pac. 477; Hooper v. Hooper, 32 W. Va. 526; 9 S. E. 937.

2 Reid v. Wilson, 109 Ga. 424; 34

S. E. 608; Dumanoise v. Townsend, 80 Mich. 302; 45 N. W. 179; Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399; 2 Am. Rep. 520.

3 Stephen v. Yeomans, 112 Mich. 624; 71 N. W. 159.

1 Pratt v. Fishwild, 121 la. 642; 96 N. W. 1089; Goodspeed v. Fuller, 46 Me. 141; 71 Am. Dec. 572; Goetz v. Foos, 14 Minn. 265; 100 Am. Dec. 218; Ware v. Allen, 64 Miss. 545; 60 Am. Rep. 67; 1 So. 738.

2 Duncan v. Grant, 87 Me. 429; 32 Atl. 1000.

3 See Ch. LX.

4 For this reason such promises fall within the principle of the second theory given above. See Sec. 613.

5 Nordby v. Winsor, 24 Wash. 535; 64 Pac. 726.

6 De Walt v. Hartzell, 7 Colo. 601; 4 Pac. 1201; Mulvany v. Gross, 1 Colo. App. 112; 27 Pac. 878; Tuttle v. Armstead, 53 Conn. 175; 22 Atl. 677; Boldenwick v. Cahill, 187 111. 218; 58 N. E. 351; affirming, 86 111. App. 561; Knisely v. Brown, 95 111. App. 516; Rothermel v. Coal Co., 79 111. App. 667; McCasland v. Doorley, 47 111. App. 513; Dickson v. Conde, 148 Ind. 279; 46 N. E. 998; Bate-man v. Butler, 124 Ind. 223; 24 N. E. 989; Deering v. Armstrong, 14 Ind. App. 44; 42 N. E. 372; Morrison v. Hogue, 49 la. 574; Neis-wanger v. McClellan, 45 Kan. 599; 26 Pac. 18; Mudd v. Carico, 104 Ky. 719; 47 S. W. 1080; Flint v. Land Co., 89 Me. 420; 36 Atl. 634; Ware v. Allen, 64 Miss. 545; 60 Am. Rep. 67; 1 So. 738; Lee v. Newman, 55 Mi--. 365; Sehufeldt v. Smith, 139 Mo. 367; 40 S. W. 887; Duerre v.

Ruediger, 65 Mo. App. 407; Barnett v. Pratt, 37 Neb. 349; 55 N. W. 1050; Mason v. Wilson, 84 N. C. 51; 37 Am. Rep. 612; Jarmusch v. Steel Co., 23 Ohio C. C. 122; Feldman v. McGuire, 34 Or. 309; 55 Pac. 872; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. St. 517; 19 Atl. 746; Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. St. 42; 15 Atl. 871; Wynn v. Wood, 97 Pa. St. 216; Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. St. 143; 18 Am. Rep. 438; Sargent v. Johns, 206 Pa. St. 386; 55 Atl. 1051; Morris v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 255; 17 S. W. 538; Gay v. Pemberton (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 400; Thompson v. Chees-man, 15 Utah 43; 48 Pac. 477; Keyes v. Allen, 65 Vt. 667; 27 Atl. 319; Don Yook v. Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459; 47 Pac. 964; Silsby v. Frost, 3 Wash. Terr. 388; 17 Pac. 887; Hooper v. Hooper, 32 W. Va. 526; 9 S. E. 937; Martin v. Davis, 80 Wis. 376; 50 N. W. 171.

7 Rothermel v. Coal Co., 79 111. App. 667; Gay v. Pemberton (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 400; Keyes v. Allen, 65 Vt. 667; 27 Atl. 319.

8 Smith v. Caldwell, 6 Ida. 436; 55 Pac. 1065; Mudd v. Carico, 104 Ky. 719; 47 S. W. 1080; Daniels v. Gibson (Ky.) , 47 .S. W. 621; Jennings v. Crider, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 322; 92 Am. Dec. 487; Coffin v. Bradbury. 89 Me. 476; 36 Atl. 988; Flint v. Land Co., 89 Me. 420; 36 Atl. 634; Reynolds v. Deitz, 39 Neb. 180; 58 X. W. 89; Moore v. Booker, 4 N. D. 543; 62 N. W. 607; Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436; Johnson v. Elmen, 94 Tex. 168; 86 Am. St. Rep. 845; 52 L. R. A. 162; 59 S. W. 253; Morris v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 255; 17 S. W. 538; Beitel v. Dobbin (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 299; Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43; 48 Pac. 477; Skinker v. Armstrong, 86 Va. 1011; 11 S. E. 977; Morgan v. Lake View Co., 97 Wis. 275; 72 X. W. S72. In a Massachusetts case, decided under Rhode Island law, B's suit against A was held to release C and to take the case out of the statute. Aldrich v. Carpenter. 160 Mass. 166; 35 X. E. 456.

9 Wolke v. Fleming. 103 Ind. 105; 53 Am. Rep. 495; 2 X. E. 325.

10Aultman v. Fletcher. 110 Ala. 452; 18 So. 215; Tevis v. Savage, 130 Cal. 411; 62 Pac. 611; Mul-vany v. Gross, 1 Colo. App. 112; 27 Pac. 878; American Lead Pencil Co. v. Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360; 11 So. 488; Rothermel v. Coal Co., 79 111.

App. 667; Scudder v. Carter, 43 111. App. 252; Dickson v. Conde, 148 Ind. 279; 46 X. E. 998; Deering & Co. v. Armstrong, 14 Ind. App. 44; 42 X. E. 372; Clinton National Bank v. Studemann, 79 la. 104; 37 X. W. 112; Watson v. Perrigo, 87 Me. 202; 32 Atl. 876; Armitage v. Saunders, 94 Mich. 482; 54 X. W. 174; Brit-tain v. Kelly. 86 Mich. 278; 49 X. W. 53; Schufeldt v. Smith, 139 Mo. 367; 40 S. W. 887; Deal v. Bank, 79 Mo. App. 262; Wills v. Bank. 23 Nev. 59; 42 Pac. 490; Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. St. 143; 18 Am. Rep. 438; Wood v. Moriarty. 15 R. I. 518; 9 Atl. 427; Dimmick v. Collins, 24 Wash. 78; 63 Pac. 1101; Gilmore v. Box Factory, 20 Wash. 703; 56 Pac. 934; Don Yook v. Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459; 47 Pac. 964; Lessel v. Zillmer, 105 Wis. 334; 81 X. W. 403; J. & H. Clasgens Co. v. Silber, 93 Wis. 579; 67 X. W. 1122: Green v. Hadfield. 89 Wis. 138; 61 X. W. 310. In Georgia A is not bound by an oral promise of this sort, Strauss v. Garrett. 101 Ga. 307; 28 S. E. 850, except where B's claim is a lien on the personalty transferred from C to A. Wooten v. Wilcox. 87 Ga. 474; 13 S. E. 595.

11Bartlett v. Smith (Neb.). 98 N. W. 687.

12 Dickson v. Conde, 148 Ind. 279; 46 X. E. 998.