If the contract is one of employment but not as servant in the strict sense of the term, we find a divergence of authority corresponding to that in Lumley v. Gye. The weight of modern authority is that one who induces another to break such a contract is liable to the party injured thereby.1 This principle has been applied to contracts to sing in a theater,2 to serve as laborer or cropper,3 to live with and care for a person in consideration of a certain weekly payment and a specified legacy,4 to act as selling agent on commission,5 or as general

3 (1898) A. C. 1; reversing Flood v. Jackson (1895), 2 Q. B. 21.

4 Quinn v. Leathern (1901), App. Cas. 495; affirming Leathern v. Craig, 2 Ir. Rep. (1899) 667.

1 Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; 22 Am. Rep. 475.

1 Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333.

2 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; 75 E. C. L. 216.

3 Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601; 16 Am. Rep. 780.

4 May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11; 51 N. E. 191. (Breach was induced by statements to the employer that the person performing the services was a dangerous person. The decision really was on a question of pleading, the majority of the court holding that the complaint was defective as not showing the statements substantially; while the minority held that the complaint was sufficient.)

5 Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443; 62 L. R. A. 962; 73 S. "W. 800; reversing (Tex. Civ. App.), 69 S. W. 436. (The defendant who superintendent of a manufacturing company,6 to work as me chanic in some manufacturing or mechanical business.7 In other cases, however, it has been held that if the contract is for employment, but not as servant, a third party who induces its breach is not liable in tort.8 This principle has been applied to a contract of employment as an actress.9